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VPREFACE
This dissertation is written in the belief that 
the prevailing tendency to assess punishments in terms 
of their utility is defective in certain important 
respects. I have no doubt that utilitarian 
considerations have a significant role to play in 
ethical discussion, and, indeed, in the discussion of 
punishment; but their role in recent discussions of 
punishment seems to have been accentuated to the point 
where other considerations have been minimized, ignored, 
or rejected out of hand.
Punishment of course is open to discussion from 
several points of view. This is evident from the 
considerable legal, anthropological, sociological, 
psychological and theological literature on the subject. 
For the purposes which I have in mind, I shall ignore 
many of the problems of punishment which arise in the 
context of these disciplines. For example, I shall not 
concern myself with investigating whether punishment 
actually does reform, deter, educate, etc.; nor with the 
ideas of punishment held by judges, lawyers, prison 
warders, parents, members of other societies, and 
’the plain man’.^ These are questions which for the
1
Relevant discussions can be found in W.B. Gallie,
’The Lords' Debate on Hanging, July, 1956 • 
Interpretation and Comment', Philosophy, Vol.XXXII, 
1957, pp.132-47; G. Gardiner, ’The Purposes of Criminal 
Punishment’, Modern Law Review, Vol.XXII, 1958,
(footnote continued on p.vi)
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most part lie beyond the competence of the philosopher 
qua philosopher. Nor shall I attempt to give an 
historical survey of ideas of punishment - an 
interesting enough task, but bearing few philosophical 
fruits.^ As wel.1, it will not be my purpose to discuss 
in detail the morality of various aims which 
utilitarians adduce to ’justify’ the infliction of 
punishment. This would take me too far away from my 
central concern which is to present for reconsideration 
some neglected elements in the discussion. This 
dissertation, then, does not pretend to represent 
a comprehensive treatment of the problems of 
punishment but is far more limited in its scope.
The problems of punishment have usually been 
problems of justification, and the first Chapter is
(footnote 1 continued from p.v)
pp.117-29» 221-35; D.A. Thomas, ’Theories of Punishment 
in the Court of Criminal Appeal', Modern Law Review,
Vol.XXVII, 1964, pp.546-67; A.M. Rose & A .E . Prell,
'Does Punishment Fit the Crime? A Study in Social 
Valuation’, American Journal of Sociology, Vol.LXI, 
1955-6, pp.247-59; F.c. Sharp & M.C. Otto, 'A Study 
of the Popular Attitude Towards Retributive Punishment’, 
International Journal of Ethics, Vol.XX, 1909-10, 
p p .341-57;idem. ' Retribution and Deterrence in the 
Moral Judgments of Commonsense', International Journal 
of Ethics, Vol.XX, 1909-10, pp.438-53- 
1
An historical survey can be found in D. Loftsgordon, 
Retributive Morality and Its Alternatives, Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, New York: Columbia University,
1959» part of which has been published as 'Present-day 
British Philosophers on Punishment’, Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol.LXIII, 1966, p p .341-53; also M. Privette, 
'Theories of Punishment’, University of Kansas City 
Law Review, Vol. XXIX, 1962"^  pp , 46-90 .
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primarily intended to give a brief clarification of 
the notion of justification. In the light of what I say 
in later Chapters, this discussion assumes some 
importance, since it is my contention that a number of 
widespread confusions have arisen through failure to 
appreciate the nature and objects of justificatory 
questions.
The second Chapter, which is concerned with the 
meaning of ’punishment’ and the distinguishing of various 
relevant justificatory questions, may seem, on the 
surface, to be covering familiar ground. And there is a 
certain amount of truth in this. However, even here my 
main emphasis has been to draw attention to features 
which have been neglected or confused in contemporary 
discussion. In the first section of the Chapter I 
question the common assumption that the tasks of defining 
and justifying are independent of each other, and in the 
following section my criticisms are directed against certain 
common assumptions about the nature of definitions. The 
conclusions of these two sections are then brought to bear 
on the final two sections, which form the subject of 
the Chapter.
As the title of this dissertation suggests, special 
consideration is given to an analysis of the concept 
of desert or merit, and to a re-assessment of its 
importance in meeting the various justificatory questions 
which can be raised concerning punishment. To date, 
very little detailed attention has been paid to the 
notion and role of desert - far less, so I contend, 
than it deserves. Chapter Three, then, is devoted to 
a general analysis of desert, while Chapters Four and 
Eight are directed to showing its relevance to punishment.
viii
Chapters Five, Six and Seven are primarily 
concerned with meeting problems raised in the first 
four Chapters. In the fifth Chapter I consider some 
of the difficulties raised by my argument of the 
previous Chapter to the effect that desert is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for morally 
justified punishment. An implication of my discussion 
in Chapters Two and Three is that to be deserving a 
person must be responsible for his actions, and in 
Chapter Six I consider, first, in what sense a person 
must be held responsible to deserve punishment, and 
second, whether people can in fact be held responsible 
in the requisite sense. In the course of Chapters 
Two and Four I argue that it is not a defining 
characteristic of punishment that it be administered 
by some authority, and also that the fact that a person 
deserves punishment is not normally regarded as a 
warrant for its infliction by just anybody. By whom, 
then, should punishment be inflicted? is the basic 
question confronted in Chapter Seven.
For the most part the problems of punishment 
cannot be isolated from more general problems in ethics, 
and any discussion of punishment is bound at some 
stage to impinge on these wider issues. This becomes 
clear in the last three Chapters of this dissertation, 
where I briefly discuss the problems of freedom and 
responsibility, the nature and justification of social 
institutions, and the nature of ethical judgment, 
respectively. Each of these problems could justly claim 
a dissertation to itself, I have therefore been 
compelled to dogmatize, oversimplify, and even ignore
ix
difficulties. This becomes critical in the last 
Chapter, where the waters run so rough and deep that 
I am conscious of being able to do little more than to 
point out how hard it is to swim. Nevertheless, I 
have endeavoured in each case to say enough to lend 
a reasonable plausibility to the views I have espoused.
Numerous people have in one way or another 
contributed to my thinking when writing this dissertation. 
My fellow Research Scholars at the Australian National 
University have frequently forced me to re-examine my 
arguments. Mr Dennis Rose and Mr Bernard Brown have 
patiently helped me in my legal naiVete. Professor 
J.A. Passmore has read through the final draft of the 
dissertation, and his comments have prevented me from 
becoming overconfident of my conclusions. Above 
all, I have been stimulated, demolished and rescued more 
times than I care to remember by my friend and 
supervisor, Mr Stanley Benn. He has given unstintingly 
of his time to reading my drafts and discussing my 
arguments. It is no fault of his that the final product 
is not better.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF JUSTIFICATION
As far back as Plato we find raised and considered 
most of the ethical problems relating to punishment.
Time has diminished neither their relevance nor their 
problematic nature. Yet the problems have not always 
been exactly the same - more like variations on a theme, 
the variations provided by somewhat differing 
conceptions of punishment, and the theme being the 
just if icat ion of punishment. Punishment is sarid to 
stand in need of justification. Whether this is an 
unambiguous or even a proper way of speaking I shall 
consider later. For the time being I shall be concerned 
with the notion of justification, as justifications for 
punishment have often been sought without there being 
any clear idea as to the conditions under which 
justificatory questions arise and in what justifications 
consist. As will soon become obvious, these are 
considerable problems in themselves, claiming more 
attention than can be given them in the scope of this 
dissertation. Nevertheless, it is essential that we 
at least enter into the problems.
1. The Concept of Justification.
Justifying is one of a complex of activities such 
as proving, establishing, explaining and excusing, 
which are conceptually tied to the giving of reasons. 
Though they are related in this way, these activities
2nevertheless represent answers to different sorts of 
questions, and hence to some extent different sorts of 
reasons are relevant to each of them. Here it is my 
task to examine the context in which justificatory 
questions or demands arise and to discuss the ways in 
which they can be met.
Requests or demands for justification are 
appropriate only with respect to things which people 
have done, are doing, or intend to do; that is, they 
can be demanded only of intentional activity.’*' True, 
a student can be asked to justify his opinions, a 
headmaster a rule, a philosopher an inference or 
argument, a doctor a diagnosis or a certain form of 
treatment, a judge a decision, or a conscientious 
objector his beliefs, but such requests are appropriate 
only because the things concerned are held, promulgated, 
put forward, stated, made, prescribed, or maintained by 
intentional agents or agencies (such as school councils, 
governments, or societies). Thus justification can 
not be the same as showing that something is true, 
effective, important, valid or coherent, as the case 
may be, even though in offering a justification an 
appeal might be made to truth, effectiveness, importance, 
etc .
But more can be said about justificatory requests. 
They are restricted to intentional activity for the 
simple reason that, unlike requests for causal 
antecedents or explanations, their purpose is to
T
Not necessarily intended activity.
3eliminate an apparent discrepancy between an agent’s 
(or agency's) intentional activity and some given norm, 
standard, rule or end.'*' This apparent discrepancy can 
arise in a variety of ways. Sometimes it will be 
between an agent’s verbal or non-verbal behaviour 
and his principles, ideals or ends (or what are taken 
to be his principles, ideals or ends). On other occasions 
it may arise between his behaviour and some generally 
accepted principle, ideal or end, or some principle, 
ideal or end adhered to or pursued by the person 
requesting the justification.
An important corollary of this is that grounds 
must be given for seeking a justification. Justificatory 
requests do not arise in a vacuum. Unless we can first 
get some idea what is bothering the questioner, a start
1
This is not always clearly seen. A.C. MacIntyre 
distinguishes two sensesof 'justification', one 'in the 
field of conduct' which corresponds roughly to the sense 
I have outlined, and the other occurring in a 
discipline like geometry in which 'the justification 
of a theorem consists in showing how it follows validly 
from the axioms' (a Short History of Ethics, New York: 
Macmillan, 1966, p .49)• This latter sense, in which 
'justification' is simply equivalent to 'proof, 
though intelligible, is very loose and is not in fact 
employed by mathematicians. The same confusion is 
made by R.¥. Newell, in The Concept of Philosophy, 
London: Methuen, 1967» Chapter Four: 'The Problem
of Justification'. Paul Edwards also maintains that 
like other 'evidence-words' 'justification' is 'highly 
ambiguous' . However, it becomes apparent that Edwards 
is confusing the meaning of 'justification' with the 
criteria for its application in different contexts 
(The Logic of Moral Discourse, Glencoe, Illinois: The
Free Press, 1955» PP‘36-8, 130-1).
kcannot be made on answering his justificatory request. 
This of course is not to say that justificatory requests 
themselves have to be justified before they can be 
admitted, but rather that they cannot be understood 
as such unless some ground of objection or alternative 
is specified.^ The history of philosophy is cluttered 
with the disputes of those who thought that they could 
keep on asking for justifications without giving any 
grounds for asking. As Austin pointedly reminds us:
The wile of the metaphysician consists 
in asking ’Is it a real table?’ (a 
kind of object which has no obvious way 
of being phoney) and not specifying or 
limiting what may be wrong with it, 
so that I feel at a loss 'how to 
prove’ it is a real one.^
1
Thus Flew argues that 'a justification has to be 
of A rather than B, against C, and to or by reference 
to D; where A is the thing justified, B the possible 
alternative(s), C the charge(s) against A, and D 
the person(s) and or principle(s) to whom and/or 
by reference to which the justification is made’
(’"The Justification of Punishment"’, Philosophy,
Vol. XXIX, 195^ +* p. 295) ; cf. J Feinberg, ’On 
Justifying Legal Punishment’, Nomos III;
Responsibility, ed. C.J. Friedrich, New York:
Liberal Arts Press, i960, p.158; E.L. Pincoffs,
The Rationale of Legal Punishment, New York:
Humanities Press, 1966, pp.6 , 64-7 •
2
J.L. Austin, 'Other Minds’, in Philosophical Papers, 
ed. J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, I96I, p .55.
5I shall argue later that much of the debate concerning 
punishment has been vitiated by the fact that what has 
stood in need of justification, and why it has stood 
in need of justification, have stood in need of greater 
sp ecification.
Not only have many past discussions of punishment 
suffered from a lack of clarity, but they have often 
betrayed a fundamental confusion of explanatory with 
justificatory reasons. Vico apparently thought that 
the essential nature of an institution was shown by 
its genesis/' and so a number of writers have argued 
that retributive justifications of punishment are 
unsatisfactory because retribution has it origin in 
the primitive tribal practice of blood-vengeance/
Now whether or not retributive notions have arisen in 
this way, as they stand such accounts of their origins 
are quite independent of the question of the
3justifiability of retributive views of punishment.
1
As reported in J. Lisle, 'The Justification of 
Punishment’, International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XXV,
1914-15, P.351.
2
See, for example, H. Weihofen, ’Retribution is 
Obsolete’, in Nomos III: Responsibility, ed. C.J.
Friedrich, New York: Liberal Arts Press, i960, pp.116-27; 
F. Vivian, Human Freedom and Responsibility, London:
Chatto and Windus,1964,p.l40. Inthisconnection 
we can note the frequent ascription to retributive 
punishment of the epithets: ’unenlightened’, ’primitive’,
'inhumane’, ’vindictive’, ’outdated’, ’barbaric', etc.
3 See M. Connolly, 'Punishment for Crime’, Studies,
1957, p*468; Pincoffs, op.cit., p.46.
6Similar considerations apply to psychological and 
psycho-analytic accounts of why people hold particular 
views of punishment. To be told that retributive views 
of punishment are the expression of a sublimated desire 
for revenge does not impugn those views if independent 
grounds for holding them can be advanced - and, of 
course, this is what retributivists claim.^
Assuming that we are now clear as to the 
character of justificatory demands, we must consider 
two further distinguishable questions, namely, How 
are justificatory demands met? and, What is it for 
something to be justified? The two questions are 
distinguishable since it is possible for certain 
justificatory demands with respect to an action or 
general activity to be adequately met without that
1
W. Ullmann writes of retributive punishment: 
’Although this theory appears at first sight tenable, 
it is by no means satisfactory. A closer 
analysis of the complex psychical mechanisms, upon 
which this theory is built, proves that retributive 
punishment is, in reality, a sublimation of the 
primitive lust for revenge, or to be precise, the 
individual, against whom or whose interests the 
crime was committed, conceives — for the most 
part unconsciously - that the crime is a personal 
injury against himself and endeavours to obtain 
some satisfaction for what he feels he has 
suffered; in the suffering of the delinquent 
he seeks to find some compensation for his own’
(’The Justification of Punishment’, Juridical 
Review, Vol. LIII, 1941, p.318); cf. H. Weihofen,
The Urge to Punish, New York: Farrar, Straus,
and Cudahy, 1956.
7action or activity therefore being justified (or 
justifiable). Suppose I see a mother beating her child. 
Suspecting that she might be doing this simply as a 
sop to her frustrations I ask her to justify her 
behaviour. She replies that she is punishing him 
for hitting his smaller brother over the head with 
a cricket bat. This is a reasonable answer to the 
justificatory question I raised, but it doesn’t 
necessarily justify her beating of the child. Someone 
else might very well complain that a beating was not 
the most appropriate way of punishing him, or, that 
considering the offence, she was punishing the child 
far too severely, or, that he was too young to know 
that what he was doing was wrong. The distinguishability 
of the two questions arises, then, from the fact that 
justificatory requests generally relate to particular 
aspects of a situation X> whereas to say ’X is 
justified’ is to say something about the situation 
as a whole, and presupposes that all outstanding 
justificatory requests have been met.
But we are not in the clear yet. There is an 
objection to saying of a general activity or of a 
person’s action simply that ’it is justified’. Such 
a statement is incomplete, for as it stands, it implies 
that there is such a thing as a neutral or all-embracing 
justification. But the fact of the matter is that a 
justificatory request is expressed in the terms of a 
particular sphere of discourse,^ and to be answered
T
The notion of a ’sphere of discourse’ is discussed 
below, pp . 14-15 .
8satisfactorily, it must be answered in terms of that 
sphere of discourse. The same goes for justifications.
¥hen somebody makes a statement like ’His punishment 
was justified', we are justified in asking 'How do you 
mean - legally, morally, psychologically, etc.?’
Usually we can tell from the context. Nevertheless, 
it is important that we distinguish between these spheres 
of discourse, since it is quite possible for an action 
or general activity which is justified in the terms of 
one sphere to be unjustified in the terms of another.
The mother might be quite within her legal rights in 
punishing the child, yet for various reasons such 
punishment may be morally unjustified. There has been 
much confusion of moral and legal issues in the controversy 
surrounding punishment. Mabbott, for example, considers 
that questions about the justice of a particular 
punishment can be settled by reference to its legality.^
1
'X is a citizen of a state. About his citizenship, 
whether willing or unwilling, I have asked no questions. 
About the government, whether it is good or bad, I 
do not enquire. X has broken a law. Concerning the 
law, whether it is well-devised or not, I have not 
asked....It is the essence of my position that none 
of these questions is relevant' to 'whether a 
particular punishment is just’ (j.D. Mabbott, 
'Punishment', Mind, Vol. XLVIII, 1939, p.l6o).
In a later article Mabbott insists that he considers 
questions about the justice of a punishment separately 
from questions about its justifiability ('Professor 
Flew on Punishment', Philosophy, Vol. XXX, 1955, p.26l).
This, however, must be a view he had gradually come to, 
as he identifies 'just' with 'justified' on a number 
of occasions in the earlier article (e.g. pp.152, 158).
Furthermore, it is to be doubted whether 'justice’ and 
'justifiability’ can be distinguished in the way Mabbott 
thinks. I discuss this in detail in Chapter Five, 
Section 1.
9Even if he is intending to use ’justice' in a very 
restricted sense, he nevertheless (wrongly) believes 
that his analysis yields substantive moral 
conclusions.
Returning now to the two questions we set 
ourselves, firstly, How are justificatory demands met? 
The person who tries to justify his actions or some 
general activity against some objection has a number 
of moves open to him:
(a) He may attempt to show that there is only an 
apparent discrepancy between his actions or the 
activity and the standard or end which his objector 
invokes. Three ways of doing this can be suggested:
(i) He might argue that the standard to which
the objector appeals incompletely specifies his action 
or the activity and that a complete specification would 
change its moral character. Suppose A accuses B of 
murdering C on the grounds that he killed Ch that B was 
not acting in any official capacity, and that he 
killed C deliberately. B, to justify himself, may 
acknowledge each of these grounds but add that C had 
attacked his wife and was preparing to kill her and 
that there was no other way of stopping him 
(justifiable homicide).
(ii) Or he may argue that the standard to which 
the objector appeals overspecifies his action or the 
activity, and that a correct specification would change 
its moral character. Suppose A questions B’s integrity 
after seeing him take C r s umbrella from the rack.
B may justify himself by pointing out that stealing
10
involved taking someone else's belongings without 
permission, whereas C had lent it to him.^
(iii) Alternatively, he may argue that his action 
or the activity in question constituted one of the 
recognized exceptions to the standard invoked by the 
objector. If B is accused of evading the draft he 
might justify his behaviour by appealing to the clause 
which permits the exemption from service of those who, 
on religious grounds, are pacifists.
(b) Another and often more radical way in which a 
person may justify his actions or some general activity 
is by challenging the standard which is invoked against 
him. Suppose a Muslim or Jew accuses a pork-eating 
Protestant of defiling himself with unclean food, the 
latter, in justifying his behaviour, may agree that 
given their presuppositions he is defiling himself, 
but then proceed to criticize their presuppositions.
We can see then that there are a number of 
avenues available to those to whom justificatory requests 
are directed, and in the course of this dissertation 
we shall have occasion to avail ourselves of most of 
them.
We are now faced with the second and more 
difficult question: What is it for something to be
justified (in the terms of a particular sphere of
1
D ’Arcy correctly points out that this way of going 
about matters is not always sufficlent for justification. 
It may well serve only to decrease the gravity of a 
person’s actions - say, from murder to manslaughter 
(E. D ’Arcy, Human Acts, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963*
pp.83-4). Nor is it necessary, as (iii) shows.
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discourse)? At what point can we say of a person’s 
actions or of some general activity that it is justified?
I have already indicated that it does not automatically 
follow from the satisfaction of any particular 
justificatory question that that in respect of which it 
is asked is therefore justified. There may be other 
outstanding justificatory questions. This should warn 
us against the fallacy of confusing ’justifying an action’ 
with ’getting an action accepted'.^  There is no necessary 
connection between these two notions. Justifying an 
action or a general activity is not necessarily or 
simply a matter of satisfying a person or group of 
people concerning it. The mother who is beating her 
child may satisfy an enquirer by recounting the child's 
deed. But there may be other objections to her action 
of which she and the enquirer are ignorant - such as the 
cruelty of her method of punishment, or the inability 
of the child to distinguish between right and wrong. 
Alternatively, the mother may fail to satisfy any 
of her enquirers even though she may have succeeded in 
justifying her action. They may be so entrenched in 
certain misguided opinions that her reasons fail to 
count with them.
Taking these things into consideration,I want to 
suggest that an action or general activity is properly 
said to be justified (or justifiable) if no unanswerable 
justificatory requests can be made concerning it (in terms
Cf. P. Edwards, op. cit., pp.25-8.
1
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of the same sphere of discourse) . In this respect 
’ ... is justified’ functions like ’ ... is true’ and
’ ... is known'. It is always logically possible that
the future will show us to be wrong, but until we can 
be given some reason for supposing that the future will 
show us to be wrong, it is improper to deny the 
legitimacy of the locution.
The distinction between 'justifying an action or
general activity’ and ’satisfying a particular
justificatory request' does not seem to be clearly
2enough drawn in the contemporary debate. . Take Rawls
1
Stating matters in this way preserves the conceptual 
link between justification and the elimination of 
apparent discrepancies. It is thus more satisfactory 
than the analysis of J.B. Moore, who distinguishes 
’complete theoretical justification’ which is achieved 
when something 'has been deduced from the most basic 
virtues or a moral theory’ from ’an equally acceptable 
sense ... according to which an action may be justified 
by appeals to lower order principles, ... without these 
principles themselves being called into question' 
(Retributive Justifications of Punishment, Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1965» p.2l).
This analysis fails to distinguish between ’proving’, 
’establishing', 'giving the rationale of and 
’justifying’. The same can be said of A.P. Griffith’s 
otherwise excellent article, ’Ultimate Moral Principles: 
Their Justification’, in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. P. Edwards, New York: Macmillan and The Free Press,
1967, Vol. 8. pp.177-82.
2
See, for example, S.I. Benn, ’An Approach to the 
Problems of Punishment', Philosophy, Vol. XXXIII,
1958, pp.325-^1; also the authors cited in J. Rawls,
’Two Concepts of Rules', Philosophical. Review, Vol.
LXXV, 1955» p •3 f/n. 2. Some of these philosophers 
show a vague awareness of the problem by referring 
sometimes to ’ultimate justification'.
13
for instance. He distinguishes between ’practices’ and 
particular actions instantiating these 'practices’, and 
then sets out to distinguish between 'the justification 
of a rule or practice and the justification of a 
particular action falling under it'. This does not 
seem to be a felicitous way of putting it. Rather, we 
cannot justify any particular action without meeting 
any outstanding justificatory questions concerning 
the 'practice' under which it falls. Even if we 
cannot justify a particular instance of punishment 
without reference to the rules which define the 'practice', 
this does not mean that the rules are sufficient to 
justify that punishment. It is only on the assumption 
that the 'practice' is justified that it is proper 
to speak of justifying a particular instance of 
punishment by reference to the rules defining the 
’practice'.
To conclude this section on justification, I want 
to direct my attention more closely to the notion of 
'moral justification'. This raises several important 
issues detailed discussion of which will have to lie 
for the most part outside the scope of this dissertation: 
What exactly is meant in speaking of ' the moral sphere 
of discourse1? Is there anything which can be 
intelligibly characterized in this way? If so, how 
is it to be distinguished from legal and other 
spheres of discourse? Although this is too large a 
question to be taken up now, there are a number of
14
relevant observations which might help us see our way 
round more clearly. ^
The language which we use to describe the world 
around us, including the actions of others, is not a 
disinterested or passive reflection of that world, but 
it and the distinctions it contains have evolved as a 
means of articulating and satisfying our needs, interests, 
desires and aspirations. As a natural part of this 
process of language-formation, a good many notions have 
been framed which cluster around particular sets of 
needs or interests. They constitute, as it were, 
different spheres of discourse - legal, moral, 
scientific, etc. The notion of lying, for example, 
comes from the moral sphere of discourse, bail from 
the legal sphere of discourse, and elec iron from the 
scientific sphere of discourse. Even though these 
spheres of discourse are distinguishable, they are not 
completely exclusive, and not only can many of our 
words function synonymously in several spheres of 
discourse (copulae, relational terms, and such words
1
For an extended and valuable discussion of some of 
the points raised in the next few paragraphs, see 
J. Kovesi, Moral Notions, London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1967» especially Chapter Four. Where 
I would speak of 'spheres of discourse’, Kovesi 
would talk of 'points of view', and Wittgenstein 
of 'language-games' (Philosophical Investigations, 
trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1953»
§§ 7ff). However I would not want to claim that 
my account was identical with either Kovesi’s or 
Wittgenstein's view. See further, J. Moline, 'On 
Points of View’, American Philosophical Quarterly,
voi. 5, 1968, pp.191-8.
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as ’die’, ’fifteen', ’good’, etc.) but it is often 
possible for a notion framed from within one sphere 
of discourse to figure as legitimate currency in another 
sphere of discourse. Legal and moral spheres of 
discourse, for example, even though they have their 
own identity, also overlap in a complex sort of way. 
(Perjury, for example, can be properly understood 
only by reference to moral and legal spheres of 
discourse). Sometimes this creates problems, as when 
a notion framed by reference to one sphere of discourse 
is taken over into another sphere of discourse and is 
re-defined (like responsibility, when it is taken over from 
the moral to the legal sphere of discourse“*“).
Our language contains a number of notions which 
must be explicated in terms of the moral sphere of 
discourse. Words like ’honesty’, ’stealing',
'obscenity', 'murder’, ’treachery’, ’sincerity’,
’lying’, etc.,already mark out for us, within the moral 
sphere of discourse, various types of behaviour. These 
notions tend to figure very significantly (either 
overtly or covertly) in justificatory disputes in the 
sphere of morals. More often than not, when a 
justificatory dispute arises, what is up for 
consideration is the proper description of an action 
or an activity. In moral disputes, each party tries, 
if possible, to show that the action or activity up 
for consideration is or is not properly described in 
terms of one of these moral notions. That is, he
T
For a discussion of this, see Chapter Six,
Section 4.
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tries to assimilate the description of the action or 
activity to one or another of these moral notions. Of 
course we do not (as yet) have moral notions to describe 
every type of behaviour in which people might engage, 
and this complicates the problem of justification 
somewhat; but not irremediably. Be that as it may, 
these moral notions nevertheless constitute a basic 
ingredient in any moral argument, for unless appeal was 
made to them, the argument could not be understood as 
taking place within the moral sphere of discoursed
We saw how this worked in our earlier examples.
To take one of them: If B kills C., he may be asked to
justify his action since it constitutes a prima facie 
case of murder. It can, for example, be pointed out 
that B was not acting in any official capacity 
(executioner, soldier), and that he had deliberately 
killed C. To justify himself C will endeavour to show 
that there are relevant features of his action which 
make it unassimilable to murder, namely, that C was 
attacking his wife with intent to kill, and there was 
no other way of stopping him.
1
Sartre’s well-known example of a person having to 
choose between serving in the resistance and 
fulfilling his obligations to his family is 
problematic largely because it is not easily 
assimilable to any of our existing moral notions. 
Not that these notions are therefore irrelevant.
On the contrary. The moral problem arises and 
has the character it has precisely because we have 
these moral notions.
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This account of justification in general and 
moral justification in particular has been necessarily 
sketchy and somewhat dogmatic. A more adequate 
discussion would need to take account of the 
contributions of Toulmin, Hare, and A. Phillips 
Griffiths, in particular, but that would take me too 
far beyond the task which I have set myself in this 
dissertation.^ Enough has been said to indicate what 
I regard to be some of the important considerations 
integral to an adequate philosophical discussion of 
punishment. Those on which I would place special 
emphasis are: (i) the importance of clearly specifying
that in relation to which an action or general activity 
needs justification; (ii) a recognition that
1
Toulmin’s major contribution is found in his book 
An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics, 
Cambridge University Press, 1950* A qualified 
defence of Toulmin’s viewpoint can be found in 
K. Nielsen, Justification and Morals, Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1955* Relevant 
sections of this dissertation have been rewritten 
for publication and appear under the title, 
’Justification and Moral Reasoning’, Methodos, Vol. IX, 
1957» pp.77-111* Hare’s views are developed in 
’Universalizability’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Vol. LV, 195^-5» PP*295-312; The Language 
of Morals, Oxford: Clarendon Press,” 1952; and
Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963*
Nielsen discusses the differences between Toulmin 
and Hare in ’Good Reasons in Ethics: An Examination
of the Toulmin-Hare Controversy’, Theoria, Vol. XXIV, 
1958» pp.9-28. A.P. Griffiths’ views are found in 
the article cited above (p.12 f/n .l) and in ’Justifying 
Moral Principles’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Vol. LVIII, 1957-8, pp.103-24.
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justificatory requests are expressed in terms of a 
particular sphere of discourse, and that this limits 
the sorts of considerations relevant to answering them; 
and (iii) a recognition of the fact that our language 
encapsulates notions framed with respect to particular 
spheres of discourse and in which description and 
evaluation are inextricably bound up.
I shall argue that on these three points in 
particular many discussions of punishment have come 
to grief. It is true that in the last few decades a 
much greater sensitivity has been shown to the subtleties 
of the justificatory questions which are relevant to 
punishment, but as shall become clear in Chapter Two,
I do not think all or even most of the confusions 
have yet been removed. There, I point out the effect 
which the definition of ’punishment’ has had on 
discussions relating to its justification, and then 
endeavour to define punishment in such a way that full 
justice is done to its role in the language. Following 
this I distinguish some of the philosophically 
interesting justificatory questions which arise. To 
prepare for an examination of some of the more 
fundamental justificatory questions in Chapters Four, 
Five and Eight, Chapter Three is taken up with a 
discussion of the notion of desert. Chapter Six, in 
which I discuss the concept of responsibility, is 
primarily a defence against objections which can be 
raised against the account of punishment I have 
presented in the preceding Chapters, and Chapter Seven, 
on the authority to punish, merits separate 
consideration in virtue of a distinction drawn in
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Chapter Two between punishment as a non-institutionalized 
activity and punishment as a social practice or 
institution.
2 .___ Retributive* and ’Utilitarian* .
There is a sense in which it would be lair to say 
that the history of discussions of punishment has been 
a history of the conflict and/or synthesis of 
’retributivism* and ’utilitarianism*. This is not 
really surprising, for the history of ethics has 
largely been one of conflict between deontological 
and teleological moralities. Nevertheless, in another 
sense such a generalization about discussions of 
punishment is somewhat misleading, since it conveys 
the impression of a conflict between two clearly 
identifiable positions. This is neither historically 
nor conceptually correct. The words ’retributive* and 
’utilitarian’ (or its alternatives: ’deterrent’,
’preventive’, ’reformative’, ’educative’, ’consequential’, 
etc.) have on some occasions been so broadly conceived 
that at other times they would have been practically 
indistinguishable from their contraries; moreover, it 
has often been difficult to state precisely what each 
of the terms has been intended to convey. ’Retributive’ 
has been applied not only to justifications but also 
to definitions of punishment. Retributive 
justifications of punishment have been formulated in 
a variety of ways, the lex talionis (variously 
interpreted), ’annulment’ (an almost unintelligible 
notion when applied to punishment), ’atonement’,
’payment’ (a formula of only limited application),
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'expiation*, 'vindication of the law’, 'retaliation', 
'denunciation', 'the right to punishment' (a very odd 
sort of right), 'satisfaction of resentment', and 
'desert' (more frequently asserted than analysed), 
being among the more familiar. J.B. Moore generates 
no less than forty-eight distinct 'retributive' answers 
to the question 'Vho is to be punished?' using just one 
of the formulations listed above. The possibilities are 
almost endless.^ D. Seligman argues that it is possible 
for a utilitarian to be a retributivist,1 2 3 and Bosanquet 
and McCloskey, who claim to be retributivists, adopt
positions with which many so-called utilitarians would
3be happy to identify themselves.
It is clear that something is amiss here, and 
that not much is achieved by arguing for or appealing to 
the retributive or the utilitarian ’theory’ of 
punishment. One reason for this is that people have 
engaged on the obscure and fruitless quest for the 
justification of punishment. I do not want to suggest 
that the distinction between 'retributive' and
1
J.B. Moore, op.cit., pp.4l-3*
2
D. Seligman, Justice and the Role of Retribution in 
Punishment, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York: 
Columbia University, 1966, pp.45-7*
3
B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State, 
Fourth edn., London: Macmillan, 1923» Chapter VIII, 
Section 7; cf. Rashdall’s comments on Bosanquet's 
standpoint in The Theory of Good and Evil, Second edn., 
Oxford University Press, 1924, Vol.I , pp.300-1 f/n. 1;
H.J. McCloskey, 'Utilitarian and Retributive Punishment’, 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXIV, 1967» pp. 9 I-HO.
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’utilitarian’ is meaningless, only that if such a 
distinction is to be drawn, it must be drawn with care: 
not only because of the ambiguity of the notions but 
also because too much concentration on relating the 
discussion to such a schema may blind us to other 
important considerations. My own opinion is that 
the problems can be discussed without using either 
of the terms. However, since so much of the current 
debate is expressed in these terms, I shall have 
occasion to use them in the course of this dissertation. 
When I do so, I shall use them in the following senses:
In relation to punishment, (a) a retributive justification 
is one whose grounds relate to the nature and 
circumstances of some act performed or activity engaged 
in, in the past; (b) a utilitarian justification is 
one whose grounds relate to the future consequences of 
that which they are intended to justify.
I am not completely happy with this distinction, but as 
nothing in my own account hangs on it, I shall not make 
any further refinements to it.
One final word is in order regarding the use of 
the word ’theory’. For some reason there has grown 
up a tradition in which the various justificatory 
questions concerning punishment are answered in terms 
of this or that ’theory of punishment’. This strikes 
me as a very odd use of ’theory’. A theory of 
punishment, I would have thought, would refer to 
an hypothe sis about why people are punished, but not
to any sort of justification for punishing them.
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In the circumstances it would make sense only to 
talk about a theory of the justification for punishing 
people.^
1
Further discussion on this point can be found in 
A.G.N. Flew, op. cit., pp.297-8; R.A. Samek, 
’Punishment: A Postscript to Two Prolegomena’,
Philosophy, Vol. XLI, 1966, p.222; J.B. Moore, 
op.cit., pp.127-8; H.L.A. Hart, ’Murder and the 
Principles of Punishment: England and the United
States', Northwestern University Law Review,
Vol. LII, 1957, pp.43^-5.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE MEANING OF 'PUNISHMENT' AND THE SEPARATION
OF QUESTIONS
One of my concerns in the last Chapter was to 
emphasize the importance of carefully distinguishing 
and formulating justificatory questions. There I 
indicated that discussions of punishment had continually 
been frustrated by a confusion of the various 
justificatory questions that could be raised concerning 
it. As well, I pointed out that what would count as 
a justification was very closely related both to the 
sphere of discourse in which the justificatory question 
was framed, and also to the specific grounds which 
provided the question’s rationale. Thus, in the case 
of a mother called upon to justify her punishment of 
her child, she must determine whether the demand is 
concerned with, say, the morality or the legality of 
her act, and then the specific grounds on which the 
demand is based (its harshness, the degree to which the 
child can be held responsible, etc.).
There is another factor which is importantly 
relevant to the question of justification. This is 
the nature of the action or general activity to be 
justified. I noted earlier that the history of the 
debate about punishment took the form of variations on 
a theme, these variations being provided by somewhat 
differing definitions of ’punishment’. To a 
considerable extent, definitions have dictated the
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nature of the justificatory questions which have been 
raised and the sorts of justifications which have been 
given of punishment.
In this Chapter I propose first to show how the 
definition of punishment and ’the justification of 
punishment’ are interrelated.^ What will count as a 
justification depends to a considerable extent on what 
description or definition is given of the act or 
activity to be justified. I then go on to show that 
the diversity in definitions of ’punishment’ is due, 
not so much to any vagueness in the term, but rather to 
different philosophic conceptions of what definitions 
ought to do. Here I argue that many discussions of 
punishment are erected on inadequate foundations.
With this background discussion I set about the 
task of defining ’punishment'. There has come to be 
accepted in the current debate a definition of ’a 
standard case punishment’ which is expressed in 
terms of five ’elements’ or 'conditions':
(i) It must involve an 'evil, an
unpleasantness, to the victim’;
(ii) It must be for an offence (actual 
or supposed);
(iii) It must be of an offender (actual 
or supposed);
(iv) It must be the work of personal
agencies (i.e. not merely the natural 
consequences of an action);
T
This appears to have been explicitly recognized at 
last in a recent article by T. McPherson, ’Punishment: 
Definition and Justification', Analysis, Vol. 28,
1967-8, pp. 21-7.
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(v) It must be imposed by authority (real 
or supposed), conferred by the system 
of rules (hereafter referred to as ’law’) 
against which the offence has been 
committed.1
Although I do not propose to discuss this definition 
point by point, it will become clear that in many 
respects my own views are at variance with it. In the 
concluding section of the Chapter I will spell out what 
I consider to be valid justificatory questions with respect 
to punishment.
1. Definitions and ’The Justification of Punishment1.
The following three examples serve to show some of 
the ways in which the definition of ’punishment' has 
influenced justifications of punishment.
(a) Anthony Quinton argues that punishment is ’infliction 
of suffering on the guilty and not simply infliction of
1
The formulation I have quoted is Benn's (in 'An Approach 
to the Problems of Punishment', Philosophy, Vol. XXXIII, 1958, pp. 325-6), which is taken from A.G.N. Flew, '"The 
Justification of Punishment"', Philosophy, Vol. XXIX,
195 >^ pp.293-^ * It is also taken over, with certainrestrictions, by H.L.A. Hart, in 'Prolegomenon to The 
Principles of Punishment', reprinted in Philosophy,
Politics and Society, Second Series, ed. P. Laslett and 
W.G. Runciman, Oxford: Blackwell, 1962, p.l6l; cf.
J. Charvet, 'Criticism and Punishment', Mind, Vol. LXXV, 
1966, P.576; G. Hawkins, 'Freewill, Responsibility and 
Punishment', Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie,
Band XLIX, 1963> p.125» Interestingly, an almost
identical list of conditions is found in A.L. Chapin,
'The Object of Punishment in the Government of God', 
Congregational Review, Vol. VIII, 1868, pp.47-8.
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suffering.’ In defining ’punishment’ such that it
logically must be of the guilty, he automatically rules
out the possibility of using a person’s guilt as a
ground for punishing him; i.e. he rules out a priori
what might otherwise have been offered as a retributive
2justification for his punishment. Quinton is well 
aware of this, for it is his aim to show that
3retributivism is a logical rather than a moral doctrine.
Of course, Quinton’s thesis does not rule out all possible
4justificatory questions. They can still arise at the
1
A.M. Quinton, ’On Punishment’, printed in Philosophy, 
Politics and Society, First Series, ed. P. Laslett,
Oxford: Blackwell, 1956, p.87.
2
Granted certain assumptions about the word ’punishment’ 
to which Quinton and many others appear to subscribe.
These assumptions are discussed in Section 3 of this 
Chapter.
3
Quinton, op. cit., p.86.
4
At the level of particular instances of punishment, 
Quinton seems to be reduced to asking: ’Am I justified in
calling this treatment ”punishment"?’ In contrast to 
this, Hobbes includes a utilitarian element in his 
definition of ’Punishment’: ’A Punishment, is an Evill
inflicted by publique Authority on him that hath done, 
or omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority 
to be a Transgression of the Law; to the end that the will 
of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience ’
(Leviathan, Everyman edn., London: J.M. Dent, 1914, p.164). 
On the basis of this definition he goes on to infer that 
’all evill which is inflicted without intention, or 
possibility of disposing the Delinquent, or (by his 
example) other men, to obey the Lawes, is not Punishment; 
but an act of hostility; because without such an end, 
no hurt done is contained under that name’ (p.165)* By 
this definition Hobbes rules out one possible, and 
indeed quite common, utilitarian justification of 
punishment, viz. deterrent.
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level of the ’practice* of punishment. At this level 
Quinton appeals to utilitarian considerations.^
(b) in contrast to Quinton, Rawls and Mabbott do not 
make actual. guilt a logically necessary element in 
their definitions of 'punishment’.^  Thus, on the 
occasions on which an accused person is actually guilty, 
they are enabled to appeal to his guilt as a reason 
for punishing him, thereby finding a niche for retributive 
justifications of punishment. But they too, and Rawls 
especially, dictate the sort of justification appropriate 
to punishment by considering it to be essentially a 
social ’institution’ or ’practice’. It is only because 
of this that they can draw a clear distinction between 
justifying punishment in general and justifying it in 
particular instances. Not only so, but in defining 
’punishment’ as a social ’practice’ they make a broadly 
utilitarian justification of punishment appear much 
more plausible than it might otherwise be.
1
Quinton, op. cit., pp. 90-1» cf« J* Laird: 'I wish
to urge ... that punishment is by definition retributive, 
but that it is not, and cannot be, justified by its 
mere definition. On the contrary, in my view, 
retribution is never self-justifying; and therefore any 
justifiable retribution must be justified on other than 
retributive grounds’ (’The Justification of Punishment’, 
Monist, Vol. XLI, 1931» PP-353-4.)
2
J. Rawls, ’Two Concepts of Rules’, Philosophical 
Review, Vol. LXIV, 1955» p.10. Mabbott does not provide 
a definition of ’punishment’, but his frequent references 
to ’punishment of the innocent’ make it evident that 
he does not make ac tual guilt a logically necessary 
condition.
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(c) A further instance of the definition of ’punishment’
prejudicing the matter of justification can be found in
Bentham’s definition of ’punishment’ as ’an evil’, by
which he means that ’all punishment is mischief’7  This
goes close to reducing any retributive justifications
of punishment to absurdity, for it presents a retributivist
with the formidable task of combining two evils to bring
forth good, where the good does not mean good consequences.
Benthan himself succeeds in justifying punishment only
2as the lesser of two evils. G.E. Moore labours under
the shadow of this Benthamite definition of punishment,
and in his efforts to avoid utilitarianism at this
point, he is forced to formulate his unsuccessful3doctrine of ’organic wholes’ .
In giving these examples I do not want it to be 
thought that I am suspicious of all definitions of 
’punishment’. On the contrary. To define ’punishment’ 
satisfactorily becomes a more important task when we 
realize how definitions can effect the sorts of 
justificatory questions which can properly be asked, 
and the sorts of answers that can properly be given to
1
J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation, ed. ¥. Harrison, Oxford:
Blackwell, 1948, p .281; idem. ’Rationale of
Punishment’, Principles of Penal Law, Part II, in 
Works, ed. J. Bowring, Edinburgh: William Tait,
T82T37 Vol. I* pp.390-1.
2
Principles of Morals, p.281; Principles of Penal Law.
P* 397♦
2
G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press,
1903, pp.214-16.
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them. Nor do I want to give the impression that I 
consider it illegitimate to define ’punishment’ so 
that certain justificatory questions or formulations 
thereof are ruled out. In the interests of clarity, 
however, it may sometimes be necessary to do so.
However, with regard to this last point it must be 
recognized that clarity is only the first word, and 
that we do not necessarily solve any moral problems by 
circumscribing ’punishment’ in certain ways, thus ruling 
out certain justificatory questions. Genuine moral 
problems cannot be defined out of existence, even if 
it can be shown that they have been infelicitously 
expressed. In these cases definitions serve only to 
shift the problems from one point to another. We can 
see how this happens if we look again at the so-called 
’definitional stop’ employed by Quinton, Beim, and Laird. 
To their utilitarian justification of punishment they 
consider the objection that it could also justify 
’(i) punishing the innocent, providing they were widely 
believed to be guilty ...; (ii) making a show of 
punishment, without actually inflicting it ...; (iii) 
punishment in anticipation of the offence.’^  They 
reply by arguing that the question is based on a 
misunderstanding of what punishment is. The innocent 
logically cannot be punished since, by definition,
T “  -  -
Benn, op. cit., p.331* Actually (ii) is out of place, 
as it refers only to making a show of punishment;
Quinton, op. cit., pp.86-7; Laird, op. cit., pp.366-9* 
C.W.K. Mundle, a non-utilitarian, produces the same 
argument in 'Punishment and Desert', Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol. 4, 1954, p.220.
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’punishment’ is of the guilty. Now this definitional 
technique undoubtedly effectively serves to rule out a 
justificatory demand in one of the forms it could take, 
but it fails to solve the moral doubts which gave rise 
to the demand. For the same doubts can be re-expressed 
so as to avoid the force of the definitional stop:
’Won’t your utilitarian position permit or necessitate 
us, in certain circumstances, doing to the innocent 
that which, when it is done to the guilty, is called 
’'punishment"? ’ *
2. Concerning Definitions.
1 have indicated some of the ways in which 
definitions of ’punishment’ bear on the question of the 
justification of punishment. I now want to take the 
discussion back one stage further to a consideration of 
the nature of definitions. For, just as some of the 
confusions and problems surrounding the justification of 
punishment have arisen from hazy or incorrect notions 
of justification, so too have some of the confusions 
and problems surrounding the meaning of ’punishment’ 
arisen from hazy or incorrect notions of definition. 
Definitions not only often reflect a philosopher's 
standpoint, they also betray his understanding of 
definition. A thorough examination of the character 
of definitions would take us too far afield for our
X “ '
Cf. K.G. Armstrong, 'The Retributivist Hits Back', 
Mind, Vol. LXX, 1961, p.485; A.C. Ewing, 'Armstrong on 
the Retributive Theory', Mind, Vol. LXXII, 1963» p.121; 
H.L.A. Hart, op. cit., p.l62.
purposes, so, as was the case with our discussion of 
justification, our discussion of definition will also 
have to be somewhat sketchy and dogmatic.
’Definition’, like other function-words, is best 
approached by asking: What are definitions supposed
to do? The possible answers are, of course, legion.^
But I want to suggest that the primary function of 
definitions is to give us rules for the use of words. 
They are not essentially descriptions, reports, or 
stipulations. On this view, the adequacy of definitions 
is to be judged by their success in enabling us to use 
a word unambiguously, comprehensively, and distinctly. 
This being the case, there is no reason why any one 
way of framing a definition should have priority over 
the rest. As in the case of justification, where what 
will count as a justification depends to a large extent 
on what is being justified, so also what will count 
as an adequate definition depends to a large extent 
on the general nature of what is being defined.
Now it seems to me that many of those who have 
discussed the meaning of ’punishment’ have possessed 
a picture of definition which is not appropriate to it. 
Just as verbal definitions are not appropriate in the 
case of colour-words, so I want to suggest that 
definitions comprising a set of necessary and sufficient
1
General discussions of definition can be found in 
R. Robinson, Definition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950»
especially Chapters I-II; R. Abelson, art. ’Definition’ 
in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards,
New York: Macmillan and The Free Press, 1967» Vol. 2,
pp.314-24.
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conditions are not appropriate in the case of many of 
the words which we use to characterize human activities. 
We can see the difficulties this view gets us into if 
we look again at Quinton’s definition of ’punishment’. 
Quite rightly, he sees that there is a very close 
connection between punishment and guilt, and therefore 
he argues that the notion of punishment includes the 
idea of guilt. But because he apparently has a very 
rigid conception of ’defining characteristics’, viz. 
that they must be logically necessary, he is forced into 
saying that ’punishment of the innocent’ is a self­
contradictory notion.^ He recognizes the oddness of
this conclusion and tries to extricate himself from the
2charge of stipulation. But the difficulties into
3which this gets him are well known.
To take a case which tends towards the opposite 
extreme, Seligman is aware that sometimes innocents are 
punished. As well he is aware that not all punishments 
are inflicted by legal authorities. Nor are they all 
given for moral offences. However, because he too
1
Quinton, op.  cit., p . 8 7 *  For other references, see 
p .29 f/n.l a b o v e .
2
Pages 8 7 - 9 *
3
Quinton’s views are effectively criticized in K. Baier, 
’Is Punishment Retributive?’, Analysis, Vol. 1 6 ,  1 9 5 5 - 6 ,
p p . 3 0 - 2 ;  K.G. Armstrong, op.cit., pp.4 8 5 - 6 .  An extended 
critique of Quinton’s position can be found in D. Seligman, 
Justice and the Role of Retribution in Punishment, 
Unpublished Ph.D.dissertation, Columbia University, 1 9 6 6 ,  
Chapter III.
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appears to have the same rigid conception of definition
as Quinton, he endeavours to def ine ’punishment’ so
broadly that it does not involve any ’stipulation’:
’the infliction of suffering as the penalty for the
1doing of some deed’. However, Seligman does not 
realize that he has now defined ’punishment’ so generally 
that it is practically indistinguishable from 
penalization.2 Not only this, but even by his own 
standards his definition is too narrow. Not every 
punishment causes suffering; some punishments do not 
involve the imposition of a penalty (generally a 
somewhat more sophisticated notion than Seligman seems 
to think); and others are meted out for the failure 
to do some deed.
It should now be clear that these philosophers are
working with a conception of definition which will not
do. It will of course do in some contexts. Sets of
necessary and sufficient conditions are just the right
candidates for defining logical or mathematical calculi,
and the technical terms of a science. Indeed it is
such terms that figure as prominent examples in the
writings of those who have this rigid conception of 
3definition. But many of the words in our language,
T~ ~  “ “ “
Page 125; cf. E„L. Pincoffs, The Rationale of Legal 
Punishment, New York: Humanities Press, 1966, p . 56 .
2
The distinction between punishment and penalization 
is dealt with below, pp.6l-5*
3
For example, J. Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical 
Analysis, First edn., London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1956, pp.26-7-
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which, like ’punishment’, are used to mark off one 
form of intentional activity from another, are 
circumscribed only to the extent to which they perform 
a specific task. This does not normally require a set 
of necessary and sufficient characteristics. Indeed, 
intentional activity is so varied that such a requirement 
would require a vocabulary many times larger than it now 
is. Thus, to look for a definition of an activity-word, 
comprising a set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
for its correct application, would most likely be to 
stipulate a use for it rather than to indicate how it 
is in fact properly used.
Most of our activity-words are defined partially 
in terms of features which are typically, but not 
always necessarily, implied in their use. What I mean 
by ’typically, but not always necessarily’ will become 
clearer when we actually discuss the meaning of 
’punishment'. The general idea is that they are 
defined in terms of a set of features which are 
jointly sufficient for their correct use, but some 
of which are necessary only in certain circumstances.
It can be represented by the following schema. A is an 
activity-word, and is partially defined in terms of 
features a, b, d and _e. It is not self-contradictory
to assert that ’A is not a ’ or (vel) ’A is not b ’ or 
'A is not c ' , etc., whereas it would be self­
contradictory to assert that ’A is not a and not b
and not c and not d and not e’, and it might be
logically inappropriate to assert that ’A is not a and
not b and not c; ’ , except where A is being used 
metaphorically. I have said that A is partially
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defined in terms of features which are typically, but 
not always necessarily implied in its use, because it 
is more frequently the case that a is always a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition for A's use, and needs 
the supplementation of b, c, d, and _e before A can be 
said to have been adequately defined. Except for a 
in this latter case, a, b, d, and are what have
been termed 'partially entailed characteristics'
Now, to approach the question of definition in 
this way does not, I believe, preclude us from doing 
all the things we hope for from definitions - we can 
still distinguish between literal and metaphorical 
uses of a word, unqualified and qualified uses of a word, 
and are not prevented from saying of a particular word 
that it has, say, three distinct senses (by pointing 
to systematic differences). As well, we can give 
sufficient clarity to our terms without being reduced 
to vagueness or unwarranted stipulation. What our 
conception of definition does do, however, is to cater 
more adequately for the complexity of human behaviour
1
Cf. R.G. Robinson, 'Partial Entailment and the Causal 
Relation', Mind, Vol. LXX, 1961, pp.526-8. Wittgenstein 
extends this to the point where he is prepared to class 
two activities under the same concept, even though they 
do not possess any features in common. The two activities 
fall under the same concept in much the same way as the 
overlapping of short fibres goes to make up a single rope 
(Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1953» §§ 66-7)* It is evident,
however, that definitions of this generality, if indeed 
there can be such, would have only a limited usefulness 
(j. Kovesi makes some telling criticisms of Wittgenstein 
in Moral Notions, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967»
pp.22-3)*
36
than its more technical counterpart. The mistakes 
that people make about definition are thus much the 
same as the mistakes they make about justification - 
the error of thinking that all definitions and all 
justifications have the same basic form.
I have suggested that the primary function of 
definitions is to give us rules for the correct 
use of words. We need to see this in the context of 
the remarks I made about language in Chapter One. The 
words which comprise our language, I maintained, are 
neither arbitrary nor disinterested reflections of the 
world, but presuppose our various needs, interests 
and desires. Not only this, but many of the words we 
use reflect or are related to specific interests 
which we have - they form, as it were, distinguishable 
spheres of discourse. Many of the terms which we use 
to describe intentional activity are framed from within 
the moral sphere of discourse. Examples of such are 
'stealing’, ’truth-telling’, ’sincerity’, etc.
However, because they have been framed from within the 
moral sphere of discourse, they are already implicitly 
evaluative. This has not always been recognized. 
Generally, to say 'Stealing is wrong’ or ’One ought to 
tell the truth' is not to express one's feelings about 
or to make a moral judgment upon a particular type of 
action. Rather, it is to make explicit what is 
already implicit in our conceptions of stealing or 
truth-telling.  ^ 'Wrong' and 'ought' function in these
1
Sometimes these judgments may be used to teach 
people the meaning of 'stealing'. Of course, understanding 
the meaning of a word does not always result in
(footnote continues on p.37)
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statements as ’reminders’ rather than as ’discriminators’, 
to use Kovesi’ s terminology. Later on in this Chapter 
I shall argue that ’punishment’ is a product of the 
moral sphere of discourse.
One further comment is necessary. When I say that
many of our concepts are defined in terms of ’features
which are typically but not necessarily implied in
their use’, I am not saying the same sort of thing as
Hart when he speaks of defining 'the standard or central
2case of "punishment" in terms of five elements.' For 
Hart’s 'elements’ comprise the empirical or quasi- 
empirical characteristics of an activity. He is thus 
led to relegate certain activities (such as
decentralized sanctions, parental and pedagogic punishments) 
'to the position of sub-standard or secondary cases’ of 
punishment. Now I have no objection to speaking of 
'sub-standard or secondary cases' of punishment. What
1 cannot see is why, apart from the fact that Hart's 
examples of such do not completely accord with his 'five 
elements’, they should be so relegated. Hart's 
definition is, to some extent, arbitrary. My own 
definition, as will be seen, relegates to the level of 
non-standard or secondary, only those cases of punishment
(footnote 1 continued from p.36)
agreement as to whether or not a particular action or 
class of actions is properly described by it (is 
’souveniring’ a sub-class of stealing?).
1
Op. cit., pp.25-32; a similar distinction is made in 
J.A. Passmore, Philosophical Reasoning, London:
Duckworth & Co., 1961, p.107*
2
Op. cit., p . 161.
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which are significantly different from the central 
cases. What I mean by 'significantly different' will 
become clear as the need to qualify 'punishment' not by 
the word 'non-standard' or 'secondary’ but by words 
such as undeserved, unjust, etc. Hart focusses his 
attention too much on the empirical or quasi-empirical 
aspects of our concepts, and too little on what we 
are trying to do when we conceptualize.
3. The Meaning of 'Punishment'.
We come now to the actual task of defining 'punishment' 
My procedure here will be fairly simple. I shall 
endeavour to isolate, one by one and as precisely as 
possible, the various defining characteristics of 
punishment; that is, those features which enable us to 
use 'punishment' correctly. At the same time I shall 
consider the differences made to our talk about the 
activity when one or more of these characteristics 
are lacking. One fact which will become obvious is 
the close relationship between the notions of justice 
and desert ( as applied to punishment) and the defining 
characteristics of punishment. The importance of this 
will emerge later in this section. One further thing 
which my analysis will show is that 'punishment' is 
not as 'vague and "open-textured"' as Flew appears 
to think.
1
Flew, op.cit., p.291; cf. H.J. McCloskey, 'The 
Complexity of the Concepts of Punishment’, Philosophy,Voi. xxxvii, 1962, p.307.
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On certain occasions ’punishment' and its cognates 
are used in a clearly metaphorical sense. In such cases 
hardly any of the typically associated characteristics 
are present, and the term is used for literary effect.
Such occasions might be when we speak of a batsman 
'punishing the bowling', or of a boxer 'dealing out 
heavy punishment to his opponent', or of an athlete 
who 'punishes himself in training' or of a big-eater 
'punishing the food'. Some philosophers have argued
that 'punishment' when employed in such phrases as
1 2 'punishing the innocent', 'collective punishment',
or in speaking of a gang 'punishing an ex-member', of
'punishing one's colleagues for their misdemeanours',
3or of 'punishing a pet', is being used in a metaphorical 
sense. It will become clear that only in some of these 
cases do I regard 1 23punishment' as being used 
metaphorically, or even non-standardly.
( a ) 'Punishment' is an activity-word. This is 
indicated by the fact that we speak of punishments 
being incurred, administered, meted out, inflicted or 
exacted. Punishments do not happen to or befall people. 
They are not occurrences or events, but treatments which
1
Benn, op. cit., pp.326, 331; S.I. Benn and R.S. Peters,
Social Principles and the Democratic State, London:
Allen and Unwin, 1959» pp.l7^> 182-3; Quinton, op. cit.,
p. 87; Mundl.e, op. cit., p.220.
2
Flew, op. cit., p.293«
3
McCloskey, op. cit., p.315* Generally, people who 
speak of punishing pets rightly or wrongly ascribe 
certain human capacities to them.
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are to be understood within the context of rule-governed 
(i.e. intentional) activity.
I need to distinguish this from the common
characterization of punishment as a ’practice’ or
’ social institution' . Rawls, who champions a ’practice-
conception’ of punishment, defines a ’practice’ as 'any
form of activity specified by a system of rules which
defines offices, roles, moves, penalties, defences,
and so on, and which gives the activity its structure’ . ^
He illustrates his conception of a practice with the game
of baseball. For various reasons we decide to establish
a game which we call ’baseball’. This is constituted
by a set of rules prescribing the number of players,
bases, strikes, penalties, etc. These rules do not
merely describe what goes on when people play baseball,
rather they define the game. In fact, such notions as
’striking out', ’stealing a base' etc. can make sense
only within the context of the game of baseball. It
follows from this conception of ’practice’ that if one
wants to play baseball, the rules cannot be treated as
2'guides as to what is best in particular cases'. To
1
Rawls, op. cit., p.3; cf. Hart, op.cit., p.160.
As examples of practices Rawls gives games, rituals, 
trials, and punishments. In a later article, he 
defines ’institutions' as 'those publicly recognized 
systems of rules which are generally acted upon and 
which, by defining offices and positions, rights and 
duties, give political and social activity its form 
and structure' (’The Sense of Justice’, Philosophical 
Review, Vol. LXXII, 1963, p.282).
2
Rawls, ’Two Concepts of Rules’, p.26.
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think that would be to misunderstand the activity in 
which one was engaged:
rules of practices are not guides to help one 
decide particular cases correctly as judged 
by some higher ... principle.... Neither the 
quasi-statistical notion of generality, nor 
the notion of a particular exception, can 
apply to the rules of practices. . . . An 
exception is rather a qualification or a 
further specification of the rule.l
Apart from somewhat confusingly departing from its 
ordinary sense of ’custom’ or ’habitual activity’, Rawls’ 
distinction between a ’practice’ and particular cases 
falling under it seems to me to be valid and important. 
The question is, however, whether punishment can be 
fitted within this schema. And there appear to be a 
number of substantial objections to this.
Although it cannot be doubted that punishment is
very often something like a social institution or
’practice’, I find it difficult to agree that it must
necessarily be so. Punishment as administered within
a legal system comes closer to being a ’practice', but
as we branch out into what Rawls recognizes as 'the
less formal sorts of punishment’ it is harder to see
how his schema is applicable. Of parental punishments
Rawls writes: ’a parent or guardian or someone in
proper authority may punish a child, but no one else 
2can.’ But Rawls is confusing moral with logical issues 
here. Certainly we are often inclined to argue that
1 ~
Page 27.
2
Page 31*
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only a parent or guardian ought to punish a child, but 
this does not mean that an outsider or stranger cannot 
punish him. Otherwise, what is Rawls to make of the 
complaint: 'You had no right to punish my Son.’? On
his view, what was inflicted on the child was not 
punishment at all. Also, may not a parent forgive his 
child on certain occasions, or sometimes warn him 
instead of punishing him? That these things can go on 
at all consistently with the retention of parental 
punishment is unintelligible on Rawls’ schema. On 
his view, these activities can go on only if they are 
built into the rules defining the practice of parental 
punishment. But obviously this is not so. Even if 
he were to argue that the practice of parental 
punishment presupposes certain discretionary powers 
on the part of parents whether or not to inflict 
punishment in particular cases, his case would hardly 
be strengthened. In fact, to allow that a practice 
could prescribe such a discretionary rule would tend 
to be self-defeating.
Rawls’ schema, then, if it is to be applicable to 
all cases of punishment, must result in a certain 
amount of stipulation as to what will count as 
’punishment’. But we can give other examples of 
punishments which will not fit into Rawls’ schema.
What about self-inflicted punishments, divine punishment, 
punishments inflicted by private individuals where law 
and order have broken down, etc. Rawls’ schema, then, 
if it is to have more than surface plausibility, must 
be restricted to the infliction of punishment within 
a legal or quasi-legal framework.
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And it is indeed a legal framework which provides 
the focus for Rawls' discussion. Thus he defines the 
institution of punishment as follows:
A person is said to suffer punishment 
whenever he is legally deprived of some of 
the normal rights of a citizen on the ground 
that he has violated a rule of law, the 
violation having been established by trial 
according to the due process of law, provided 
that the deprivation is carried out by the 
recognized legal authorities of the State, 
that the rule of law clearly specifies both 
the offense and the attached penalty, that 
the courts construe statutes strictly, and 
that the statute was on the books prior to 
the time of the offense.1
But on closer examination not even legal or quasi-legal 
punishment will fit neatly into Rawls’ schema. This is 
recognized by Quinton, who sees the 'practice' conception 
of rules as only 'a schema, a possible limiting case’.
It is 'not an accurate description of the very complex 
penal systems actually employed by states, institutions 
and parents’. The 'practice' conception of punishment 
'ignores an almost universal feature of penal systems ... 
- discretion. For few offences against the law is one
1
Page 10. Baier's definition sets out the practice 
conception of legal punishment even more clearly:
’"Punishing" is the name of only a part activity 
belonging to a complex procedure involving several stages. 
Giving orders or laying down laws, affixing penalties, 
etc. It follows from the nature of this whole "game", 
consisting of rule-making, penalization, finding guilty 
of a breach of a rule, pronouncing sentence and finally 
administering punishment, that the last act cannot be 
performed unless things have gone according to the 
rules until then’ (op. cit., p.26). Does it follow from 
this that people cannot be punished under retrospective 
laws?
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and only one fixed and definite punishment laid down. 
Normally only an upper limit is set.1^  Rawls’ 
elucidation of the practice conception of rules is 
convincing because he elucidates it by pointing to the 
game of baseball. Baseball, and games generally, are 
much more amenable to Rawls' schema, tending as they 
do to form a closed system in which all the possible 
moves are anticipated and dealt with. Though even in 
games there is room for a discretion which is not 
embodied in the rules. An umpire may often let minor 
breaches of the rules (in, say, hockey or football) go 
unchecked, so that the game may flow smoothly.
¥e can afford to follow rigidly a practice conception 
of rules in games, for, after all, they are only games.
But the law is, by and large, a more serious business, 
and to be an acceptable institution it must cater more 
adequately than the rules of a game for the multiplicity 
of human behaviour and the almost infinite variety of 
situations into which human beings can get themselves. 
Therefore, although it must lay down a fairly definite 
pattern of laws, procedures, and penalties in order 
to be at all practicable, it cannot afford to be quite 
as rigidly enforced and definite as the rules of a 
game.
However, the differences between Rawls' schema and 
the legal institutions with which we are familiar are 
not limited to the matter of discretionary power. On 
Rawls' view, the judge's task is simply to apply
T
Quin t on, op. cit., p.91*
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previously legislated rules to particular cases. But 
this is not a true picture of what happens in common law, 
for within common law the judges themselves have, by 
their decisions, a stake in law-making. The whole legal 
practice of appealing to precedents to justify decisions 
is unassimilable to the schema Rawls has outlined. 
Furthermore, under our present legal systems, not only 
the task of judging, but also the task of legislation, 
is compassed about by laws. Legislators by and large 
no longer decide whether there will be laws, but what 
laws there will be. Rawls in ascribing to legislators 
the task of deciding (on utilitarian criteria) whether 
to have laws and what laws to have, and to judges the 
task of applying (on a retributive basis) these already- 
prescribed laws has grossly oversimplified the actual 
structure of most legal systems and legal punishments, 
a structure which moreover we would find preferable to 
Rawls' suggested schema.
To sum up this critique of Rawls, then, I have not 
wanted to deny that punishment can be a social practice 
or institution, though I think that 'practice' and 
'institution' need to be regarded far more flexibly than 
in Rawls’ account. I do, however, want to deny that 
punishment as such must be conceived as a practice or 
social institution. Where it is defined as a practice, 
this is mainly because legal punishment is taken as the 
paradigm.
A corollary of the view that punishment is an activity 
is that it is administered by some intentional agent or 
agency (community, state, club, etc.). The unpleasant 
natural consequences of a person’s actions are not
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normally regarded as ’punishment’, unless they are seen
2as being delivered by some divine agent. Thus,
whereas we might sometimes say of the escaping criminal
who is crushed in a landslide he has caused, that ’it
served him right’, it would be a little eccentric to
regard this happening as ’punishment’, unless we viewed3natural calamities as the punitive instruments of God.
1
Contrast B. Bosanquet, who maintains that basically 
punishment is a ’reaction of the automatic system, 
instrumental to the end, against a friction or obstacle 
which intrudes upon it’ (The Philosophical Theory of the 
State, Fourth edn. , London: Macmillan, 1923» p.202;
also Kant, who speaks of ’Natural Punishment (poena 
naturalis) in which Crime as Vice punishes itself’
XPhilosophy of Law, trans. ¥. Hastie, Edinburgh: T.
and T. Clark, 1887» p.1.95)* Further examples can be 
found in S. Hobhouse, ’Retribution’, Hibbert Journal,
Vol. XL, 194l=2, pp.320-1. Sir Ernest Barker writes:
’It is not the injured person who retributes or pays back; 
it is not even the whole community of persons considered 
simply as persons. It is the mental rule of law which 
pays back a violation of itself by a violent return, much 
as the natural rules of health pay back a violation of 
themselves by a violent return’ (Principles of Social 
and Political Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951, p.182). 
The main point that is being made rather badly here is 
that punishment ought to be impersonally administered.
Barker’s statement of this point is heavily influenced 
by his Idealism.
2
The moral degradation which may be consequent upon 
wrongdoing is not punishment for it, unless it is also 
seen as ’God’s hardening of the wrongdoer's heart’.
3
McPherson allows that ’punishment by fate' is a 
legitimate locution (op. cit,, p.22), but this seems
to involve a personification of 'Fate'. We may, however, 
sometimes speak of the natural consequences of a person’s 
behaviour as 'penalties'. Flew points out that there 
still remains a distinction between the natural penalties 
of and the prescribed penalties for, even though it is
"^footnote continued on p.47)
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That the criminal ’brought it upon himself’ is not 
sufficient to fulfil the requirement of intentional 
agency - we also think that it should have been the 
deliberate intention, of the agent to inflict the punishment. 
Thus we speak of self-inflicted punishments only when 
the agent deliberately make himself suffer something 
unpleasant.^ We might, however, imagine a case in 
which a judge addresses a criminal whose behaviour has 
wrecked his marriage and bankrupted him: ’You have been
punished enough. It would be cruel to punish you 
anymore.’ But the judge could just as well have said, 
without any loss of meaning: ’Your evil deeds have
caused you enough suffering. It would be cruel to 
punish you as well.’ The judge may have been tempted 
to use ’punish’ because he sees the criminal's sufferings 
as 'serving him right' or as 'giving him his deserts', 
and the relationship between the notions of punishment 
and desert is very close, as we shall see. Nevertheless, 
as I shall show in the next Chapter, the giving of 
deserts is not linked to intentional agency as strongly 
as the giving of punishment.
(footnote 3 continued from p .46)
not clearly marked in our language. The former sense, 
however, probably exhibits the last vestiges of a once 
commonly held belief that all happenings are divinely 
ordered (op. cit., p.294).
1
Hart states that punishment ’must be intentionally 
administered by human beings other than the offender' 
(op. cit., p .161), thus relegating self-inflicted 
punishment to the status of a 'sub-standard or 
secondary case’. This appears to be arbitrary unless 
Hart’s definition is taken to be, not of ’punishment’ 
but of 'legal punishment’.
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Some people have regarded remorse and ’the pangs 
of conscience’ as punishments. But this seems to make 
sense only if they are believed to have been prompted 
by some agency such as God.“*" Those of psycho-analytic 
bent also speak of conscience in this way. They are 
enabled to do this because they conceive of the
2conscience or super-ego itself as an intentional agent. 
_________
C. de Boer considers remorse and ’the pangs of 
conscience* to be the paradigms of punishment: ’To inflict
punishment as such is quite beyond the power of any person 
or institution. Punishment is suffered in the offender’s 
conscience "at the hand of God", and consists in an 
intellectual, and emotional attitude towards past character 
and past action in the light of the judgments of God or 
of Society as these are appropriated by the offender 
himself’ ('On the Nature of State Action in Punishment’, 
Monist, Vol. XLII, 1932, p.618). Although de Boer speaks
here of punishment being suffered ’at the hand of God’, 
from what follows, it is evident that he does not regard 
intentional agency as being necessary. E.F. Carritt 
also comes fairly close to this view when he maintains 
that ’remorse is the penalty that fits the crime, that 
which all punishment seeks to simulate and to stimulate’
(The Theory of Morals, Oxford University Press, 1928, 
p .110); cf. J. Charvet, op. cit., p-576; Ella Wheeler’s
poem, ’The Punished’, in Galaxy, Vol. 23, 1877, p*789;
F.B, Ebersole, ’Free Choice and the Demands of Morals', 
Mind, Vol. LXI, 1952, pp.248-9; G. del Vecchio, ’The 
Problem of Penal Justice’, Revista Juridica de la 
Universidad de Puerto Rico, Vol. 27, 1957-8, p.67
f/n. 3*
2
Freud’s writings contain many references to the punishing 
activity of the super-ego or conscience; e.g. The 
Interpretation of Dreams, in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. J. 
Strachey, London: Hogarth Press, 1955-66, Vol. V,
p.476 f/n. 2; Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Vol. XVIII, 
p.32; New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis, Vol. 
XXII, p.60. See also D. Cappon, ’Punishment and the 
Person’, Ethics, Vol. LXVII, 1956-7, pp.192-3.
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(b) Punishment involves the infliction of 
unpleasant or unwanted treatment. Offering a job to a 
penniless or unemployed thief is not likely to count 
as punishing him, even if it reforms him. The reason 
for this is that we do not intend that offering a job 
to him should cause him any unpleasantness. Nor do 
we expect him to find it unpleasant. But it is not 
difficult to think of cases in which punishment which 
is intended to be unwanted or unpleasant is not so.
A masochist, for example, may commit an offence in 
order to get flogged or whipped. A magistrate may fine 
a millionaire gangster for a criminal offence knowing 
full well that the fine will be laughed off. A fanatic 
may seek to be punished in order to further his cause. 
During the last century it became a matter of concern 
that many vagrants and paupers were committing petty 
criminal offences in order to get the bed and food 
provided in prison. *'
In a recent article, J.M. Smith gives a number of 
literary examples of punishments which, in the 
circumstances, could only doubtfully be regarded as 
’unwanted or unpleasant’. From this he concludes that 
unwanted or unpleasant treatment is not a defining 
characteristic of punishment. But this point would 
hold only against those who believe that ’if an act 
which we took to be an act of punishment could be shown
1
See the article by C. Hickox, ’Shall Punishment Punish?’, 
Galaxy, Vol. 23» 1887» pp•355-8; cf. ’Soapy’ in the 
0. Henry short story: The Cop and the Anthem, in
Stories, introduction by H. Golden, New York: Platt &
Munk, 1962.
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not to be painful or coercive, we would, or at least 
should, withdraw the name "punishment",1  ^ It is because 
Smith himself holds this rigid conception of definition 
that he denies any conceptual relationship between 
punishment and unwanted treatment. It should be clear 
however that on my own conception of definition, the 
fact that a particular punishment does not involve unwanted 
or unpleasant treatment does not automatically disqualify 
it from being punishment. Such punishments may well be 
inadequate, inappropriate, misguided or inefficacious 
(depending on the case), but they are punishments 
nevertheless.
But while I do not think it to be a necessary 
characteristic of punishments that they are experienced 
as unpleasant or unwanted, I would insist on the 
necessity of punishments being intended to be unpleasant. 
Unless a person intends to inflict unwanted or 
unpleasant treatment on another, then what he inflicts 
is not punishment, whether or not it is unpleasant.
This is of course closely related to what I have been 
arguing in (a) above.
This brings us to a distinction which has an 
important bearing on our discussion of the meaning of 
’punishment’. Tables with broken legs or missing tops 
are still tables. Their being defective in some way 
does not make us call them something else. It would be
__ - —
James M. Smith, ’Punishment: A Conceptual Map and a
Normative Claim', Ethics, Vol. LXXV, 1964-5, p.285.
Smith’s article is taken from his unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Punishment: Its Nature and Justification,
Brown University, i960.
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too inconvenient. Nevertheless, they are not ’tables’ 
in the standard sense of the word. We could not easily 
teach a person the meaning of the word ’table' by using 
defective examples. This is because tables typically or 
characteristically have sturdy legs and tops - it is 
important that they do in order to fulfil the purposes 
for which they have been made (and in terms of which 
they are partially defined). To question whether tables 
with broken legs or missing tops are really tables, is 
unnecessary (even confusing), but to think that tables 
can therefore be characteristically broken-legged or 
topless is mistaken, as it is also mistaken to call a 
frame supported by four legs a ’table' or even a 
’topless table’ if there was never any intention of 
putting a top on it. The two cases are empirically 
similar but conceptually different, because what makes 
a certain empirical arrangement into a table is not 
simply its organization, but also the human needs, 
interests, etc. which have led to its organization in 
that way. Similarly with punishments. To question whether 
punishments which are not unwanted or unpleasant really 
are punishments is unnecessary (even confusing), but to 
think that punishments can therefore be characteristically 
'inefficacious' is mistaken, as it is also mistaken to 
call treatment given to offenders but not intended to 
cause them any unpleasantness, ’punishment’. To give 
a definition is to give rules for the use of a word; 
it is not simply an enumeration of various empirical 
characteristics. What makes us call a certain piece of 
behaviour ’punishment’ is not simply its empirical 
features but also the human interests and purposes 
which have given rise to it.
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Generally, writers on punishment have characterized
it as 'an evil' (Hobbes, Bentham, Flew, McCloskey^),
2'pain' (Ewing, Armstrong, D. Locke, Maclagan ), 'injury'
o U(Hegel. ), 'hurt' or 'hardship' (Baier ), 'suffering' 
(Quinton, Feinberg, Loftsgordon, Oxford English
KDictionary ), or 'deprivation' of a good, a privilege 
or a right (D. Locke, J.M. Smith, Mabbott, Rawls ),
1
Hobbes, op. cit. , p.164; Bentham, Principles of Morals, 
p.281; Flew, op. cit., p.293; H.J. McCloskey, 'A Non­
utilitarian Approach to Punishment', Inquiry, Vol. VIII, 
1965» p.249. Others who hold this view are cited by 
G. del Vecchio in Justice, ed. A.H. Campbell, Edinburgh 
University Press, 1942, p.193 f/n.10; idem. 'The
Problem of Penal Justice', p.66 f/n. 2.
2
A.C. Ewing, The Morality of Punishment, London: Kegan
Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1929, pp.15 f/n.2, 24;
Armstrong, op. cit., pp.478-9; D. Locke, 'The Many 
Faces of Punishment', Mind, Vol. LXXII, 1963» p.368;W.G. Maclagan, 'Punishment and Retribution', Philosophy 
Vol. XIV, 1939, p.281.
3 G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942, §99, p.69*
4 Baier, op. cit., p.27. In a more recent article Baier 
speaks of punishment simply as 'unwanted treatment' 
('Responsibility and Freedom', in Ethics and Society, 
ed. R.T. De George, New York: Doubleday & Co.
[Anchor Books], 1966, p.52).
5 Quinton, op. cit., p.83; J. Feinberg, 'Justice and 
Personal Desert’, Nomos VI: Justice, ed. C.J. Friedrich 
and J.¥. Chapman, New York: Atherton Press, 1963» p.80;
D. Loftsgordon, 'Present-day British Philosophers on 
Punishment', Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXIII, 1966,
p.3^3.
6 D. Locke, op. cit., p.368; J.M. Smith, Punishment:
Its Nature and Justification, p.92; Mabbott, 'Professor 
Flew on Punishment', Philosophy, Vol. XXX, 1955» p.237> 
Rawls, 'Two Concepts of Rules', p.10.
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imposed or inflicted on someone for some misdemeanour. 
Most of these terms can be extended to cover the various 
kinds of treatment that can figure as punishment, but
they tend to be too closely related to specific forms
1 2 of punishment, or are unsatisfactory in other ways.
1
’Pain', ’hurt1 2, and ’hardship’ are probably more 
appropriate for physical sufferings. Some frequently 
used punishments, such as fining or even execution, do 
not necessarily involve pain. ’Suffering’ is perhaps 
a little too exaggerated for many punishments, but it 
has the necessary range. 'Deprivation of a right' has 
a false simplicity about it as it must be understood 
to cover both legal and 'natural' rights.
2
To speak of punishment as an evil is ambiguous, and 
those who have spoken of it in this way have tended to 
trade on the ambiguity. For example, Rashdall writes:
'A wrong has been done - say, a crime of brutal violence; 
by that act a double evil has been introduced into the 
world. There has been so much physical pain for the 
victim, and so much moral evil has polluted the offender's 
soul. Is the case made any better by the addition of a 
third evil, - the pain of the punished offender, which 
ex hypothe si is to do him no moral good whatever?' (The
Theory of Good and Evil, Second edn., Oxford University 
Press, 1924, Vo 1. J~, p.286); and Salmond: 'Punishment
is in itself an evil and can be justified only as the means 
of attaining a general good. Retribution is in itself not 
a remedy for the mischief of the offence but an aggravation 
of it' (quoted in T. Sheard, 'The Theory of Punishment*, 
University of Toronto Quarterly, Vol. IV, 193^-5* P*98)#
The two senses of 'evil*(both with respectable histories) 
can be brought out by considering the two sentences,
'Evil befell Jones' and ’What Jones did was evil'. The 
substantive form bears the meaning of 'unpleasant 
happening', the adjectival form of 'morally wrong’. Bentham 
fails to see this ambiguity, and so he slides from 
'punishment is an evil* to 'all punishment is mischief' 
(Principles of Morals, p.28l). Hegel strongly criticizes 
the view of punishment which treats it as an 
'unqualified evil', thus reducing retributive
(footnote continued on p.5^)
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Some writers use a combination of these terms; but in 
all these cases the important thing about punishment is 
its unpleasantness or unwantedness.
Linking the aspect of unpleasantness or unwantedness 
with my earlier point about its deliberate infliction, 
it can be seen that it is not enough that the treatment 
received by the person punished just happened to be 
unpleasant (as in the case of the dentist who fails to 
anaesthetize the patient’s tooth properly) or was even 
unavoidably but not intentionally so (like lancing a 
snakebite when no anaesthetics are available). Rather, the 
unpleasant or unwanted nature of the treatment must be the 
deliberate intention of the punisher or punishing authority.
(c) Punishment is meted out for moral wrongs.
Punishment is always given for something. It cannot be 
meted out for no reason at all or for no reason in 
particular. In principle it must always be possible to 
give reasons for punishing a person. This would seem to 
be a necessary rather than simply a partially entailed 
characteristic of punishment. If no reasons can be 
given, then the person has been ill-treated or 
victimized, but not punished.
(footnote 2 continued from p*53)
’justifications’ to the level of ’adding evil to evil’
(op. cit., pp.69-70> for a re-working of Hegel’s 
criticism, see J.F. Doyle, ’Justice and Legal Punishment’, 
Philosophy, Vol. XLII, 1967, pp.56-8).
1
This point is accounted for by Beim and Peters' 
addition to the five conditions satisfied by a standard 
case of punishment as originally suggested by Flew 
(op. cit., P.174), and is incorporated into Hart’s list 
(condition iv). Bentham makes the same point in 
Principles of Penal Law, p.391*
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What, then, is punishment given for? Typically, 
it is meted out for some disobedience or failure to obey.
It is usually maintained that the disobedience or 
failure to obey must constitute an offence against some 
law or rule. There is a sense in which this is true, 
but not in the way it is sometimes thought to be:
(i) Jurists with Austinian leanings tend to 
regard laws as commands backed by sanctions or punishments. 
However, punishments are not related to laws in this 
way. There are many laws which threaten no punishment, 
even if certain consequences follow from the failure to 
observe them; take, for example, constitutional, 
administrative, or procedural laws.^
(ii) Mabbott maintains that ’punishment is a
2corollary not of law but of law-breaking.’ But not 
all punishments are for law-breaking. A child may 
be quite properly punished for disobeying the command 
of his parent; the pupil, for throwing chalk, even 
though there is no explicit ruling against it.
Nevertheless, I want to insist that a background of
O
rules (in the broadest senseJ) or at least an established
1
For an extended critique of Austinian views, see H.L.A. 
Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961,
Chapter II.
2
J.D. Mabbott, ’Punishment’, Mind, Vol. XLVIII, 1939» p.l6l. 
3
I say this because I suspect that moral rules function 
significantly differently from legal and quasi-legal rules, 
and I shall want to argue that the legal model on which 
many philosophers lean in their discussions of punishment 
is not a good one (See Rawls, ’Two Concepts of Rules’,
(footnote continued on p.56)
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way of doing things must be presupposed where punishment 
is meted out. This can be seen in the counter-examples 
to Mabbott which I have cited. The unpleasant treatment 
oT the child Tor disobeying the command is regarded as 
punishment because it is viewed in the context of parent- 
child or family relationships which generally include a 
rule or understanding to the effect that children ought 
to obey their parents. Similarly, although there is no 
explicit ruling against throwing chalk, yet the 
unpleasant treatment which the child receives is 
regarded as punishment because it is seen against a 
background within which his behaviour is unacceptable, 
and the child ought to know it. This background of 
rules becomes more explicit when we say that punishment 
is meted out for an offenee or wrong, rather than for 
an injury (in the sense of damage) of some sort. The 
notion of an offence or wrong presupposes a background 
of rules, whereas the notion of an injury does not.* 
Injuries are punishable only if they also constitute 
offences or wrongs. This is one of the features which 
distinguishes punishment from revenge or retaliation. 
Revenge is taken because of some hurt or injury, not 
because of some offence or wrong (whether or not the 
hurt or injury also constitutes an offence or wrong).
(footnote 3 continued from p.55)
p .10; Hart, ’Prolegomenon to the Principles of 
Punishment’, especially pp. 1.60-2; Smith, Punishment s
Its Nature and Justification, especially p .24). On legal 
models and moral rules, see J. Feinberg, ’Supererogation 
and Rules', Ethics, Vol. LXXI, 1960-1, pp.276-88.
1
There is of course a perfectly respectable sense of 
’injury' in which it means 'a wrongful action or offence', 
but it is not this sense to which I am appealing here.
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I want now to suggest that typically, the disobedience
or failure to obey of which the offender is guilty, must
expose him to moral condemnation or blame, if the
unpleasant treatment meted out on him is to be regarded
as punishment.^ This is one of the ways in which
punishment is to be distinguished from quarantine. My
contention, however, goes contrary to the trend of much
recent discussion of the nature of punishment, though it
is more in line with classical views. Mabbott, we have
seen, argues that punishment is a corollary of law-
2breaking, not of moral wrongdoing. 'A criminal', he
writes, 'means a man who has broken a law, not a bad
man’. Otherwise we would be faced with the problem of
finding someone with authority to punish moral wrongdoing.
This, he believes, cannot be done, God alone having the
3status necessary to punish moral offences.' More recently, 
Beim and Peters have argued that 'we do not punish men 
for their wickedness but for particular breaches of4law.' The State, they maintain,
is not an agent of cosmic justice, it 
punishes only such acts as are contrary to 
legal rules, conformity to which, even from 
unworthy motives like fear, is considered of
T
This being the case, certain important conditions 
relating to the wrongdoer must first be satisfied. Some 
of these will be discussed in Chapter Six.
2
Mabbott, 'Punishment', pp.l55> 161.
3
Page 154.
4
Benn and Peters, op. cit., p.176.
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public importance. And if we offer the 
narrower ground, that the wicked ought not 
to profit from their crimes, we are bound 
to justify the distinction between crimes 
and offences against morals in general.^
In similar vein, Hart states that punishment is a
social institution of which the 
centrally important form is a structure of 
legal, rules, though it would be dogmatic to 
deny the name of Punishment ... to the 
similar though more rudimentary rule-regulated 
practice within groups such as family, or a 
school or in customary societies whose customs 
lack some of the standard or salient features 
of law (legislation, organized sanctions, 
c our t s).2
He putatively takes over criteria for a standard case
of punishment from the articles by Flew and Benn,
though it is interesting to note how he alters one of
their criteria from 'an offence against some law or
rule' to * an offence against legal rules’ . Thus he
relegates to what we have seen he calls ’sub-standard
or secondary cases’ of punishment, ’punishments for
3breaches of non-legal rules or orders.’ Consistently 
with this, he argues that certain actions are made 
into crimes or offences
1
Page 177-
2
Hart, ’Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment', 
p.160. Cf. J.M. Smith, who argues that even parental 
punishments can be construed on a legal model (Punishment: 
Its Nature and Justification, Chapter VII).
3
Page 161; cf. Flew, op. cit., p.293; Benn and Peters, 
op. cit., P.174. In his article, Flew made it quite 
clear that he was throwing his net wider than legal 
rules (pp.294-5)*
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to announce to society that these actions 
are not to be done and to secure that fewer of 
them are done. These are the common immediate 
aims of making any conduct a criminal offence, 
and until we have laws made with these primary 
aims we shall lack the notions of a ’crime’ and 
so of a ’criminal’. 1
Otherwise 'we cannot distinguish a punishment in the form 
of a fine from a tax on a course of conduct.’
Now there is of course a sense in which legal 
punishments, at any rate, are for law-breaking and not 
for moral wrongdoing. When a man is brought before a 
court, what is directly up for consideration is his legal 
status, not his moral status. Not that his character 
and actions cannot come up for moral assessment and 
censure in the courtroom, but rather that they do so 
initially only in so far as they are relevant to the
2determination of whether or not he has broken some law.
1
Page 163*
2
An interesting and controversial exception is, of course, 
Shaw v . D ,P .P . ([1961] 2 All E.R. 446), in which Viscount
Symons argued: ’When Lord Mansfield, speaking long after
the Star Chamber had been abolished, said that the Court 
of King's Bench was the custos morum of the people, and 
had the superintendency of offences contra bonos mores, 
he was asserting, as I now assert, that there is in that 
Court a residual power, where no statute has as yet 
intervened to supersede the common law, to superintend 
those offences which are prejudicial to the public 
welfare. Such occasions will be rare, for Parliament 
has not been slow to legislate when attention has been 
sufficiently aroused. But gaps remain and will always 
remain since no one can foresee every way in which the 
wickedness of man may disrupt the order of society.’ 
(p.452). However, it must be noticed that even here, the 
interest is not primarily centred on the moral quality of 
Shaw's act, but on. its tendency to 'disrupt the order of 
society’.
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At a Later stage of the proceedings they may be relevant 
to the penalty he is to receive, but the primary concern 
is still with what the law prescribes. If allowance is 
made for the circumstances under which a crime was 
committed, this is first of all because provision is 
made for this in the law.
But I do not think this goes deep enough. We are 
reluctant to call all penal sanctions 'punishments’.
Such impositions as parking fines, fines for duck 
shooting out of season, fines for failure to have a red 
light showing, etc. are hardly punishments, even though 
they are sanctions imposed for law breaking. True, 
they are often called 'punishments', yet somehow we feel 
that the term does not fit happily here. The same goes 
for punishments for offences in which liability is strict. 
There is a tendency even within the law to shy away from 
calling them crimes, and to refer to them as 'regulatory 
offences' or some similar name instead.“*“ The 
concentration on a legal model in recent discussions of 
punishment has I think obscured this differentiation within 
legal sanctions. Had parental punishment been used as a 
model then I do not think this assimilation of all legal 
sanctions to punishment would have occurred so easily 
(though no doubt other generalizing mistakes would 
have been made). There are of course some jurists who 
recognize this differentiation and distinguish
2between 'condemnation sanctions' and 'other deprivations'.
See below, Chapter Six, pp« 238-9»
2
To use the terms of H. Lasswell and R.C. Donnelly,
'The Continuing Debate over Responsibility: An
(footnote continued on p.6l)
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The distinction, I want to suggest, is properly made 
by reference to the moral worth of the offending action. 
’Punishment’, 1 shall argue, properly applies only to 
those legal offences which also expose the offender 
to moral condemnation; otherwise he is penalized not 
punished . There is a stigma attached to being punished 
which we are usually reluctant to associate with minor 
traffic and other administrative offences. The 
distinction between penalty and punishment is an 
important one, yet confused in almost every recent 
discussion of punishment.^ As will be seen, it is 
somewhat broader than the distinction between ’condemnation 
sanctions’ and ’other deprivations’, yet they are 
basically the same.
If I am punished for an offence and there is a 
prescribed penalty for my action, the distinction between 
the two can be marked by saying that the penalty is 
the form which the punishment takes. Thus we may speak 
of there being a penalty of $40 with a one month’s 
suspension as punishment for a first drunken driving 
offence; or of the need for heavier penalties for sexual 
offences; or of an option between a fine of $50 and 14 
days imprisonment as the penalty for being in possession
(footnote 2 continued from p.60)
Introduction to Isolating the Condemnation Sanction’, 
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 68, 1958-9» pp- 869-99» cited 
in J. Feinberg, ’The Expressive Function of Punishment’, 
Monist, Vol. XLIX, 1965» P-398.
1
Feinberg, in the article mentioned in the preceding 
footnote, is one of few to have noted the importance of 
the distinction. The distinction is also made by 
McCloskey, but he does not develop it (’The Complexity 
of the Concepts of Punishment’, pp.313-4).
of stolen goodsj or we might speak of the maximum 
penalty for manslaughter being life imprisonment, the 
exact penalty being left to the .judge’s discretion.
Since penalties are (in these cases) the form which 
punishments take, the imposition of an alternative 
penalty could constitute just as severe a punishment.
Mabbott argued that punishment is a corollary of 
law-breaking, not of moral wrongdoing. On the basis of 
the distinction I have pointed out between penalties and 
punishments he would have been somewhat nearer the truth 
had he said that penalization is a corollary of law­
breaking, not of moral wrongdoing. If we can grasp the 
point that when a person is punished, the penalty he 
receives is the form which his punishment takes, we can 
see that what legal rules prescribe are not punishments 
but penalties.
Before I expand this last point further, I want 
to note various features of penalties both in themselves 
and in their relation to punishments. I have already 
observed that not every penalty which is prescribed by 
law is administered as a punishment. Often a $2 fine 
for overparking is not regarded as a punishment (though 
a refusal to pay the fine may give rise to a penalty 
that would be regarded as a punishment). We look at 
such fines more as discouragements to the breaking of 
certain administrative rules than as punishments. There 
is not the same stigma attached to them. Penalty 
clauses are often included in contracts, requiring 
certain payments should the contracted work not be
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completed by a stated date. We also speak of penalty 
rates which are introduced into some wage arrangements.2 
in all these cases we have examples of legally prescribed 
and enforced penalties, but there is no suggestion of 
punishment.
The notion of penalization, like that of punishment,
is not limited to the law, and in siich cases, as in the
cases where it is legally imposed, the two may be
distinguishable and separable. Penalties may be
prescribed in almost any situation where rul es may be
broken. For example, the penalty for tackling a person
round the neck in Australian Rules Football is a free
3kick to the opposing side. Yet it is clear that the 
penalty which is incurred here does not also constitute
1
Strictly speaking, these are referred to as 
liquidated damages clauses. In law they are called 
’penalty clauses* only if deemed excessive.
2
The term ’penalty rates’ may be peculiar to 
Australia. It refers to the special rates of pay 
appropriate to overtime work (such as time and a half).
3
Sometimes we tend to use the notion of penalty 
even more broadly to refer to the natural and 
unpleasant consequences of an act (cf. p. ^  f/n.3 of 
this Chapter). Thus, if I arrive at a party after all 
the food has been eaten, I might be told, 'Ah well, 
that’s the penalty for coming late,’ Even, here 
there is some notion of appropriateness which leads 
us to speak of the consequences of late-coming as 
a penalty. I would not have evoked the same response 
if instead I had trodden on a piece of glass left 
from the party.
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a punishment. ' Nevertheless, in some circumstances we 
might regard the penalty incurred for a breach of non- 
legal rules as a punishment. If the player was sent off 
the field for ’foul, play’ or disqualified for life 
because of ’unethical conduct’ we might justifiably 
regard it as punishment.
Conversely, not every punishment involves a penalty. 
When a mother spanks her child for stealing from the 
biscuit tin, the spanking can hardly be called the 
’penalty’ for stealing biscuits because it has not been 
publicly prescribed in accordance with a set of rules.
Of course the mother could have Laid it down that 
whenever anyone (or simply ’her child’) was caught 
stealing from the biscuit tin he would be spanked, in 
which case a spanking would be the prescribed penalty.
A. penalty is essentially a specific treatment of an 
unpleasant nature which is prescribed by a system of 
rules for breaches of those rules. This is also 
supported by the Oxford English Dictionary which defines 
a ’penalty’ as ’a loss, disability or disadvantage of 
some kind, either ordained by law to be inflicted for 
some offence, or agreed upon to be undergone in case 
of violation of a contract’. Thus we may have a legal 
system in which there are specified penalties for 
breaches of the rules but under which no one is penalized
1
R .M . Hare has drawn a distinction between ’penalty’ 
and ’punishment’, but he goes too far when he says that 
’a penalty is a threat the carrying out of which is a 
punishment’. (’Punishment’, an unpublished paper 
read to the Australasian Association of Philosophy 
I Canberra Branch], July, 1966).
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or punished because no one has broken any law or has 
ever been successfully convicted. The fact that there 
are no punishments does not mean that there are no 
penalties either. Penalties are prescribed, whereas 
punishments cannot be. Punishment is an activity, 
not a Legal or quasi-legal prescription.
I have been wanting to suggest tha t the pena l.ization 
of a person for breaking some rule or law (which is the 
proper function, of the law) constitutes the infliction 
of punishment on the person only on such occasions as 
he is held to be morally blameworthy. There is a 
stigma attached to being punished which does not 
attach to being merely penalized, and this stigma 
arises from the fact that punishment carries with it 
the moral condemnation of the wrongdoer's actions. Of 
course 'penalization' and 'punishment' are not always 
used in this way in the law, but then we must not 
confuse a word's use with its usage. 'Punishment', to 
put it bluntly, does not find its home in the legal, so 
much as in the moral sphere of discourse. This does 
not mean that it cannot be used (or misused) in a legal 
context, only that to understand it in terms of that 
context is to misconceive it. Law-breakers can. be 
punished as well as penalized, but this is because 
many legal offences are also moral offences. The 
fundamental mistake of rule-utilitarian justifications, 
of punishment is that they are not really justifications 
of punishment but of penalization.
The philosophers whom 1 have criticized for failing 
to distinguish between penalties and punishments also 
tend to analyse the notion of a crime without reference
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to moral wrongdoing. To call an act a crime or a person 
a crimina1 normally has strong condemnatory overtones, 
and we lind it very appropriate to speak of criminals 
deserving punishment. To define the terms ’crime' and 
'criminal1 is, however, no easy task. On the one hand, 
Fitzgerald's claim that 'whether or not any conduct 
constitutes a crime in English law depends solely on 
whether or not such conduct has been proscribed as 
criminal by the law', is in a sense unexceptionable.^
On the other hand, such an unsatisfying definition may 
prompt us to say with H.M. Hart, Jr. that 'so vacant
2a concept is a betrayal of intellectual bankruptcy.'
Hart goes further than this to argue that such a
definition '.is false to popular understanding and false
also to the understanding embodied in existing
constitutions'. On his view, 'what distinguishes a
criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes
it ... is the judgment of condemnation which accompanies
3and justifies its imposition.'' A crime 'is conduct 
which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a 
formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral
4condemnation of the community.' Fitzgerald's definition,
1
P.J. Fitzgerald, Criminal Law and Punishment, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1962 , p.7; cf. Wharton: 'A crime is
an act made punishable by law.'
2
'The Aims of the Criminal Law', Law and Contemporary 
Problems, Vol. 2 3 , 1958, p.404.
3 Ibid.
4
Page 405. 1 am not sure that I would choose to identify
'moral wrongdoing' with ' the moral condemnation, of the 
community'. Nevertheless, Hart's point is clear enough.
(footnote continued on p.67)
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while it avoids the stipulation which jeopardizes 
Hart’s, nevertheless fails to account for the attitudinal 
differences which, tend to be involved in our common 
distinction between ’crimes' and ’civil or regulatory 
offences'. This Hart endeavours to do by linking crime 
with moral wrongdoing.
I am not convinced that analysis will help us to 
solve this problem. A, decision is called for. We are 
confronted with at least two partially competing 
conceptions of crime, each of them having certain 
drawbacks. To some of those offences classed as 'crimes’ 
under Fitzgerald's definition we feel strongly tempted 
to say 'They shouldn't regard B as a crime’ or 'B isn't 
really a crime'. And we do not regard a person as a 
criminal simply because he persistently commits criminal 
offences; e.g. the businessman who repeatedly leaves 
his car in a half-hour parking bay as long as he Likes, 
because it is more worthwhile to pay the fine than to 
find an alternative way of organizing his business. 
Alternatively we can object to the stipulative nature 
of Hart's definition, which denies the epithet 'criminal'
^footnote 4 continued from p.66)
Cf. J.F. Stephen: 'By a criminal, people understand
not only a person who is liable to be punished, but a 
person who ought to be punished, because he has done 
something at once wicked and injurious in a high degree 
to the interests of the community ! (A. History of the
Criminal Law in England, London: Macmillan, 1883» Vol.
II, p . ?6) ; H. Ra.shda.il: 'A crime is simply a sin which
it is expedient to repress by penal enactment' ('The 
Theory of Punishment' , .In terna t iona .1 J ournal of E thic s, 
Vol.. II, 1891-2, p.30). The common identification of 
'sin' with 'wrongdoing' seems to me to be incorrect and 
often misleading. But I shall not go Into that here.
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to such dubiously immoral acts as 'betting: in a public 
house, shooting game on Sunday',  ^ both of which are 
criminal offences in English law.
It seems to me that if the designation of some
acts as 'criminal.5 is going to have some point, then we
must opt for some more restrictive definition similar
to Hart's. Not that moral wrongdoing is the only
possible candidate for discriminating between criminal
and other offences. We might define criminal acts as
those acts proscribed by law which cause considerable 
2social harm. However, this does not seem as satisfactory
as Hart's definition. For not only would it be
difficult to class 'attempted crimes* as criminal offences
on this definition, but also it ignores the fact that
it is as much a criminal offence to steal a 5c stamp
3as to murder someone.
________
Fitzgerald, op. cit., p.4. Many other strict liability
offences would fall into this category too.
2
For classical utilitarians such as Mill, for whom social 
harm or welfare was the criterion of wrongness or 
rightness, the choice between moral wrongdoing and social 
harm as defining features of a crime was an unreal one.
See A.R. Louch, 'Sins and Crimes', Philosophy, Vol. XLIII, 
1968, pp.38-50.
3
It might be plausibly maintained that although someone’s 
stealing a 3c stamp after hours from the office stamp 
reserve, because he had run out, would legally constitute 
a crime, we should not be willing to say that the person 
was guilty of a crime. This is probably because we feel 
that an offence of this sort would not warrant the weight 
of the law being brought to bear on its de minimis non 
curat lex. In these cases we might draw a further 
distinction between crimes and peccadilloes. This is 
acknowledged in Papua and New Guinea law where there is a 
defence of triviality (Local Courts Ordinance (1963) §20).
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I do not want to enter into a discussion of the 
traditional distinction between those acts which are said 
to be mala in se and those which are said to be mala 
prohibita, except to relate it to my own view. All 
legal offences which are mala in se are crimes, on my 
view - such acts as murder, stealing, rape, fraud, etc. 
(making allowance for the fact that the legal definitions 
of these acts are not quite coextensive with their moral 
definitions). But only some acts which are mala prohibita 
could be considered crimes: those administrative
directives (such as driving on the left hand side of 
the road^) the neglect of which constitutes a danger 
or threat to the well-being of others.
Although I have been arguing that punishment is 
typically or characteristically meted out for some 
offence which exposes the offender to moral blame, it 
must be quite clear that sometimes people are punished 
and not mereLy penalized for offences which do not also 
constitute moral, wrongs. This is permitted by my 
definition of ’punishment1. Punishments are only 
typically and not always necessarily meted out for moral 
wrongs. Nevertheless, as I indicated before, in cases 
where one of the typically associated characteristics 
is missing, we qualify the punishment in some way. In 
this case we would probably say that the punishment was 
undeserved or unmerited. This reaction would probably 
not have been appropriate had the person simply been 
penalized for his non-moral wrong. No complaint would 
have been made. But to regard his treatment as
1
In Australia.
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punishment rather than as penalization imputes to him 
an unworthiness which he may rightly deny by saying 
that such punishment was undeserved.*
(d) Punishment is inflicted on offenders. I have 
argued that punishment .is administered on the basis of 
some disobedience or failure to obey which also 
constitutes a moral wrong. However, more is needed for 
unpleasant treatment to qualify as punishment. It is 
also characteristic of punishment that the person to 
whom unpleasant treatment is meted out has committed 
the offence in respect of which the punishment is 
in f 1 ic t ed.
A question which immediately rises, and around
2which a surprising amount of controversy has gathered, 
is: Does this mean that we cannot refer to the
unpleasant treatment which is inflicted upon, a person 
in respect of some wrong which he is believed to have 
committed, but which he has not actually committed, as 
’punishment’? Quinton, as we saw earlier, argues that 
’the infliction of suffering on a person is only properly
This point is made in a slightly different way by a 
number of recent writers who link punishment with the 
expression of resentment or indignation; e.g. J. Feinberg, 
’Justice and Personal Desert', pp.80-4, 91“3? idem.
'The Expressive Function of Punishment’, passim .;
P.F. Strawson, 'Freedom and Resentment’, Proceedings of 
the British A.cademny, Vol. XLVIII, 1962, pp.207~8;
O.C. Jensen, 'Responsibility, Freedom, and Punishment’, 
Mind, Vol. LX.XV , 1966, pp. 235-6.
2
Perhaps it is not surprising that so much controversy 
has surrounded this question, for the fate of the 
utilitarian position has often been thought to hang on it.
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described as punishment if that person is guilty,’ Thus
to speak of ’the punishment of the innocent’ is ’in a
sense a contradiction in terms', and 'applies to the
common enough practice of inflicting the suffering
involved in punishment on innocent people and of
2sentencing them to punishment with a lying imputation
3of their responsibility and guilt.’ However, people are 
sometimes punished for things which they have not done, 
and Quinton endeavours 'to meet this difficulty by 
likening ’punish’ to 'performative verbs’ such as 
’promise’, and thus distinguishing its first-person- 
present use from its use in the second and third persons:
By the first-person-present use of 
these verbs we prescribe punishment and make 
promises; these activities involve the 
satisfaction of conditions over and above 
what is required for reports or descriptions 
of what their prescr.ibers or makers represent 
as punishments or promises.^
1
Quinton, op. cit., p .86.
2
This is odd, for it is surely possible for people to 
be mistakenLy punished (Cf. McCloskey, ’The Complexity of 
the Concepts of Punishment’, p.319)* Probably Quinton has 
in mind only those cases in which it is known that the 
’offender' is innocent (Cf. Rawls: 'Certainly by
definition [punishment] isn’t what it pretends to be.
The innocent can only be punished by mistake; deliberate 
’punishment’ of the innocent necessarily involves fraud' 
[’Two Concepts of Rules’, p.8 f/n. 8]).
3
Quinton, op. cit., p.87, cf. Hobbes, op, cit., p.165»
T. Stromberg,'Some Reflections on the Concept of 
Punishment’, The oria, Vol. XXIII, 1937» p*7^* 
k  ... ...”
Page 88.
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Again, as we have noticed earlier, Renn also insists
that ’punishment of the innocent’ is a logical
impossibility, and lor the phrase to be understood, it
must mean either ’’“pretending to punish’, in the sense
of manufacturing evidence, or otherwise imputing guilt,
while knowing a man to be innocent’, or simply 'cause
to suffer’, in which case we would be using ’punish’ in
1a secondary sense. More recently, K.G. Armstrong has 
drawn a distinction between weak and strong senses in 
which, the sentence ’Re was punished for something he did 
not do' can be understood. In the weak sense,
the sentence could simply be asserting 
that someone who was not in fact the perpetrator 
of the crime had been treated as though he were, 
either because those in authority held 
sincerely though mistakenly tha t he wa s guilty 
of it, or because they had deliberately tried 
to mislead the public.2
This use of ’punish’ is no more odd or un.intelligible
than the use of ’kill’ in the familiar expression, 'They
3half killed him’ . If, however, ’punish’ is used in 
the strong sense, i.e,, that sense in which it is being 
used in its ’exactly proper way’, then the sentence,
’He was punished for something he did not do’ is
1
Berm, 'An Approach to the Problems of Punishment.’, 
p.331; cf. Benn and Peters, op. cit., p.174. As I 
mentioned earlier, Benn has since modified his position. 
Cf. Laird, op. cit., pp.368-9» Mundle, op. cit.,
p.220.
2
Armstrong, op. cit., p.4?9‘
3
Ibid.
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self—contradictory. Flew takes a somewhat different
tack by maintaining that, while
it would be pedantic [because the 
term 'punishment* is vague2] to insist in 
single cases that people (logically) 
cannot be punished for what they have not 
done still a system of inf 1 icting 
unpleasantness on scapegoats - even if they 
are pretended to be offenders - could scarcely 
be called a system of punishment at all.3
Flew thus sees no contradiction in speaking of punishment
in cases where one or other of the criteria for what we
call a standard case of punishment is not satisfied, so
long as these cases are regarded and continue to be
4regarded as exceptional. In a later article, Baler
takes exception to both Quinton and Flew. Quinton, he
argues, is mistaken in his view that ’punish* is a
’performative verb’ like ’promise*, for to say ’I punish*
is not to punish, whereas to say ’ I promise* is to
5promise. Flew, on the other hand, is mistaken in 
thinking that the problem is simply one of frequency 
of occurrence. Is is easy to envisage the deterioration 
of a legal system which results in the wrongful
1
Pages 479-80.
2
Flew, op. cit., pp.291, 299.
3
Page 293.
4
Page 303.
5
Baier, ’Is Punishment Retributive?’, p.30. An excellent 
discussion of Quinton’s claim that the first-person-present 
use of ’prniish’ is performative is found in D. Seligman, 
op. cit., pp.74-80.
Ik
punishment of a majority of people. What is important, 
Baier claims, is that people are found guilty, not that 
they are guilty^ for punishing is part of a ' game' 
consisting of rule-making, penalization, finding guilty 
of a breach of a rule, pronouncing sentence, and finally 
administering punishment', such that
the last act cannot be performed unless things 
have gone according to the rules till. then. It 
is one of the constitutive rules of this whole 
'game1 2* that the activity called punishing, or 
administering punishment, cannot be performed if, 
at a previous stage of the 'game*, the person 
in question has been found 'not guilty'. ... If,
after the jury has found the accused 'not guilty', 
the judge continues as if the jury had found him 
guilty, then his 'I sentence you to three years' 
hard labour1’ is not the pronouncement of the 
sentence, but mere words. If, for some reason, 
the administration acts on these words, then 
what they do to the accused is not the 
infliction of punishment, but something for 
which (since it never happens) we do not even 
have a word.^
Armstrong, however, expresses some doubts as to whether 
Baier's analysis will do, even for his (Armstrong's) own 
weak sense of 'punish'; for although 'it includes
everything that we would call punishment, it also, 3includes things we would not call punishment.5 Take,
for example, the case of an innocent man, who, though
known to be innocent is declared to be guilty by a
court that goes through the formal motions of a trial,
1
Page 28.
2
Pages 26=7.
Armstrong, op. cit. , p.48.1.
.3
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is sentenced, and duly executed. Would it be proper to 
call this 'punishment'? Or, if a schoolmaster regularly 
beats one of his pupils after saying the words 'Bloggs'. 
You were laughing'« 1 Ian informal declaration of his 
guilt), although Bloggs never so much as cracks a 
smile and the teacher's eyesight is good, would we 
want to say that Bloggs is punished regularly? Or is 
he rather being victimized? Other philosophers have 
also taken exception to views like those of Quinton,
Flew and Beim, and have maintained instead that the 
person punished must be believed or supposed to have 
committed the offence. * Some have gone even further 
and have allowed that
we call arbitrary punishments, punishments — e.g. 
punishments under the Nazi regime, where 
individuals are punished when not guilty of 
any offence.... If there were any suggestions 
of an allegation of an offence, even in the 
most stretched sense of 'offence' such as 
allows the incurring of the monarch's 
displeasure to count as an offence, we 
should, I suggest, speak of them as systems 
of unjust, unmerited punishments, rather 
than systems of pain inflictions that were 
not really systems of punishment but 
pseudo-punishment systems.2
1
E«g. A.Co Ewing, 'Armstrong on the Retributive Theory', 
p.l22°} D» Locke, op. cit., pp. 568-91 S. Gendin,
Theories of Punishment and the Idea of Criminal 
Responsibility, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New 
York University, 1966, pp. idem. 'The Meaning
of "Punishment"', Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research,Vol. XXVIII, 1967-8, p.235.
2
McCloskey, 'The Complexity of the Concepts of Punishment', 
p.320. In 'Utilitarian and Retributive Punishment1, 
McCloskey interprets this as meaning that punishment is 
not 'conceptually tied to the fact that the person
(footnote e ontinued on p .?6)
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It seems to me that the root of the problems which 
give rise to this debate is to be found in the tendency 
to subscribe to the rigid conception of definition which 
I criticized earlier. Certainly, if ’offender', 
’wrongdoer', ’guilt’ or 'disobedience or failure to 
obey’ is made a logically necessary condition for 
calling unpleasant treatment ’punishment’, then it will 
not make sense to speak of ’punishing the innocent’.
But if ’guilt’ is only typically or characteristically 
involved in speaking about punishment, then it is only 
a logically necessary condition for speaking about 
unqua1ified punishment, and we may quite well speak about 
qua1ified punishment when the person punished is not 
guilty. When a person is mistakenly punished then we 
must speak of his punishment as ’undeserved’ or 
’unmerited’. Of course the situation is different 
when it is known that the person is innocent.
However, doubts can be raised as to whether my own 
suggestion can escape all the problems. For in saying 
that ’guilt’ or ’disobedience or failure to obey’ is
(footnote 2 continued from p.75)
punished is an offender’ (p.105). There is an interesting 
proclamation preserved in the Australian National War 
Museum, Canberra, which reads: 5 In future the inhabitants
of places situated near railways and telegraph lines 
which have been destroyed will be punished without mercy 
(whether they are guilty of this destruction or not).
For this purpose, hostages have been taken in all places 
in the vicinity of railways in danger of similar attacks; 
and at the first attempt to destroy any railway, telegraph 
or telephone line, they will be shot immediately.
Brussels, The Governor,
5th October, 1914. VON DER GOLTZ.’
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typically or characteristically involved in speaking 
about punishment, am I not committed to the same 
difficulty as Flew, namely, of having to deny the 
possibility of a situation arising in which most 
punishments (in our present use of the word) are 
wrongful? Or alternatively, am I not, like Baler, 
committed to including as punishments more than we 
would want to call punishments? (Unless I wish to go 
as far as McCloskey, and allow that a mere ’allegation’"*" 
is sufficient to qualify unpleasant treatment as 
’punishment’.) These objections, however, misunderstand 
the meaning which I have given to ’typically’ or 
’characteristically’, for they are not equivalent to 
’usually’. To say that ’guilt’ or ’disobedience or 
failure to obey’ is typically or characteristically 
involved when speaking of punishment, is to say that 
unless punishment is qualified in some special way, it 
is assumed by the speaker that this feature is present 
when he speaks of unpleasant treatment as ’punishment’. 
Also, as I argued earlier in this Chapter, we must 
draw a distinction between the absence of one of the 
features characteristically involved in employing a 
concept, and its deliberate exclusion. It seems to me 
that we shall be quite willing to speak of punishment, 
albeit undeserved punishment, when unpleasant treatment 
is inflicted on a person in respect of some offence 
which he is believed to have committed but which he 
has not actually committed. But deliberately to inflict
_ _
I am not convinced that ’allegation’ is as non»commital 
as McCloskey appears to think.
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unpleasant treatment on a person knowing full well 
that he has not committed any offence (even though 
he may have been 'alleged* to have committed an offence 
or may have been formally 'found guilty’ of an offence) 
is not to punish him, but to victimize, take advantage 
of, bully, persecute, tyrannize, or oppress him, and 
to cover this up by making it look as though he is 
being punished."*'
(e) Must punishments be administered by an authority?
It is almost universally agreed in philosophical circles 
that one of the defining characteristics of punishment 
is its administration by some authority.^ Punishment,
1
It seems to me that Baier's example ('Is Punishment 
Retributive?', p.30) of the executioner whispering to the 
man being sentenced to death, 'I am punishing you for 
something you have not done', gains any plausibility it 
has from the fact that the punishing authority and the 
instrument of punishment (the executioner) are separated. 
¥e take the executioner to mean, and indeed he could 
just as well have said: ’They’re punishing you for 
something you have not done' or 'You’re being punished 
for something you have not done’. Seligman would not 
agree with this. He argues that the statement 'I am 
punishing you for something you have not done' is 
ambiguous and is absurd only if it is interpreted as 
'I am punishing you for nothing' . Punishment must 
always be for something. But the statement is not 
absurd if it means 'I am punishing you for something 
even though you did not do this something’ (op. cit., 
pp.72-4). This interpretation is more persuasive, 
though I think we would still speak of 'making someone 
pay' rather than 'punishing'. (But see the ’proclamation’ 
on p.76 f/n.2 above).
2
I have come across very few exceptions to this.
Bentham, interestingly enough, seems to recognize this 
possibility. He defines punishment as 'an evil
(footnote continued on p.79)
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it is said, cannot be administered by just anybody,
It ’has to (be at least supposed to) be imposed by 
virtue of some special authority, conferred through or 
by the institutions against the laws or rules of which 
the offence has been committed.'  ^ I do not believe
(footnote 2 continued from p.78)
resulting to a person from the direct intention of another, 
on account of some act that has been ! or at least appears 
to have beenJ done or omitted’ . And he comments on this: 
’By the denomination thus given to the act, by the 
word punishment, taken by itself, no limitation is put 
to the description of the person of the agent; but on 
the occasion of the present work, this person is all 
along considered as a person invested for this purpose 
with the authority of the State;’ etc. (Principles of 
Penal Law, p.39l)» Filangieri, Hobbes and Locke 
considered that in a state of nature every man possessed 
the right to punish, a right, however, which had been 
transferred by contract to the sovereign at the formation 
of civil society (cf. J. Heath, Eighteenth Century Penal. 
Theory, Oxford University Press, 1963> p .61). Others who 
do not make ’authority’ a defining characteristic of 
punishment are R.B. Brandt, ’Blameworthiness and 
Obligation', in Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. A.I.
Melden, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958,
p .27; R.A. Samek, 'Punishment: A Postscript to Two
Prolegomena', Philosophy, Vol.XLI, 1966, pp.2l6, 221;
P. Herbst, 'Notes on Punishment’, an unpublished 
(duplicated) lecture delivered at the Australian National 
University, Canberra, June, 1966 . pp.2-3l J.A. Patterson,
’Uses of "Punishment"’, Unpublished paper read to the 
New Zealand Philosophy Conference, May, 1968.
1
Flew, op. cit., p.294. Flew confirms his argument by
appealing to the Oxford English Dictionary, which defines 
'punishment’ (sensela)inthefollowing way: 'As an
act of a superior or of public authority: To cause (an
offender) to suffer for an offence; to subject to 
judicial chastisement as retribution or requital or as a 
caution against further transgression; to inflict a 
penalty upon.’ But this definition does not support 
Flew - for it is intended only to be a definition of
(footnote continued on p.80)
80
this to be the case. For unpleasant treatment to be 
’punishment’ it is not at all necessary that it be 
meted out by some special authority. Punishment which 
is not inflicted by an appropriate authority is by 
definition unauthorized, illegal, or unlawful punishment 
(provided that it is meted out in the context of a legal 
or a quasi-legal framework), yet it is still punishment. 
Punishments do not presuppose either a legal or a 
quasi-legal system: only authorized, legal or lawful
punishments. Punishments may be deserved or just even 
when they are unauthorized. There is nothing at all 
odd about a father saying to a neighbour who has 
punished his son for fighting. ’You’ve got no right 
to punish my son’; nor do we find any logical oddity 
in speaking about people who ’take the law (or 
punishment) into their own hands’ ; nor are we puzzled 
about self-inflicted punishments, nor punishments 
inflicted by private citizens when the institutional 
authority has broken down. It is still punishment even 
if the punisher recognizes his lack of authority: ’I
know I don’t really have the authority to do so, but 
I’m going to punish you. myself’ . This is in marked 
contrast to the defining characteristics which I have 
been considering. There we saw that if a particular 
characteristic was deliberately excluded from the 
unpleasant treatment, then we no longer referred to it 
as ’punishment’.
(footnote .1 continued from p.?9)
punishment ’ a_s an act of a superior or of public authority 
not of punishment in general. This legal or quasi-legal 
context is not part of the definition of punishment.
This is shown by sense lb in the 0.E,D. The Shorter O.E.D 
does not mention authority.
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What, then, do most philosophers say about 
unpleasant treatment which is not imposed by some 
authority? Flew is as good and as representative an 
example as any, and 1 quote his views:
A parent, a Dean of a College, a Court 
of Law, even perhaps an umpire or a referee, 
acting as such, can be said to impose a 
punishment; but direct action by an aggrieved 
person with no pretensions to special authority 
is not properly called punishment, but revenge. 
(Vendetta is a form of institutionalized revenge 
between families regarded as individuals.)
Direct action by an unauthorized busybody who 
takes it upon himself to punish, might be 
called punishment - as there is no unanimity 
rule about the simultaneous satisfaction of 
all the criteria - though if so it would be 
a non-standard case of punishment. Or it 
might equally well be called pretending 
(i.e. claiming falsely) to punish.^
In contrast to Flew, the position which I wish to defend
is that punishment ought generally to be meted out by
some authority - parental, legal, etc. It is not the
case that unpleasant treatment _is punishment only if it
is imposed by some authority. Flew1s defence of this
latter position is based on a number of confusions.
(i) He states that 'direct action by an aggrieved person
with no pretensions to special authority is not properly
2called punishment but revenge.' It is true that
1
Ibid.
2
Flew is supported in this by G.H. von Wright, who 
states: 'One could say that revenge and retaliation are
what punishment "logically” deteriorates into, when 
approximate equals try to command one another’ (The 
Varieties of Goodness, London: Routl.edge and Kegan Paul,
(footnote continued on p.82)
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whereas we speak of having an authority to punish, it 
would be strange to speak of having an authority to take 
revenge.'*' But to think, as Flew seems to, that the 
difference between revenge and punishment is a matter 
of authority is quite mistaken. For it is quite possible 
for an aggrieved party who does have special authority 
(e.g. a parent) to take revenge on another (his child). 
For the ground of revenge, and the feature which 
distinguishes it from punishment, is the fact that 
someone has hurt me or someone close to me. Revenge is 
the getting of one’s own back; the notion of moral 
wrong is irrelevant to it. A father may thus take 
revenge on his child if the unpleasant treatment is 
inflicted on the child, not because of the offence or 
wrong which the child has committed, but because of the 
injury caused to the parent by the child’s offence. The 
act of a busybody who ’ took it upon himself to punish’ 
an offence logically could not be revenge if his own 
interests (and those of others close to him) were not 
harmed in any way by the offence. Not only this, but 
revenge can be taken on a person whose actions are
(footnote 2 continued from p.8.l)
1963> p.200). Compare also Bacon, who says that 'revenge 
is a kind of wild justice’ (Essays, IV, 'Of Revenge’, ed. 
S.H. Reynolds, Oxford: Clarendon Press, I89O, p.3^)j
Hobbes, op. cit. , p.l63j Hegel., op. cit. , § 220, p.l4l;
J.M. Smith, Punishment: Its Nature and Justification,
p.8; R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education, London: Allen
& Unwin, 1966, p.268.
1
It would be strange, but not impossible. I could 
imagine such an authorization occurring in countries 
where vendettas are recognized by the authorities 
(e.g. Corsica).
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morally praiseworthy. If X murders Y and is gaoled for 
it, I, being a close friend, relative, or admirer or 
X, may without .Logical oddity be said to seek revenge 
on the policeman who caught him or the judge who sentenced 
him. The same applies also to the notions of 
vindictiveness and retaliation.^
(ii) If with Flew we regard vendetta as a form of
institutionalized revenge, the same difficulties are
faced. Vendettas will be distinguished from punishments
not by the fact that they are not authorized actions,
but by the fact that they are retaliatory - matters of
getting one’s own back. Injuries, not moral, considerations,
2will be primary.
(iii) Flew is double-minded on punishment by busybodies: 
it may be regarded either as a non-standard case of 
punishment or as a false claim to punish. But he does 
not tell us why either of these should be the case apart 
from the fact that ’punishment by busybodies' does not 
fulfil the criterion of 'imposed by some authority' .
This is simply to reiterate the point that 'punishment 
by busybodies' is either non-standard or a false claim
to punish, not to give grounds for it. As I mentioned
1
For a discussion of some of the differences between 
retaliation and punishment, see T.S. Woolsey, 'Retaliation 
and Punishment', Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law, 1913» pp.62-9«
2
Flew’ s characterization of vendetta as institutionalized 
revenge is not altogether convincing^ 'institutionalized 
vengeance’ is somewhat closer. Vengeance, unlike revenge, 
is specifically for wrongs done to the avenger (or those 
close to him).
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before, there is nothing odd about the use of the word 
'punish’ in the sentence, 'You've got no right to punish 
him'. There is no suggestion that he wasn’t really 
punished - unless it is felt that when others take 
punishment into their own hands, they must be merely 
getting their own back. Similar sorts of considerations 
apply to lynching - which at its best is illegal 
punishment and at its worst mob revenge.
As I have already suggested, the relationship of 
punishment to authority is moral rather than conceptual.
As a rule we think that the task of administering 
punishment ought to be limited to someone having the 
appropriate authority. It is not difficult to conceive 
of a society whose members punished their fellows 
whenever they did wrong. But it is considerably more 
difficult to imagine persons like ourselves as members 
of such a society. Human, nature is not like that; we 
cannot be trusted justly to punish our fellows if left 
to ourselves. We are too impetuous and fault-finding, 
too easily swayed by the wrong motives, too eager to 
excuse ourselves at the expense of others, and too 
ready to remove the mote from our brother's eye while 
neglecting the beam in our own. This is why we have 
blood-feuds, lynchings and revenge. This is also why 
we need to adopt conventions and draw up regulations for 
the imposition of punishment. Only so can we reasonably 
hope for a tradition of impartial and just punishment.^
But we shall say more about this in Chapter Seven.
I
Similar ideas are put forward by Locke in his Second 
Treatise of Civil Government, introdn. by W.S. Carpenter, 
Everyman edn., London: J.M. Dent, 1924, §§ 87=90» pp.158-61.
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I have now completed my enumeration of the criteria 
for calling something ’punishment'. Ve may sum up as 
follows: Punishment, when unqualified, must be
an activity;
administered by some intentional 
agent or agency;
unpleasant or unwanted;
intended to be unpleasant nr unwanted; 
for something;
inflicted for some disobedience or 
failure to obey which constitutes a 
moral wrong;
of the wrongdoer.
Of these criteria, I have suggested that ( i) , ( ii) , (iv)
and (v) are logically entailed in referring to something 
as ’punishment’ (except, of course, when it is being 
used metaphorically). Criteria (iii), (vi) and (vii) 
are what I have referred to as partially entailed 
characteristics. Their absence does not necessarily 
mean that we can no longer speak of 'punishment’, only 
that we must at least qualify it as inefficacious, 
undeserved or unjust. If either (iii), (vi), or (vii) 
is deliberately or knowingly omitted, then it is no 
longer appropriate to speak of the treatment as ’punishment’
But we have not quite completed our task yet, for 
although we have elucidated the defining characteristics 
of punishment we have not fully explained what 'punishment* 
means ~ what is its role in the language. To this we
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
now come.
86
(f) Punishment as a moral notion. In his article on 
punishment, K.G, Armstrong writes: 1 2’'punishment! is
not in itself an ethical termq "pimishment!!, like all 
activity words, can occur in ethical, propositions, but 
such propositions are not made ethical by its presence*. 
¥ith this we may compare some remarks of Rawls:
The subject of punishment, in the sense 
of attaching legal penalties to the violation 
of legal rules, has always been a troubling 
moral question. The trouble about it has not 
been that people disagree as to whether or 
not punishment is justifiable. Most people 
have held that, freed from certain abuses, 
it is an acceptable institution. Only a few 
have rejected punishment entirely, which is 
rather surprising when one considers all that 
can be said against it.^
1
Armstrong, op. cit., p.476. Much the same sort of 
view was propounded by Hare in the paper mentioned above.
2
Rawls, op. cit., p .4. William Godwin was one who 
argued that the infliction of punishment was unjustifiable. 
His primary reason was that punishment, in enforcing 
moral, behaviour, obscured the real reasons for doing 
right. As well, by pigeon-holing human behaviour it 
constituted the main cause of prejudice. A further 
reason for Godwin’s rejection of punishment can be found 
in his acceptance of determinism. Despite this, Godwin 
still argued for the retention of punishment as a 
temporary expedient (Cf. D. H. Monro, Godwin* s Moral 
Philosophy, Oxford University Press, .1953» pp. 145-52) •
Those who reject all. punishment nowadays generally do so 
because they subscribe to deterministic theses which 
lead them to repudiate the notions of ’moral wrongdoing* 
and ’responsibility*. We shall discuss this in some 
detail in Chapter Six.
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Now if, as I suspect he does, Rawls has a 
conception of the word ’punishment’ which is similar 
to Armstrong's, then it is not difficult to understand 
his surprise. For an ethically neutral concept which 
described an activity involving the infliction of 
unpleasant treatment would certainly face a number of 
prima facie objections. However, if the implications 
of my previous discussion have been grasped, it will be 
seen that Rawls has no real reason to be surprised, 
because ’punishment’ is a moral notion.^
Armstrong’s remarks suggest that activity-words 
cannot be ethical terms; he does not argue for it. 
However, it is clear enough that quite a number of 
activity-words are ethical terms: 'promise-keeping’,
’murder’, ’stealing', 'lying', etc. All these words,
as I pointed out in Chapter One, have been framed from 
within the moral sphere of discourse. It is my 
contention that ’punishment’ belongs to this group.
This is not because all activity-words are ethically 
loaded. Indeed, many of them are not. 'Killing', 
'taking' and 'inflicting unpleasant treatment' fall 
into this latter category. If I am asked: 'Are
killing and taking things and inflicting unpleasant 
treatment wrong?’ my only answer can be: 'It depends.'
Before we can tell whether killing or taking things or 
inflicting unpleasant treatment are wrong we must 
have a fuller description of what situations are
__
Cf. J . D . Percy, 'Revenge and Retribution', London 
Quarterly Review, Vol. 168, 194.3» p.71? K. Baier,
'Responsibility and Freedom’, pp.52, 66; Peters,
op. cit., p.269.
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envisaged. Supposing the descriptions are now expanded 
to: killing people because you bear a grudge against
them; taking things that do not belong to you without 
first gaining permission; inflicting unpleasant treatment 
for moral offences; then we are in a better position 
to say whether or not they are wrong. For now we have 
given descriptions of murder, stealing, punishment. The 
first two describe morally reprehensible activities, the 
third a morally acceptable one. If instead we had 
expanded ' inflicting unpleasant treatment’ to ’ inflicting 
unpleasant treatment for fun’, then we would have 
described ’sadism’, another notion framed from within 
the moral sphere of discourse, and by definition wrong. 
’Punishment’, I want to say, stands in the same relation 
to ’inflicting unpleasant treatment’ as ’telling the 
truth’ stands to ’ saying what is the case’ . ’Sadism' , 
on the other hand, stands in much the same relationship 
to ’inflicting unpleasant treatment' as 'telling on 
someone’ or 'betraying' stand to 'saying what is the case’ 
In each of these cases we are confronted with an 
activity which has not been described in terms of the 
moral sphere of discourse, and which therefore cannot 
be judged right or wrong. To judge the activity right 
or wrong, the activity has to be related to a context 
provided by the moral sphere of discourse. (That is, 
it most probably would not have helped us to say 
'inflicting unpleasant treatment at 7*^5 a.m. on 
Thursday'.)
Punishment, because it is a moral notion, does not 
stand in need of justification any more than honesty does. 
It makes no more sense to ask whether punishment is right
89
than to ask whether stealing and murder are wrong.
Rawls' surprise is a philosophical surprise, a product 
of idling words.^ But wait! Of course we can ask 
whether punishment as such is justified. The question 
can be given perfectly good sense. I am not denying 
that punishment can come up for justification. But if 
it does, the grounds for this must be other than that 
punishment involves the infliction of unpleasant treatment 
on people, since in calling that unpleasant treatment 
'punishment', we have already distinguished it from 
other forms of unpleasant treatment as being morally 
permissible for a particular sort of reason. What is 
open to us is to raise the question asked by many 
psychologists and penal reformers - whether punishment, 
although referring to a morally permissible form of 
unpleasant treatment, is logically dependent upon a 
false premise of free will and moral responsibility.
But more of that later.
It is true that most philosophers have asked 
whether punishment is justifiable, on the ground that 
it involves the infliction of unpleasant treatment. But 
then many have asked similar questions about murder 
and stealing.^ However, such questions, in their present 
form, are unintelligible, for the notions answer the 
questions before they are asked. That a particular act 
is honest is the moral justification for doing it;
Cf. L. Wittgenstein, op. cit., §132, p.^lei 'The 
confusions which occupy us arise when language is like 
an engine idling, not when it is doing work.'
2
Cf. G.E. Moore, op. cit., p.156=7; A.J. Ayer, Language, 
Truth and Logic, Second edn., Londons Gollancz, 19^6,
pp. 107 ff.
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that a particular act is one of (unqualified) punishment 
is the moral justification for doing it. Most of our 
moral disputes do not arise at this level.« They arise 
because we cannot agree whether a particular act is 
best described as honesty, or telling on someone, or 
betraying, etc. Or in the case of punishment, they 
arise because we cannot agree as to whether or not an 
act should be regarded as unqualified or qualified 
punishment, victimization, or revenge, etc.
We recognize the evaluative nature of the concept 
of punishment in our ordinary discourse. If we see a 
mother beating her child, it is usually sufficient for 
her to answer the question ’Why are you doing that?’
(a question asked to ascertain whether what she is 
doing is right or wrong) with ’I'm punishing him’.
Any further questions we may ask of her are simply 
directed at finding out whether her punishment of the 
child is ungualified punishment - whether the child 
had committed some moral offence, whether he could have 
known that what he was doing was wrong, etc. The 
question of the justifiability of punishment in general 
does not come up. This is not because ordinary people 
are unreflective, but because ’punishment’ is 
axiologically loaded. Armstrong fails to see this when 
he criticizes Ewing for commencing The Morality of 
Puni shine nt
with the assumption that, whatever it is, 
punishment is morally justified, and then 
rejects some definitions because he cannot 
agree that what they produce is morally 
justifiable (e .g . on p.30). Clearly the 
logical order is first to decide what
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punishment is, then to decide whether this 
thing is morally justifiable or not.*
Armstrong’s criticism would have been valid had his 
suggestions about the ethical neutrality of activity- 
words been correct. But as we have seen this is not so.
Before turning to consider the various legitimate 
justificatory questions which can be raised in relation 
to punishment there is one point which must be 
emphasized. X do not want to suggest that with one 
swift definitional flick I have solved or dissolved 
a problem which has been passionately debated since 
Plato. That problem still remains. What I hope to 
have shown is that due to a failure to understand the 
way in which terms like ’punishment' function in our 
language, we have stated the problem in a way which 
has brought not clarity but confusion.
k. Justificatory Questions and Punishment.
We are now in a position to specify more clearly 
the different justificatory questions which can be 
raised in relation to punishment. The question, 'What 
justifies punishment?' carries with it a false clarity 
and simplicity. In fact, as it stands, it is quite 
obscure, and when it is clarified, it is multifaced.
It is obscure because it is without a context. We do 
not know what is bothering the questioner, and to meet 
a justificatory question we must at least know this. 
Justificatory questions, as I argued in Chapter One,
Armstrong, op. cit., pp.475~6.
1
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do not arise in a vacuum, They presuppose an apparent 
discrepancy between an action or activity and some 
standard, rule or end, and unless this standard, rule 
or end is made clear, the justificatory questions can 
be neither understood nor answered. We cannot even 
be sure whether the question is being raised about a 
specific instance of punishment, the general activity 
of punishing or the practices of legal, parental, pedagogic 
or ecclesiastical punishment.
So that we can get clear about the various possible 
justificatory questions, I want to sketch the outline 
of a possible situation so that we can consider some of 
the sorts of questions which might be raised with respect 
to punishment. In this sketch I am concerned solely 
with the types of justificatory question asked. I am 
not concerned with the adequacy of the answers given.
Suppose Black has been charged with and convicted 
of homosexual practices. He has been sentenced to 
three years imprisonment for the offence. A group of 
men discuss the case together.
Williams: ’Do you think they were justified in
punishing him? The evidence seemed 
pretty thin. 1 wouldn’t have trusted 
the key witness. I ’m sure he had a 
grudge against Black.’
White: ’True enough, but the other witnesses
corroborated his testimony, so it's 
not likely that he was lying. But even 
if he wasn't lying, what does that 
matter. Homosexuality isn’t immoral; 
it's a psychological defect. The poor 
guy couldn’t have helped it. He needs 
treatment, not punishment.'
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J one s:
Macdonald:
Collins:
Green:
Davidson:
’In some cases this is so, but not 
all homosexuals are inverts. Some do 
it simply because the normal outlets 
are not available to them, and there 
was no real evidence of any psychological, 
instability in Black’s case. But what 
bothers me is that homosexuality should 
be punished by the law. I guess it’s 
wrong wilfully to engage in such practices, 
but it’s not for the law to punish. It 
doesn’t cause any trouble.’
’¥ell, maybe it doesn’t often cause trouble. 
But remember that one of the witnesses 
mentioned that on another occasion he had 
seen Black trying to seduce a young boy. 
Imagine what the psychological and moral 
effect on the child would have been.
Still, three years imprisonment is a bit 
much to give a person for an offence 
like Black’s. I t ’s hardly that serious. 
After all, if you're drunk and get 
involved in an accident which kills 
someone, you can get away with two 
years in gaol.'
'It’s not simply that three years is too 
much. I t ’s the fact that they should 
imprison a person for an offence like that. 
Gaol sentences only aggravate matters. A 
good stiff fine would have been more 
appropriate. That would have been, 
sufficient to deter him.’
'I agree that a gaol sentence would not 
necessarily have been the best thing for 
him. Nevertheless, isn’t it wrong to 
think in terms of deterrence? That could 
lead to all sorts of unjust treatment. 
Shouldn't we think, rather, of punishing 
according to deserts?’
’But that's impossible. You can’t measure 
or determine how much punishment people 
deserve. This is the whole trouble with 
punishing people. It commits you to 
making moral assessments of them. 
Psychologists have now shown that moral 
assessments are based on the false
9k
assumption of free will. People are 
moulded by their heredity and 
environment. Criminals are social 
deviates, not immoral. Pimishment is 
outmoded and should be scrapped and 
replaced by some form of treatment or 
cure. ’
Let us stop here and review the sorts of questions 
which are being asked. The questions of Williams and 
White are directed specifically at Black's punishment 
and are concerned with whether or not some of the 
formal criteria relevant to the justification of this 
particular instance of punishment have been satisfied:
Did Black commit the offence? Was he morally responsible 
for the offence? Was what he did morally wrong? With 
Jones we find a shift from Black’s particular case to 
a more general question. He is not concerned with 
whether or not Black's punishment was legal, (he 
presumably thinks it was), but with whether there is 
any moral justification for the legal punishment of 
acts like Black's. His concern, then, is with the 
formal criteria which must be satisfied to justify the 
punishment of a certain class of wrongdoing by a 
particular authority. Macdonald turns the discussion 
from the question whether or not Black ought to have 
been punished, to the question of how severely he ought 
to have been punished. Specifically he is concerned 
with whether or not the formal criteria which must be 
satisfied to justify a particular penalty have been met. 
Collins’s question is similar, but concerns the 
particular type of penalty. Green shifts the attention 
to the more basic question concerning the formal 
criteria for justifying the severity of punishment.
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This question, however, presupposes that punishment 
in general is justified, and it is this presupposition 
which Davidson challenges - not by suggesting that 
punishment is evil or morally unjustified, but by 
suggesting that in punishing, the impossible is 
being attempted.
These questions are all intelligible enough, and 
we shall have occasion to look at them in the course of 
this dissertation. Questions like those of Williams 
and White will be examined in Chapters Four and Five; 
Davidson's in Chapter Six; Macdonald's in Chapter 
Seven; and Collins's and Green's in Chapter Eight.
Nevertheless, none of these justificatory questions 
is quite comparable to the question which has 
traditionally been primary in the debate, namely,
'What justifies the infliction of punishment in 
general?’ It should be clear that on my own view, this 
question cannot arise, for to describe a particular 
type of activity as (unqualified) punishment is to 
give the justification for it. Does this mean that 
the old debate has been based on a misconception about 
the word 'punish'? I do not think so, even though 
certain aspects of the traditional debate confuse the 
issues. What has traditionally bothered people about 
punishment, and what has given rise to the justificatory 
questions concerning the general activity of punishing 
is that 'to punish a man is deliberately to do something 
unpleasant to him, not as a dentist does, as a 
regrettable accompaniment to the long-term betterment 
of his condition, but as a matter of deliberate
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principle’. The problem which this raises is not 
removed by a particular definition of 'punishment1, even 
though its character is changed somewhat. We can 
acceptably express its basic thrust in the following 
way: 'Can we have any justification for deliberately
inflicting unpleasant treatment on people?’ On the 
basis of what I have said about the meaning of ’punishment’, 
a short answer relevant to this question would be:
’Yes, when that deliberately unpleasant treatment 
constitutes "punishment"; i.e. is for moral wrongdoing.’
I am not sure on what basis a further justificatory 
question can be raised here unless it is suggested that 
it needs to be shown why moral wrongdoing in. particular 
justifies the deliberate infliction of unpleasant 
treatment. I shall give some detailed consideration 
to this and the preceding question in Chapters Four and 
Five. I shall do this in the context of a discussion 
of the even broader question ’Can we have any 
justification for inflicting unpleasant treatment on 
people?’ In the meantime, I shall, turn to the concept 
of desert, since it has a crucial place in the argument 
of these Chapters.
1
Benn and Peters, op. cit. P-173.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE CONCEPT OF DESERT
In Chapter One I noted that justifications of 
punishment had traditionally involved an appeal to either 
or perhaps both of two sorts of considerations, namely, 
retributive and utilitarian. It would be difficult to 
argue that either one of these has been historically 
dominant. Both Plato and Aristotle appeal to retributive 
as well as to utilitarian considerations, although Plato 
is probably more of a utilitarian. Bishop Butler,
Richard Price, Kant, Hegel^ and Bradley are all basically 
retributivists, whereas Beccaria, Hume, Bentham, the Mills, 
and Sidgwick^ are fundamentally utilitarians. Not much 
therefore is achieved by any appeal to names.
Nevertheless, in the last 1^0 years it is undeniable 
that utilitarian considerations have been dominant in
1
The classification of Hegel as a retributivist is 
somewhat controversial. Taken in itself his discussion 
has a strongly retributive flavour, but it has been 
persuasively argued that in the context of his whole 
theory Hegel’s fundamental justification is reformative. 
This interpretation is taken by J.M.E. McTaggart, 'Hegel’s 
Theory of Punishment’, International Journal of Ethics,
Vol. VI, 1895-6, pp.479-502; W.B. Wines, 'On Hegel's 
Idea of the Nature and Sanction of Law', Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy, Vol. XVIII, 1884, pp.19-20;
O.K. Flechtheim, 'Hegel and the Problem of Punishment', 
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 8, 1947* pp.298,
301-3.
2
Sidgwick, however, has a definite intuitionist streak.
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discussions of punishment, as they have been in ethics 
generally.^ There are no doubt many reasons for this, 
but two can. be mentioned:
(i) Utilitarianism is in many ways an appealing position. 
To men like ourselves utilitarian considerations possess 
a non-metaphysical reasonableness and persuasiveness 
which is not characteristic of retributive considerations: 
’Our ideas of happiness and misery are of all our ideas 
the nearest and most important to us’, wrote Butler, a 
philosopher of unusual sensitivity to human nature:
though virtue or moral rectitude does 
indeed consist in affection to and pursuit 
of what is right and good, as such; yet, 
when we sit down in a cool hour, we can 
neither justify to ourselves this or any 
other pursuit, till we are convinced that 
it will be for our happiness, or at least 
not contrary to it.^
Butler himself was a non-utilitarian, yet he recognized 
the pull which utilitarianism has for us. Non­
utilitarian considerations also have a pull for us, 
but in many contemporary discussions of punishment there 
has been a tendency to regard them as impulses or 
feelings belonging to our lower nature, primitive 
desires for revenge. Retribution, Solovyof writes,
1
The recent 8 volume Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. P. 
Edwards, New York: Macmillan & The Free Press, 1967)
contains no article on or discussion of the notions of 
desert and merit.
2
J. Butler, Works, ed. W. Gladstone, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1896, Vol. II, p.206.
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is ’incompatible with any degree of developed human 
feeling.* ^
(ii) The recent philosophical disenchantment with 
rationalist and intuitionist theories of ethics has 
further detracted from the retributivist position. For 
it is in such theories of ethics that a basic, 
ultimately unanalysable or intuitively discerned fitness 
or desert has seemed at home. According to Butler, we
have a capacity of reflecting upon actions 
and characters, making them an object to our 
thought: and on doing this, we naturally
and unavoidably approve some actions, under 
the peculiar view of their being virtuous 
and of good desert; and disapprove others, 
as vicious and of ill-desert.
It is not fashionable for philosophers to claim to have 
such perceptions any more, and if they do, there are
1
V. Solovyof, The Justification of the Good, trans.
N.A. Duddington, London: Constable, 1918, p.302; cf.
de Quiros: ’The old notion of retribution, like extinct
flora and fauna, has no place in our modern world’
(New Theories of Punishment; quoted in Sir Leo Page,
’The Retributive Theory of Punishment’, Nineteenth 
Century and After, Vol. 148, July-December 1950» p.264); 
on May 11, 1950, Lord Justice Asquith referred to
retribution as ’a theory now so discredited that to 
attack it is to flog a dead horse’; W. McDougall:
’The fuller becomes our insight into the springs of 
human conduct, the more impossible does it become to 
maintain this antiquated doctrine of retribution’
(An Introduction to Social Psychology; the latter two 
quotations come from Lord Longford, The Idea of Punishment, 
London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1961, p.29).
2
Butler, op. cit,, Vol. I, pp.397-8.
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many others willing to deny it. What one age ’sees', 
another age cannot or will not. In fact, such is the 
current philosophical ethos, that it has become very 
hard for moral philosophers to think in anything but a 
utilitarian fashion.1 2 Even those discussions of 
punishment which find room for both retributive and
1
Take, for example, Sidgwick: ’Personally, I am so far
from holding this | the retributive] view that I have an 
instinctive and strong moral aversion to it: and I
hesitate to attribute it to Common Sense, since I think 
that it is gradually passing away from the moral 
consciousness of educated persons in the most advanced 
communities: but I think it is still perhaps the more
ordinary view' (The Methods of Ethics, Sixth edn., 
London: Macmillan, I9OI, p.281);Ewing: 'Now it seems
to me that, instead of it being intuitively certain 
that punishment should be inflicted only as an end-in- 
itself without any consideration of consequences, the 
intuitive evidence is all the other way' (The Morality 
of Punishment, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 
1929> p.18; cf. p.20); E.A. Westermarck: 'The
infliction of pain is not an act that the moral 
consciousness regards with indifference even in the 
case of the criminal' (Ethical Relativity, London:
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1932, p.77)> Temple
also declared that he had no ’ intuition ... that it is 
good that the wicked should suffer’ (The Ethics of 
Penal Action, London: Clarke Hall Lectures(No. l),
193^* "p. 28; and Laird: 'Exponents of the [retributive]
theory seem to rely upon a self-evident intuition. I 
suggest that this so-called intuition is only a 
superstition' ('The Justification of Punishment’, Monist, 
Vol. XLI, 1931, p.364).
2
Cf. A.R. Manser: 'nowadays all justification is
thought to be utilitarian, and utilitarian in a 
comparatively crude sense' (’It Serves You Right', 
Philosophy, Vol. XXXVII, 1962, p.305)* Further evidence
for this is provided in W.B. Gallie, 'The Lords’ Debate 
on Hanging, July, 1956: Interpretation and Comment',
Philosophy, Vol. XXXII, 1957» pp.132-47; see also 
D. Loftsgordon, 'Present-day British Philosophers on 
Punishment', p.347 f/n.26.
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utilitarian considerations almost invariably subordinate 
the retributive to the utilitarian considerations,^
But retributive considerations are not so easily
disposed of. They are embedded in our language, and
2still play a useful role in it. Even the staunchest of 
utilitarians have not been able to ignore them, 
whatever they might have said about them. Mill and 
Sidgwick tried to give a utilitarian analysis of justice; 
Duncan-Jones and Nowell-Smith have endeavoured to analyse 
desert in utilitarian terms; Rawls recognizes the 
retributive nature of desert, but gives it a subordinate 
justificatory role within a broader utilitarian framework; 
Quinton purges guilt of any justificatory role and 
includes it in his definition of punishment.
This is clearly an unsatisfactory state of affairs, 
yet one to which there is no simple solution. In an 
endeavour to take some steps towards an answer, I shall 
devote this Chapter to an analysis of desert claims.
1 begin by distinguishing different kinds of desert 
claims, and then turn to a consideration of that which 
is said to be deserving, that which is deserved, and the 
grounds of desert, respectively. I conclude the Chapter 
with a discussion of the meaning of ’X deserves A ’ and 
the role of desert claims in our language.
T “
This also goes for Mabbott, despite his claim to be 
a retributivist.
2
Whether they will continue to do so is questioned by 
Brian Barry in Political Argument, London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1965» pp.112-15. Barry’s position in this 
regard is examined below in Chapter Four, Section 4.
102
'People ought to be punished because they de serve 
it' is one of the dominant strains in many retributive 
justifications of punishment as they have been put 
forward down, through the centuries. Yet the crucial 
notion of desert has rarely been, analysed even by its 
most ardent defenders, And when attempts have been 
made to analyse it, they have almost always been made 
in relation to punishment.1 This has helped to bring
1
Some of the classical political theorists (e.g. Aristotle, 
Nich.omach.ean Ethics, V.3) touch on desert in relation to distributive justice, but they do not treat it in any 
great depth or length. Discussions of desert (or merit) 
which have come to my notice are as follows: W.H. Moberly,
'Some Ambiguities in the Retributive Theory of Punishment’, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. XXV, 1924-3? 
pp. 289-304 ; H.Ho Farmer, 'The Notion of Desert Good and 
Bad', H i b b e r t J ourna 1, Vol XL.I, 1942-3? pp.347-34;
L. Garvin, 'Retributive and Distributive Justice', Journal 
of Philosophy, Vol. XLJI, 1943, pp.270-7; C.W.K. Mundle, 
'Punishment and Desert’, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.4, 
1954, pp.216-28; P.H, Nowell-Smith, 'Freewill and Moral 
Responsibility’, Mind, Vol. LVII, 1948, pp.43-61; A.R. 
Manser, op. cit., pp.293-306; J. Feinberg, 'Justice and 
Personal Desert', Nomos VI: Justice, ed. C.J. Friedrich 
and J,W, Chapman, New York: Atherton Press, 1963? PP*69-97?Richard Price, A Review of the Principal. Questions in 
Morals, ed. D.D. Raphael, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948,
Chapter IV; D.D. Raphael, Moral Judgement, London:
Allen & Unwin, 1953? Chapter V; A.E. Duncan-Jones,
Butler' s Moral. Philosophy, Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1932, Chapter 6; J. Hospers, Human Conduct, New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, I96I, Chapters 9? 10; Brian
Barry, Political Argument, London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, I.963? Chapter 6, sec. 4; Nicholas Rescher, 
Distributive Justice, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966,
Chapters 3? 4 j" R.L. Franklin, Freewill and Determinism,
London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968, Chapter IX.
Of these, Feinberg's article is by far the most substantial, 
and my own discussion is partly based on his.
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the notion into disrepute, for in this context desert 
has often appeared either to represent an emotional 
reaction or a refusal to give further reasons. In my 
opinion, desert claims are not properly restricted to 
punishment or even reward, and my discussion will for 
a time be directed to their broader context. I think 
this will illuminate the particular case of punishment.
1. Types of Desert Claims.
I think it is possible for us to distinguish three 
general types of desert claims:
(a) Raw desert claims, which have the (at least 
implicit) general form: ’X deserves A in virtue of B’.
Raw desert claims are not dependent on any legal or 
quasi-legal system of rules and therefore the 
responsibility for their fulfilment does not devolve 
upon any particular person or authority. Take the 
f o11owing e xamp1e s:
’Peters deserves to get good weather 
for his holidays. He’s planned 
everything so carefully.’
'Smith deserves a break-through. He’s 
been working at that problem for years 
nowi '
'Martin deserves to be punished. He 
lied to Jackson and Burns about 
ringing up yesterday.’
Although we are prepared to say quite specifically that 
Peters deserves 'good weather’ and Smith deserves a 
'break-through', there is no one whom we would hold 
responsible if they did not get it. Of course we 
may want to complain of some cosmic injustice if they
(i)
(ii)
(in)
io4
do not, but this seems hardly necessary. In Martin's 
case, if he is punished, then he has no grounds for 
complaint, but if he is not, then no one in particular 
is to blame for this.
(b) Institutionalized desert claims, which have
the (at least implicit) general form: 'X deserves A of Y
2 —in virtue of B' . The deserved treatment in these cases
presupposes a context of legal or quasi-legal rules - 
institutional or practice rules (in Rawls’ sense - 
appropriately modified). Institutionalized desert 
claims are being made in the following cases:
(i) 'Nolan deserved the prize for his efforts.
His painting was by far the best.'
(ii) 'McKenzie deserves to go to gaol for 
robbing that old lady.'
(iii) 'Menzies deserved to be honoured for 
his contribution to Commonwealth 
relations.'
In each of these cases a claim is implicitly made on 
some particular authority: the competition sponsors
or judges, the law, and the monarchy respectively. 
Sometimes only the context will tell us whether or 
not a desert claim is institutionalized. Claims such 
as 'X deserves compensation' and 'X deserves punishment' 
need to be specified more fully before we can tell 
what type they are.
1
I am assuming that Martin is an adult, and that 'lying' 
as such does not constitute a legal or quasi-legal offence. 
2
Rescher writes as though all desert claims are of this 
sort (op. cit. , p.62,),
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(c ) Specific desert claims. These are usually of 
the same general form as (b), but they concern not so 
much what is deserved as how much is deserved. The 
following examples will serve to distinguish them;
(i) 'Nolan deserved every bit of the $500 
he got for the First Prize.’
(ii) 'McKenzie deserved about 5 years gaol 
for his offence.’
(iii) 'Menzies deserved at least a K.C.M.G.’
In this Chapter I shall be concerned only with raw 
and institutionalized desert claims. However, an 
examination of the dispenser of deserts (y ) will be held 
over till Chapter Seven. Specific desert claims will 
be examined in detail in Chapter Eight.
2. The Deserving (x),
In his R eview of the Principal Questions in Morals, 
Richard Price informs us that
The epithets, right and wrong, are, with 
strict propriety, applied only to actions; 
but good and ill desert belong rather to the 
agent. It is the agent alone, that is 
capable of happiness or misery; and, therefore, 
it is he alone that can properly be said to 
deserve these.1
1
Price, op. cit., p.79* A critical account of Price’s
views on desert can be found in Lennart J^qvist, The 
Moral Philosophy of Richard Price, Lund: C .¥.K . 
Gleerup; and Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard, i960,
pp. 171-85 • j^qvist, however, does not question the 
aspect of Price’s views under consideration.
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By insisting that desert applies 'with strict propriety' 
or 'properly' only to agents, Price implicitly recognizes 
the fact that we do not always speak as though this 
were the case. For we commonly make statements like 
'Nolan's painting deserved the First Prize' or 'Alexander's 
manuscript deserves publication.’ These, Price would 
say, are only elliptical ways of saying 'Nolan deserved 
the First Prize for his painting' or 'Alexander deserves 
to have his manuscript published'. Now it might be 
possible to rephrase all such desert claims in this 
way,^ but even if it is, Price fails to distinguish 
cases where the grounds for desert relate primarily to 
qualities possessed by the agent, and cases where they 
relate primarily to that which the agent has produced 
(a painting, a manuscript, etc.). A desert claim such 
as 'Locke's theory of education deserves serious 
consideration’ can (and may in fact sometimes properly) 
be interpreted as an expression of my estimation of 
Locke as a philosopher, but it need not be so. I may 
not have a very high regard for Locke's general 
philosophical acumen, and may feel that it is more in 
spite of himself that his theory of education deserves 
serious consideration. Price does not appear to see 
this point.
However, we may think that he was not far wrong.
For in the examples we have given, non-human objects which 
could be said to deserve a particular kind of treatment
1
Although 1 have some doubts about this. How would 
Price rephrase the claim: 'This bill of legislation
deserves to be passed’?
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or consideration did not do so apart from their being 
artefacts or products of some intentional agent or 
agency.^ Moreover, although we do not speak of a 
beautiful sunset deserving to be photographed, we might 
speak of God deserving praise for having produced the 
beautiful sunset. Nor do we speak of a certain type of 
weed deserving to be eradicated, even though we may speak 
of certain persons deserving to be fined for having 
introduced it.
But this will not quite do. Ve can quite properly
speak of the Niagara Falls being deservedly famous or
of the Western Australian coastline deserving to be as
well known as that of the East. Here there is no
presumption that these sights are human artefacts. Of
course the fact that they are not artefacts limits the
sorts of things that they can deserve - praise and fame
is about all. This fact has quite an important bearing
on our analysis of desert claims. It is sometimes said
that desert is a moral notion - and it is true that
desert claims are usually made in a moral context.
However, as our analysis will show, although desert is
an evaluative notion (like ’good* and ’bad’), it is not
2specifically tied to moral contexts.
 ^ We can accommodate this to those who speak of treatment 
of varying sorts being deserved by animals. If animals can 
in certain respects properly be regarded in the same way as 
humans, this would be quite legitimate: if we think animals
can be immoral then it is reasonable to speak of them 
deserving punishment. If we do not think they can be either 
moral or immoral, they can deserve neither punishment nor 
conditioning, though they may need conditioning (training).
2 E.g. R.L. Franklin, op. cit. , p.173 (although Franklin's 
example of aesthetic merit goes counter to this);
(footnote continued on p.108)
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3 . The_Deserved (AO .
If we consider the sorts of things which people 
might be said to deserve, we are not, as it would appear 
from most philosophical discussions of desert, limited 
to reward and punishment as its proper objects. True, 
some of the things which people can be said to deserve, 
such as prizes and honours, are, in so far as they are 
deserved, reducible to rewards.^ But there are other 
things which people can deserve and which cannot be 
subsumed under the two-fold classification of reward 
and punishment. ¥e might say of someone who has suffered 
through another's negligence, that he deserved some sort 
of compensation. Or we might speak of people deserving 
praise and blame.
Tfootnote 2 continued from p.107)
Dunean-Jones, op. cit., pp.136-41; Feinberg’s article 
is directed to showing that ’desert is a "natural" moral 
notion’ (op. cit., p.70), but he has previously set 
aside non-personal desert as ’less central’ (p.69)* 
However, it can be doubted whether all personal desert 
is based on moral considerations - especially in the 
area of prize-giving. Desert is no more centrally 
’moral’ than is good.
1
Feinberg distinguishes five major classes of treatment 
that per sons can deserve: (l) Awards of prizes ; (2)
Assignments of grades; (j) Rewards and punishments;
(4) Praise, blame and other informal responses; (5) 
Reparation, liability, and other modes of compensation 
(op. cit., pp.75 ff) ♦ Positions of honour and economic 
benefits he regards as subsumable ’under one or another 
or some combination of the other headings’. There are 
interesting differences between prizes, grades and 
honours, as Feinberg shows, but this does not gainsay 
the fact that inso far as these are deserved, they are 
subsumable under the heading of 'rewards’.
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These categories of things which may be said to 
be deserved (rewards, punishments, praise, blame, 
compensation) are not necessarily exhaustive. Anything 
which is pleasant or unpleasant can be said to be 
deserved (by people, that is). Price correctly points 
out: ’It is the agent alone, that is capable of
happiness or misery; and therefore, it is he alone 
that properly can be said to deserve these’ (italics 
mine). We can deserve anything which is capable of 
giving us ’happiness or misery’, or, to put it more 
generally, anything which is pleasant or unpleasant. 
Deserved treatment is not something towards which we 
remain indifferent. We are glad when our arguments 
are given serious consideration, and upset if they are 
just passed off. To have a manuscript accepted for 
publication is an achievement, to have it rejected a 
disappointment. We regard passing exams as desirable.
We appreciate praise, and do not like exposing ourselves 
to blame. We enjoy being rewarded, and dislike being 
punished. Of course, there will always be people who 
shun praise, eschew honour and despise success. But 
these are not typical cases, and do not complicate the 
issue to any great extent. Such exceptions simply mean 
that on the occasions when we might rightly say of such 
people that they deserve praise, honours or success, 
they will not want to say it of themselves.
In the case of institutionalized desert claims, A 
characteristically refers to treatment which comes as 
the intended result of some agent or agency. Honours, 
prizes, success, compensation, reward and punishment, 
in so far as they are institutionally based, are
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characteristically given by intentional agents or 
agencies. This does not necessarily hold for raw desert 
claims; e.g. 'Peters deserves to get good weather for 
his holidays’ and 'Smith deserves a break-through’. A.R. 
Manser makes much the same point. Taking as a typical 
way of referring to ill-desert the statement, ’It serves 
you. right’ , he argues that there are cases where we might 
properly use this phrase even though what served the 
person right followed by natural law. He gives two kinds 
of example. The first is that of a child being told not 
to slide on the ice, doing so, and falling down and 
hurting himself (though not too seriously) as a 
consequence. This would ’serve it right’. The second 
type of case is ’ that where someone M ought to have 
known better”, where he suffers either some physical 
harm or material loss [though not too great] as a 
result of ignoring a law of nature, e.g. striking a 
match to see if the petrol tank is full. The resulting 
conflagration "serves him right".’^
4. The Grounds of Desert (.B).
When we say ’X deserves A ’ we are implicitly
committed to holding reasons for X’s desert. It is
logically absurd for X to deserve A for no reason in
particular or for no reason at all. I may enjoy reading
for no reason in particular, or may feel anxious for
2no reason at all. , and to say this would be quite 
1  — —
Manser, op. cit., p.301.
2
Not that no cause for my anxiety can be cited, but 
rather that I have no reason for being anxious.
Ill
intelligible and often sufficient^; but to say that
Locke’s theory of education deserves serious consideration,
or that Nolan deserved the prize, or that Scott’s child
deserved to be punished for no reason in particular or
for no reason at all, would satisfy no one- On this
basis it would be inappropriate to say that they deserved
anything at all. All desert claims are implicitly of
2the form ’X deserves A in virtue of B ’ .
Not any sort of reasons are appropriate to the 
making of desert-claims. Desert can be ascribed to 
something or someone only on the basis of characteristics 
possessed or things done. That is, desert is never 
forward-looking. This was recognized by the classical 
retributivists. A number of recent philosophers, 
however, have tried to ground desert-claims on forward- 
looking considerations. I shall examine one of these 
attempts in this Chapter, and another in Chapter Six.
If a theory of education deserves serious 
consideration, it does so, not on the basis of advantages 
which might accrue if it is a good one, but on the basis
.1
Of course we usually can and do give reasons for 
things which we like or dislike, enjoy or find unenjoyable, 
but it is not necessary to give reasons in order for 
these notions to be intelligible.
2
There may be occasions on which we find it difficult 
to specify or express the grounds on which we claim 
that something is deserved, and to that extent, at least, 
those to whom the claim is made may be hesitant about 
whether it really is deserved. But this is very 
different from saying that it is deserved for no reason 
in particular or for no reason at all. Desert cannot 
be a non-rational desire or distaste for something.
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either of the established reputation of the person who 
has propounded it, or of an adequacy which it has 
already been seen, to possess. If a manuscript is said 
to deserve publication, this is said not on the basis 
of the impact which it is likely to make or some future 
benefits which it will bring, but on the basis of the 
quality of its contents. If a student deserves to 
pass an exam, he does so, not because this will encourage 
him or get him a scholarship, but in virtue of his 
performance (and his performance is not necessarily 
limited to the exam itself, for a student may have 
failed the exam, yet deserve to have passed).^ If 
a person deserves compensation for some loss, then he 
does so not because things will be very difficult for 
him if he does not get some, but because his loss has 
been sustained through someone else1s mismanagement, 
negligence, or deception, etc. When a person deserves 
to be punished he does so, not because it will reform 
him or deter others, but because he has done some moral 
wrong. A person, may deserve to be punished even 
though carrying it out would have disastrous effects 
on. him and/or society. The disastrous consequences 
could be reasons for not punishing him, but not for his 
not deserving to be punished.
It is not enough to base desert claims on ’states 
of affairs’ (which may include actions performed or things 
said by X) which at present exist, or have existed in the 
past. Not all. such ’states of affairs' will serve to
1
We can notice the distinction between deserving 
encouragement and needing encouragement.
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justify a desert claim. Desert claims can be made 
only on the basis of characteristics possessed or things 
done by the subject of the claim. A painting (logically) 
cannot deserve a prize because it once belonged to the 
Royal Family, or because Sir Herbert Read thought it to 
be very good. ’Belonging to the Royal Family’ and 
’Sir Herbert Read thinking it to be very good’ are not 
characteristics of the painting itself. Sir Robert 
Menzies did not deserve a knighthood because Dame Pattie 
happened to be a very active social worker, or because 
it would have fulfilled her greatest ambition for him.
For these were not things done by Sir Robert himself, 
and although they could conceivably have been reasons 
for conferring a knighthood on him, they could not 
conceivably be reasons for his deserving a knighthood.
If Wilson deserves a reward, it can be only on the basis 
of something he himself has done, not on the basis of 
what anybody else has done. If, in fact, he receives 
a reward on the basis of something which Grey has done, 
then we say that Wilson did not deserve it; he did not 
do anything for it - notwithstanding the fact that 
Wilson may be more in need of the reward than Grey.
The case is similar with punishment. A person can deserve 
to be punished only on the basis of what he himself has 
done, not on the basis of what other people may have 
done. Vicarious and collective punishments are thus 
generally undeserved. *-
1
This way of stating the basis for desert claims would 
need to be amended slightly if we were considering a 
person’s desert of compensation. In such a case,
(footnote continued on p.ll4)
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A serious attempt at giving an act-utilitarian 
analysis of desert claims is to be found in Duncan-Jones’s 
treatment of Butler’s Moral Philosophy« We might argue, 
he suggests, that
When we say a man is responsible, and 
has certain deserts, the whole meaning of our 
statement can be resolved into two clauses:
(l) he has done a good or bad action, or a 
right or wrong action; (2) it is useful to 
apply certain sanctions to him - useful, 
that is, in the way of influencing his 
habits and other people's.^
Nevertheless, although these two clauses ’convey the 
whole of our meaning when we ascribe responsibility or 
desert, they are not the whole of what we have in mind'- 
For we ’tend to feel repugnance towards bad actions and 
those who do them, and to have friendly and warm feelings 
towards those who do good actions’. Thus,
our spontaneous feelings back up the 
policy which, on utilitarian grounds, ought 
to be adopted. But suppose in exceptional 
cases, it were established that penalties 
for the bad and rewards for the virtuous
(footnote 1 continued from p.113)
compensation would not be deserved on the basis of anything 
the person had done, but rather on the basis of the
damage done to him. This would be closer to saying that
he deserved compensation ’on the basis of characteristics 
possessed’ - what he has had to put up with through no
fault of his own. If no damage is done, no compensation
is deserved.
1
A.E. Duncan-Jones, op. cit,, p.137* There is some 
oddity in Duncan-Jones’s requirement that punishment will 
weaken habits of acting wrongly. Supposing it to be 
wrong and illegal to kill thalidomide babies, could 
there be utilitarian considerations to justify punishing 
offenders - for such behaviour would hardly become 
habitual, even if it became prevalent?
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would do more harm than good, our sentiments 
would not be correspondingly apportioned: 
we should still wish the good to prosper and 
the bad to suffer. In consequence, we come 
to feel that there is a sort of intrinsic 
tie between the moral value of a man’s 
character or conduct and the way in which 
he ought to be treated.1
Now Duncan-Jones1s position would have been clear enough 
had he left it at that. But he complicates it somewhat 
when he contrasts Butler's analysis with that of the 
utilitarian:
In Butler's view, deserving is a three- 
termed relation between a person, his wrong 
act, and a penalty - A, the agent, deserves 
P, the penalty, because of ¥, the wrong act: 
but on this analysis the utilitarian theory 
will make deserving a four-termed relation 
- A deserves P because C, the consequences of 
P, tends to discourage such acts as ¥.2
¥hat is not clear is how C is to be distinguished from 
the tendency to discourage such acts as ¥. Does Duncan- 
Jones mean that 'unpleasant treatment', the consequence 
of punishment, tends to discourage 'such acts as ¥'?
But unpleasant treatment is internally related to 
punishment, and can hardly be called its consequence. 
However, if he does not mean this, it is difficult to 
see what he could mean if he intends to distinguish C 
from the tendency to discourage such acts as ¥. To 
express the difference between Butler and the utilitarian, 
Duncan-Jones ought to have said something like the
1
Page 139*
Page 140.
2
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following of the utilitarian’s analysis: A deserves P
because of W and Y (P’s tendency to discourage w). A 
further unclarity in Duncan-Jones1s analysis is the 
switch in his last formulation from an uncompromising 
act-utilitarianism to a position not easily 
distinguishable from rule-utilitarianism. His primary 
allegiance, however, seems to lie with the act- 
utilitarians.
But apart from these internal difficulties, Duncan- 
Jones' s analysis is open to other objections. For one 
thing, it obliterates the distinction which I have been 
pressing, between deserved treatment and needed treatment. 
A person may very well deserve treatment of a certain 
sort without needing it, and may need it without 
deserving it. A rich man may well deserve compensation 
for some financial loss occasioned to him as a result of 
another’s negligence, yet most probably he will not 
need it. In fact, the person on whom the burden of 
compensation falls may need it far more than the rich 
man. On the other hand, a child who has come from a 
tough background may need all the encouragement and 
help it can get from its teacher yet such encouragement 
and help can hardly be said to be deserved, even if it 
brings forth good results.
Furthermore, Duncan-Jones suggests that when we 
ascribe desert, we have in mind more than utilitarian 
considerations. ¥e are also expressing our repugnance, 
though this does not form part of what we mean by 
'deserve'. It is true that desert claims can be used as 
vehicles of sheer animus, especially in such phrases as 
'It serves you right’, and that this is detachable from
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the meaning of ’desert'. On these occasions desert 
claims are not being used to ascribe desert but to 
express malice 5 or, as Dunean—Jones would put it, 
they express the fulfilment of our wish that the bad 
should suffer. Desert does not involve a wish that the 
bad should suffer. However, as Strawson has persuasively 
argued, the resentment or indignation which we feel 
towards a person who has done a wrong act is conceptually 
related to our judgment of his responsibility for that 
act and cannot be detached from it.^ But resentment 
and moral indignation are not to be confused with 
feelings of ill-will.
We can see then, that the act-utilitarian analysis 
of desert will not do. The rule-utilitarian analysis 
will be discussed a little later. In the meantime we 
must tighten up our previous condition for desert, 
namely, that desert claims can be made only on the basis 
of characteristics possessed or things done (b ) by the 
subject of the claim (x)» For it is possible to think 
of cases in which X can be said to possess or do B 
without deserving A. Take the following case: Davis
is being pursued by two wanted criminals (for whose 
capture a reward of $500 is offered). He conceals 
himself in the loft of a house while the criminals 
search for him below. But the supporting beams have 
rotted, and the floor of the loft suddenly collapses onto 
the criminals underneath. They are knocked out by the 
blow and subsequently taken into custody. Davis collects
1
P.F. Strawson, 'Freedom and Resentment’, Proceedings 
of the British Academy, Vol. XLVTII, 1962, pp.187-212.
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the reward. But does he deserve it? I do not think so. 
Admittedly Davis is an intentional agent, but it was not 
qua intentional agent that he was instrumental in the 
capture of the two criminals. In so far as people are 
said to be deserving, the grounds on which they are 
said to be so (b ) must be ones for which they can be 
held responsible. The situation is slightly different 
in the case of inanimate objects. If X is a stalagmite 
shaped exactly like the Venus de Milo, having acquired 
this shape by natural processes over thousands of 
years, it might become deservedly famous as a natural 
phenomenon, but it could not be said to deserve prizes 
or awards. To deserve the latter it would need to be 
the work of an intentional agent.
Leaving aside cases in which inanimate objects can 
be said to be deserving, I want to consider in more 
detail the precise nature of the things done or 
characteristics possessed for which X or X*s producer 
can be held responsible, and which support or justify 
the claim that X deserves A_. For it is at this point 
that an important confusion has crept into many 
philosophical discussions of desert.
W.G. Maclagan and Brian Barry have both maintained 
that the grounds for desert claims can be of two different 
sorts, and on the strength of this they have argued 
that there are two senses of desert. I shall endeavour 
to show that one of their two senses is based on a 
confusion.
The first sense, according to Maclagan, is that 
in which desert is used ’as a correlate of "moral 
guilt"’, and the second is that in which it is used as a 
correlate or legal or quasi-legal guilt:
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It seems clear to me that we might say 
of a person performing an action, whatever his 
motive, in the knowledge that there was a 
penalty annexed to it (or even without that 
knowledge if the fact that there was such a 
penalty had been 'sufficiently1 published), 
that he deserved the penalty,1
In contrast to the narrowness of Maclagan's first sense, 
Barry rightly recognizes that desert works in a much 
wider field than that of reward and punishment. He 
contrasts two sentences:
(1) 'Anyone who climbs that rock deserves 
£50 and I hereby offer it'; and
(2) 'Since £50 has been offered for climbing 
the rock and I have climbed it, I 
deserve it.'
In (l) desert 'might be taken to prescribe specific 
amounts of differentials' whereas in (2) desert is used 
in a 'subsidiary sense', and it is claimed only that 
'given the prize is so much, so-and-so deserves it more 
than anyone else in that he fulfils the conditions 
laid down better than anyone else*. Barry considers 
that (l) is more appropriate to wage determination and 
punishment, whereas (2) is more at home when used ’in 
connection with the contest procedure'. In such cases,
1
W.G. Maclagan, 'Punishment and Retribution', Philosophy , 
Vol. XIV, 1939» p.285* I should point out that I would 
have no objection to what Maclagan says here had he not 
identified penalization and punishment in his article.
Cf. C.H. Vhiteley, 'On Retribution', Philosophy, Vol. XXXI, 
1956, p.15^1 J.M. Smith, Punishment: Its Nature and
Justification, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brown 
University, i960, p.160; J. Hospers, Human Conduct, New
York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961,p .451•
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'the prize may have been set up not to reward desert 
but to stimulate productions of suitable kinds; 
nevertheless, it generates a sense of "desert" in the 
subsidiary sense* .^
This second sense of’desert1, I maintain, is not 
in fact a genuine sense of’desert’ at all. Instead, what 
Maclagan and Barry have given us is an analysis of 
’entitlement’ and ’liability’, and desert is not a 
kind of entitlement or liability. Desert, unlike 
entitlement and liability, is not created by satisfying 
the conditions laid down in a system of legal or quasi- 
legal rules, even if some things can be deserved only 
because of a pre-existing system of legal or quasi-legal 
rules. To say that a person deserves a higher wage than 
he is getting is not to say he is entitled to it. This 
is one of the reasons for having Unions and Arbitration 
Courts^ to endeavour to secure wages commensurate with 
employees’ deserts. If a wage rise is refused, the 
employees may strike, but even if they were justified 
in striking this in itself would not show that they were 
entitled or had a legal right to higher pay. They have 
no such right until or unless their employers or an 
Arbitration Court decides in favour of their submissions. 
The person who is entitled to the prize for winning a 
competition of skill is not necessarily the person who 
deserves it. His win may be a fluke, or the result of 
moves that are shrewd though permissible (within the
B. Barry, op. cit., p.112.
1
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rules of the game).  ^ It is only to confuse the issue
to speak of people having a moral right or entitlement
to treatment of a particular kind. Of course we do, as
2reinberg properly points out, speak of 'moral rights', 
but we do this in connection with what we consider to 
be basic human rights, and not in connection with the 
parochial claims involved in ascribing desert. Our moral 
right to freedom from interference is not something 
which we are said to deserve. Feinberg comments:
The defeated presidential candidate who 
deserved to win ... is not by that token 
entitled to the office, nor does he have 
any right to it. These are conferred by 
votes, not by deserts. And I fail to see 
how matters are clarified by qualifying 
the alleged entitlement as moral. The 
defeated candidate has no right to the 
office, moral or otherwise, unless of 
course 'moral right' is simply another, _
eccentric, way of referring to his deserts.
Of course there are occasions when what a person 
deserves is conferred by a system of rules. The painting 
that deserves to win may actually win. Someone may 
claim that he deserves every penny he gets, or, if this 
is too much of a colloquialism, we may claim of someone
1
Pace Hobbes: 'Vhen a gift is given indefinitely, as a
prize to be contended for, he that winneth Meriteth, and 
may claim the Prize as Due' (Leviathan, Everyman edn., 
London: J.M. Dent, I9H, p . 70) • Hobbes' whole discussion
of 'merit' is vitiated by the confusion of desert and 
entitlement.
2
Feinberg, op. cit., p.96.
3
Ibid.
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that what he deserves he gets, though what he gets he 
is entitled to by virtue of an agreement he has made 
on commencing his employment. Nevertheless, though 
entitlement and desert may coincide in such cases, the 
grounds of the entitlement are not precisely the same 
as the grounds of desert. In the case of the painting, 
the grounds for entitlement include the decision of 
the judges that this particular painting be given First 
Prize, and this is provided for in the conditions 
according to which the competition is conducted, namely, 
’The judges’ decision shall be final’. The judges could 
have chosen an inferior painting, and then that would 
have been entitled to the prize: though the decision
may well have caused an uproar. The grounds of desert, 
however, are found primarily in the quality of the 
painting, and perhaps secondarily in the circumstances 
surrounding its production; e.g. the age of the artist, 
whether he was in some way handicapped, etc. In other 
words, the desert relates to what could be loosely 
called the ’skill’ displayed in the painting. In the 
case of payment for labour, a person deserves what he 
gets by virtue of such things as his industry, efficiency, 
etc. But he is entitled to what he gets solely by virtue 
of an agreement or contract between his employer and 
himself. He may get sacked because he is lazy, 
inefficient, etc.; i.e. because he does not deserve 
what he is getting. But until he gets sacked, he is 
entitled to the pay even though he does not deserve it.
The distinction between entitlement and desert enables 
us to distinguish the situation where the employer 
cheats the employee from that in which he exploits him.
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The same points hold for the case of punishment.
To say, ’McKenzie deserves to be punished’ is not 
equivalent to saying, ’McKenzie is liable to punishment’. 
McKenzie is liable to punishment if it is believed that 
he has broken some legal or quasi-legal rule which 
exposes him to moral, blame. He may nevertheless be 
morally blameless, and not deserve punishment. He can 
be said to deserve punishment, however, even if what he 
does is not proscribed by some institutional rule. A 
person may of course deserve the punishment which is 
inflicted upon him for some crime; but that he deserves 
it is not because he has broken some law.^ To confuse 
desert and entitlement is to make the same mistake as 
Urmson when he confused grading and evaluating.^
The confusion of desert and entitlement or liability 
is not limited to Maclagan and Barry. Rawls ( and most 
of those who find his views congenial-^) makes the 
same mistake in ’Two Concepts of Rules’, where he 
purports to find a place for the ’retributive view ... 
that punishment is justified on the grounds that
4wrongdoing merits punishment.' However, in his
1
It seems to me that one of the faults of social contract 
justifications of punishment is that they regard the 
grounds of punishment as institutional in nature.
2
J.O. Urmson, 'On Grading’, printed in Logic and Language, 
Second Series, ed. A.G.N. Flew, Oxford: Blackwell, 1953»
pp.159-86. I say this despite Urmson's disclaimers at 
the end of the paper.
3
I.e. rule-utilitarians.
4
Rawls, 'Two Concepts of Rules’, Philosophical Review,
Vol. LXIY, 1955, p.4.
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article he gives us no grounds for thinking that 
wrongdoing merits punishment: that a person has broken
a law only renders him liable to punishment, it does not 
say anything about his deserts.
Barry’s confusion of desert with entitlement arises 
mainly from his failure to distinguish properly between 
institutionalized and raw desert claims. He correctly 
recognizes that some desert claims arise independently 
of any legal or quasi-legal rules and that others arise 
only because of an already existing system of legal or 
quasi-legal rules. His mistake lies in thinking that 
the difference necessitates two different senses of 
desert. However, the difference lies rather in the fact 
that institutionalized desert claims at least implicitly 
prescribe a dispenser of deserts.
Having noticed this easy confusion of entitlement 
with desert, we can now state more clearly the type of 
grounds (b ) by virtue of which X is said to deserve A. 
These grounds, I suggest, must be such as express X’s 
worthiness or unworthiness. We must, however, clear up 
certain ambiguities which may arise here. ’Worthiness’ 
is often used synonymously with ’worth’. But there are 
at least three senses of ’worth’, two of which are not 
synonymous with ’worthiness’. These two are as 
follows:
(i) Often, when we speak of something’s worth, we are 
referring to its (usually) monetary equivalent. I 
might for instance enquire about a certain article: 
’What’s it worth?’ or say of a businessman that he 
is ’worth’ $5 million.
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(ii) We can exhibit the second sense by means of the 
following sentence: 'Montgomery's performance is worthy
of a prize, but it would not be worth your while to 
give it to him.’* What I mean is that Montgomery's 
performance is of such quality that he ought or 
deserves to be awarded a prize, but that it would not 
be of any use presenting one to him (because, for 
example, he could not appreciate it, or would throw it 
away immediately, etc.). 'Worth' in this sense is a 
utilitarian notion referring to the usefulness of 
taking a particular course of action, in this case, 
that of presenting Montgomery with a prize. We can see 
from this example that to say of a certain performance 
that it deserves a prize is to imply that it has 
demonstrated a commendable level of competence in a 
competition the purpose of which was to match people's 
competence (in this particular field). What constitutes 
a commendable level of competence will of course vary 
from one activity to another.^
Some examples will help us to see better what I 
am driving at. The sorts of considerations which will 
be relevant to our saying of a person that he deserves 
a promotion will be his initiative, efficiency, and
_ _  -
Compare the frequent remark: 'It’s not worth it*.
This can be used to refer to either retributive or 
utilitarian worth.
2
There is another (probably secondary) use of 'worthiness', 
'worth', and 'merit' in which they do not take an object 
and are roughly equivalent to 'value'. Take such 
statements as: 'He is a worthy man’; 'He is a person
of worth'j 'This scheme has merit'. But for an opposing 
viewpoint, see Franklin, op. cit., pp.167-8.
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industry. If we look at the sorts of considerations 
which will be relevant to saying that Wood deserves to 
fail his exams, we will point to such things as laziness,
1
(i) Even these qualities will be of only general relevance, 
and will not suffice to cover every case in which a person 
is said to deserve a promotion. If he cannot get along 
with people, these qualities will not be sufficient to 
enable us to say that he deserves promotion from a 
clerk's to a public relations' position. (ii) Also, 
there are complicating factors. Consider the following 
two cases. The first is one in which there is an 
undetermined number of vacant posts in a particular firm 
to which people can be promoted. Atkins is a Senior 
Clerk in the firm, but because of his ability to get 
along with people, his administrative efficiency, and 
his initiative, we might say he deserves to be promoted 
to the position of Public Relations Officer. Walsh is 
also a Senior Clerk, and possesses the same qualities 
as Atkins. However, he is even more charming, efficient 
and enterprising than Atkins, and we consider that he 
deserves promotion to Secretary of the firm (a higher 
position than that of Public Relations Officer).
Suppose now a second case in which there is only one 
vacant position, that of Public Relations Officer.
What if Atkins got the job in these circumstances?
Did he deserve it? Do we say that Atkins did not 
deserve to get the job; Walsh ought to have got it?
It could be argued that because there was only one 
vacant position, they could not both have deserved it, 
and that therefore only Walsh could have deserved it: 
in which case desert could not be based simply on 
worthiness. But this objection is misconceived, and 
there are two alternative ways of meeting it: (l)
When we are dealing with institutionalized desert claims 
as in this case, and where there are limited benefits 
to be distributed, then as part of the criteria for 
worthiness we include the condition that only the best 
candidate(s) deserves the benefits. And since in this 
case Atkins was not the best candidate, he did not 
deserve it. (2) We are not forced to say this, however. 
We could phrase our reply slightly differently and still 
avoid the objection. Rather than saying that Atkins did
(footnote continued on p.127)
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poor performance, and cheating. Or again, the sorts of 
considerations which will be relevant to saying that 
McKenzie deserves to be punished will be that he has 
robbed a bank, lied, or committed some other moral 
offence.^
Earlier in this Chapter I pointed to certain cases 
in which a subject, X, could possess certain 
characteristics or d j certain things, B, without 
deserving a certain form of treatment, A. With certain 
qualifications, these were cases in which B was not the 
work of an intentional agent or of an intentional agent 
qua intentional agent. We can now point to another 
sort of case in which X can possess or do certain things, 
B, without deserving A, even though B is the work of an 
intentional agent qua intentional agent. We can 
illustrate this by varying the previous examples. Suppose 
now that the criminals are captured due to their 
betrayal by Davis (with whom they had an understanding), 
the reason being that Davis wanted the reward money.
In this case, though Davis is indeed entitled to the
(footnote 1 continued from p.126)
not deserve the position (which in other circumstances 
he would have deserved), we could say that Walsh was more 
deserving, and therefore, that Atkins ought not to have 
got it. It is part of the 'logic' of desert that it 
allows of the comparative and superlative degrees. This 
second answer, however, is probably more appropriate to 
raw desert claims. I think these answers help us to see 
our way through some of the puzzles which Feinberg raises 
with respect to offices and positions of honour (op. cit. ,
p.89-90).
1
We shall consider the 
Chapter Eight.
assessment of moral worth in
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reward, we would be reluctant to say that he deserved 
it, because he did not contribute to their capture for 
commendable reasons. Or, to vary the second example, 
suppose now that the Venus de Milo is a manufactured 
marble reproduction of the original. Ve would not say 
of the reproduction that it deserved praise or fame as 
a work of art, even though it has been manufactured by 
intentional agents.'*' This is because the skills needed 
for the reproduction of the sculpture are not the same 
as those for which praise or fame (as a work of art) 
is given.
5« The Role of Desert Claims.
So far we have suggested that it is appropriate and 
correct to say of a certain subject, X» that it deserves
A, where A is a form of pleasant or unpleasant treatment, 
when X possesses characteristics or has done something,
B, which renders it worthy of A. Naturally the criteria 
of worthiness differ with different kinds of subjects. 
Normally, if a subject, X» is properly said to be 
deserving it must be, or be the intentional product of, 
some intentional agent. Nevertheless we do recognize
a narrow range of cases in which inanimate natural objects
1
Like most judgments in aesthetics, this one is 
controversial. The assumption underlying my own 
judgment is that given similar technical skills, the 
merit of a copyist (reproducer) is different from the 
merit of a sculptor (artist), and that this difference 
consists in something like the ’creative imagination’ 
possessed by the latter, but not evidenced in the 
work of the former.
129
may be said to be deserving - though the sort of things 
which they can be said to deserve is quite limited: praise,
fame. One reason why desert can be ascribed even to 
inanimate natural objects is that even in its personal 
use it is not essentially a moral notion but rather 
an evaluative notion (like 'good', 'right', etc.). 
Nevertheless it would be a mistake to overlook the 
pre-eminence of its use in moral contexts.
But what do we mean when we say that X deserves A?
What is the force of such a remark? What role do 
desert claims play in our language? It should be clear 
now that in saying that X deserves A we are evaluating 
or appraising X* This is evident from the fact that the 
characteristics or acts of X which are relevant to 
making desert claims must be such as express X*s 
worthiness. This has important implications for the 
role which desert claims can properly play in the 
language.
I noted earlier that desert claims are sometimes 
used as expressions of vindictiveness: 'It served you
right.' Some writers have regarded desert claims as 
paradigm expressions of vengefulness. But if our 
analysis so far has been in the right direction, we 
can see that this is not so, and that using desert claims 
to express vindictive feelings is to pervert them from 
their central role. Desert claims are appropriate in 
too many different contexts to be susceptible to this 
sort of analysis, and the fact that they are based on 
assessments of worthiness renders this interpretation 
even more impossible.
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In saying that X deserves A we can be claiming any 
of the following things, depending on the context:
’X ought to get or suffer A ’;
'It would be a good thing to give X 
(for X to suffer) A';
'If X gets or suffers A he has no grounds 
for complaint'.
I do not want to suggest that 'X deserves A' is always 
interchangeable with any one of these statements. 'X 
deserves A' is just one formulation of 'X ought to get 
or suffer A.', etc. - such that the grounds of the claim 
are in virtue of characteristics or acts of X rather 
than in order to produce certain consequences. The 
latter may also constitute legitimate grounds for 
ought claims. Sometimes situations arise in which we 
say 'X deserves A although X ought not to get or suffer 
A'. For example, if gaoling a man for theft would 
(because of prison conditions) endanger his life, then, 
provided that other possible means of punishment were 
also objectionable, we could argue that he ought not to 
be punished, even though he deserved it. We would 
probably ask that his sentence be suspended. Similarly, 
were the punishment of a convicted spy likely to trigger 
off a nuclear war, then we would have a ground for saying 
that he ought not to be punished. But this would in no 
way eliminate the fact that he deserved to be punished.^
I shall argue in a later Chapter that although we mean
1
I do not want to suggest that we say 'X deserves A 
although X ought not to get A' only when the
countervailing considerations are utilitarian. This point 
is convincingly made by Feinberg, op. cit., pp.90-1.
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’X ought to suffer punishment’ when we say ’X deserves 
to suffer punishment’ we are not contradicting ourselves 
when we say 'X deserves to suffer punishment but ought 
not to be punished’, because two issues are being 
conflated: the grounds for X*s suffering punishment
and the grounds for his being punished by a particular 
authority or in a particular way.
Feinberg distinguishes two types of ought judgments, 
(a) those in which we say that X ought to get A ’all 
things considered’, ’in the final judgment’, or ’on 
balance’ - and (b) those in which we say that X ought 
to get A ’pro tanto’ or ’other things being equal.’ . ^
’X deserves A ’ , he considers, entails an ought judgment 
of the latter kind:
A person’s desert of X is always a reason 
for giving X to him, but not always a conclusive 
reason.... Considerations irrelevant to his 
desert can have overriding cogency in 
establishing how he ought to be treated on 
balanc e.^
Now, were we able in practice to separate the mode of 
punishment and the status of the punisher from the 
punishment itself and think of the punishment solely 
as deliberately inflicted unpleasant treatment, then 
’X deserves to be punished’ would entail ’X ought to be 
punished’ in the ’all things considered’ sense. But of 
course we cannot do this in practice, and so in 
considering whether a particular person ought to be
1
Page 74.
2
Ibid.
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punished we must take into account not only whether 
he deserves to suffer punishment but also what form the 
punishment ought to take and what authority the punisher 
has. For God, presumably, unhampered by the difficulties 
which make the task of giving people what they deserve 
morally objectionable for us>, 'X deserves to suffer 
punishment* would entail *X ought to be punished* in 
the * all things considered* sense.
I have argued, then, that desert claims, far from 
being claims about an intuitively perceived 'fitness 
of things’, are ought claims, differing from other ought 
claims primarily in the fact that they are based on 
different sorts of considerations, viz. the worthiness 
of the deserving subject. In Chapters Four and Five we 
shall examine in detail, the function of desert in 
relation to punishment.
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CHAPTER FOUR
GETTING WHAT ONE DESERVES
We have now covered most of the ground preliminary 
to a detailed discussion of the various justificatory 
questions relating to punishment. It was pointed out in 
Chapter One that justificatory questions can properly 
arise only when there is an apparent discrepancy between 
some intentional act or activity and a standard, rule 
or end. These justificatory questions can be met by 
showing either that there is only an apparent discrepancy 
between the act or activity and the standard, rule or 
end which the objector invokes, or that the standard, 
rule or end which is invoked is itself suspect.
A detailed consideration was given to the notion of 
punishment in Chapter Two. There it was suggested that 
it is unnecessarily confusing to define many of the words 
in our language in terms of a set of necessary and 
sufficient characteristics. 'Punishment* is best 
defined in terms of a set of characteristics, only 
some of which are necessary, but the sum of which is 
jointly sufficient for its unqualified use. As well 
I took the view that 'punishment', like a number of 
other activity-words, finds its home in the moral sphere 
of discourse. The term is used to describe what is 
taken to be the morally justified activity of inflicting 
unpleasant treatment on people for their wrongdoing.
These two factors, the flexibility and the normativeness 
of the concept of punishment, lead us to qualify
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punishments which lack some of the partially entailed 
characteristics by some term which cancels out the 
moral, endorsement of the acts which would otherwise 
be implied. Thus punishment inflicted upon innocent 
persons or for non-moral offences is undeserved or 
unjust.
Chapter Three was devoted to an analysis of desert 
claims, desert being probably the key concept in many 
retributive justifications of punishment. Not that 
desert cannot figure in utilitarian justifications. It 
often has. But when it does, it is given either a 
subsidiary role or a new meaning. Usually, however, it 
is dismissed as an unanalysable or intuitively perceived 
fitness of things, or as an instinctive irrational 
impulse. In contrast to these opinions, I argued that 
desert claims are a species of ought claims in which 
treatment of a certain sort is prescribed on the basis 
of worthiness rather than utility or anything else.
All these points have some bearing on the three 
main questions which I shall discuss in this Chapter. 
Firstly, what sorts of considerations are relevant to 
justifying a general activity? Secondly, can the 
infliction of unpleasant treatment on people be 
justified? Thirdly, assuming that the second question 
has been answered affirmatively, what special 
considerations are relevant to justifying the infliction 
of punishment in particular instances? As they stand 
these questions are not unambiguous, and, as they are 
discussed, further necessary distinctions will be made. 
They suffice nevertheless to give a useful starting
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point. A short appendix is included at the end of 
the Chapter dealing with a general objection to desert 
as a justification for an activity.
1. Justifying General Activities.
In some of the traditional discussions of punishment, 
efforts have been made to answer all the relevant 
justificatory questions by recourse either to retributive 
or (vel) to utilitarian considerations. Sometimes this 
has been because there has been thought to be only one 
relevant justificatory question, but more often it has 
been thought that one sort of consideration precluded 
the other. Some writers have hopefully appealed to both 
sorts of considerations in the belief that whatever is 
just is useful and whatever is truly useful is just.'^
More recently it has been felt that there are certain 
limitations to be placed on their use, and the trend has 
been to answer justificatory questions concerning 
punishment in general by recourse to utilitarian 
considerations and those concerning particular punishments
1
A view which is in danger of becoming vacuous. See 
W.H. Moberly, 'Some Ambiguities in the Retributive Theory 
of Punishment', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Vol. XXV, 1924-5, p.292; C. de Boer, 'On the Nature of
State Action in Punishment', Monist, Vol. XLII, 1932, 
p.620; Anon., 1 *5The Principles and Objects of Punishment', 
Prospective Review, Vol. I, 1.845» p.331, A.L. Chapin,
'The Object of Punishment in the Government of God' , 
Congregational. Review, Vol. VIII, 1868, p.52; F. Peek,
'Just Principles of Punishment', Dark Blue, Vol. 4, 1873» 
pp.273-6, 404“7 j Lord Longford, The Idea of Punishment,
London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1961, pp-59, 61; A.C. Ewing,
'Armstrong on the Retributive Theory', Mind, Vol. LXXII,
1963, P-123*
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by reference to retributive considerations. I have 
already hinted that I find this general account of the 
debate unsatisfactory, not simply because ’retributive’ 
or ’utilitarian' tend to be ill-defined, but also 
because I do not consider the alternatives 'retributive' 
and 'utilitarian' to be exclusive of all other 
possibilities."^ Nevertheless the terms have become 
so deeply entrenched in the debate that it has become 
impossible to avoid using them. With this expression 
of dissatisfaction, then, 1 shall continue to use them.
The recent trend is persuasively exemplified by
Rawls who, as I have already observed, takes the view
that retributive considerations are appropriate to the
justification of instances of a practice, and utilitarian
considerations are appropriate to the justification of
2the practice itself. I have already raised several3objections to Rawls' position. A further thing to be 
noticed about it is that there is nothing intrinsic to 
his distinction between a practice and the instances
The tensions raised by a simple retributive-utilitarian 
classification can be seen in Benn’s charge of 'veiled 
utilitarianism’ levelled at Hegel (S.i. Benn and R.S. 
Peters, Social Principles and the Democratic State,
London: Allen and Unwin, 1939» p.177)»
2
It would be a mistake to infer from this that Rawls is 
a utilitarian in ethics. See his 'Two Concepts of Rules',
Vol. LXIV, 1955, P-32 f/n.27;
3
See supra, pp.12-13, 40-5- Further criticisms of 
the usefulness of Rawls' distinction can. be found in 
C.Landesman, 'Promises and Practices', Mind, Vol. LXXV,
1966, pp.239-43.
1
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which fall under it which necessitates an appeal to
utilitarian considerations in justifying the practice.
Rawls makes statements like: '.I hope to show that if
one uses the distinction in question then one can state
utilitarianism in a way which makes it a much better
explication of oiir considered moral judgments . . . than
traditional objections would seem to admit’ ; and: ’The
suggested way of reconciling the retributive and the
utilitarian justifications of punishment seems to account
2for what both sides have wanted to say.’ Evidently 
Rawls thinks that his view accords with what ’intelligent 
and sensitive persons’ hold concerning punishment. But 
this of course is no argument to show that the general 
practice of punishment can be justified only on the 
grounds of its utility. In contrast to this, Rawls does 
adduce strong grounds for saying that once we have 
understood the rules as rules of a practice, then it 
is logically inappropriate to justify particular 
applications of them by appeal to the utility of so 
doing. Particular instances of the practice can be 
justified only by reference to the rules. This is 3tantamount to an appeal to retributive considerations.
It would seem, then, that Rawls’ position, rather 
than strengthening utilitarianism, leaves open the 
possibility of justifying both general activities and 
their instances on non-utilitarian grounds.
Raw!s, op. cit. ,
2
Page 8.
Pages 24 ff.3
PP-3-4.
138
Beim, however, takes a tougher line than Rawls 
on this point. According to him, the retributivist 
refusal to look to the consequences of punishment makes 
it
virtually impossible for him to answer 
the question ’What justification could there 
be for rules requiring that those who break 
them should be made to suffer?’ except perhaps 
in theological terms. For appeals to authority 
apart, we can justify rules and institutions 
only by showing that they yield advantages.^
All attempted retributive justifications can be shown to 
be ’either mere affirmations of the desirability of 
punishment or utilitarian reasons in disguise.’  ^ In a 
later article he states that utilitarianism has
the merit, as an approach to the 
justification of punishment, that it provides 
a clear procedure for determining whether 
the institution is acceptable in general 
terms. This the retributivist approach 
cannot do, because it denies the relevance 
of weighing advantages and disadvantages, 
which is what we ultimately must do in „ 
moral criticism of rules and institutions.
There are two sides to Beim’s argument: (a) the
vacuity of retributive justifications, and (b) the 
necessity of utilitarian justifications. We shall 
examine them in turn.
T~~“
Beim and Peters, op. cit., p.173* An almost identical 
statement can be found in Benn, ’ An Approach to the Problems 
of Punishment’, Philosophy, Vol, XXXIII, 1958, p.3^6.
2
Ibid.
3
Benn, art. ’Punishment’, in The Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards, New York: Macmillan & The
Free Press, 1967» Vol. 7» p.31*
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(a) Berm writes that retributive justifications 
are 'either mere affirmations of the desirability of 
punishment or utilitarian reasons in disguise’. To 
support this contention he examines several putative 
retributive justifications. Here I shall comment on 
just twos
(i) Statements like ’it is fitting (or justice
requires) that the guilty should suffer’ say only that
’it ought to be the case Tthat the guilty should suffer],
and it is just this that is in question.’"*- While I
can agree that ’it is fitting’ says no more than ’it
ought to be the case’, the same does not go for his
alternative readings ’Justice requires’. This latter
reading is not synonymous with ’it ought to be the
case’ and few retributivists would claim that it was.
Certainly they would want to maintain that ’Justice
requires’ entailed ’it ought to be the case’.
However, claims such as 'Justice requires’ or ’The
guilty deserve’ (which, in this context, is equivalent2to ’Justice requires’ ) do not merely entail 'it ought 
to be the case’ or ’the guilty ought', but do so on 
particular sorts of grounds, and these can be adduced 
to back up the implied claim that the guilty should 
suffer. These grounds have already been touched on in 
Chapter Three, and T shall return to them later in 
this Chapter.
______
Beim and Peters, op. cit. , p.175; cf. Benn, 
’Punishment’, p.30.
2
I shall support this in Chapter Five.
i4o
(ii) ’To say, with Kant, that punishment is a good 
in itself, is to deny the necessity for justification.
.., But it is by no means evident that punishment 
needs no justification, the proof being that many 
people have felt the need to justify it.’*' That many 
people have fe.lt the need to justify punishment proves 
only that they have been confused about the notion, 
or so 1 have argued in Chapter Two. For ’punishment’, 
when unqualified, carves out from our experience a 
type of unpleasant treatment which we regard as being 
justifiably inflicted. What people have properly 
felt the need to just.ify is the deliberate infliction 
of unpleasant treatment on people or perhaps particular 
instances of punishment. They may also have wondered 
why wrongdoing in particular should justify the 
infliction of unpleasant treatment. We shall consider 
each of these questions later in this Chapter.
(b) Beim maintains that rules and institutions
must be justified by reference to their advantages. His
support for this appears in a footnote to his 1958
article where he concedes that ’a rule might be
justified in the first place by reference to one
more general, under which it is subsumed as a particular 
2application.’ Thus someone might say ’It is wrong to 
pick flowers from public gardens because it is wrong to 
steal - and this is a special case of stealing’. But, 
Benn argues, the acceptance of the rule as an extension
1
Beim and Peters, op. cit., pp.175-6.
2
Benn, 'An Approach to the Problems of Punishment', 
p.326.
of a more general rule can be justified only if it 
can be shown to have the same advantages as those which 
justified the more general rule, and if it can be 
shown that its exception would tend to defeat these 
advantages. For it could be objected that stealing is 
concerned only with private property, not with public 
property. Whether this objection sticks, Benn maintains, 
’must depend on the reasons for the more general rule, 
understood in terms of its expected advantages, and on 
whether to allow the exception would tend to defeat them.
In reply to Benn’s position the following may be 
urged: whether or not the distinction between private
and public property holds depends on whether or not 
’picking flowers from public gardens’ can properly be 
described as 'stealing’. And this is determined, not 
by a comparison of the advantages of a rule forbidding 
the picking of flowers from public gardens with the 
advantages of a rule forbidding stealing, but by giving 
a fuller description of each of the activities to see 
whether the former amounts to a special case of the 
latter. Benn misdescribes the character of much of our 
moral reasoning which consists in an endeavour to 
assimilate acts or activities to the various moral
1
Ibid. Benn makes similar points with respect to the 
ruLe ’Euthanasia is wrong because it is wrong to kill’. 
Here he is clearly going further than Rawls, who 
confesses to the ’feeling that relatively few actions of 
the moral life are defined by practices and that the 
practice conception is more relevant to understanding 
legal and legal-like arguments than it is to the more 
complex sort of moral arguments' (op. cit., p.32 f/n.27).
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notions which are embedded in our language. Thus it 
might be pointed out in this case that public gardens 
are ’public1 2*5 only in the sense that access to them may 
be had by all, not in the sense that they are owned by 
no one. They are, let us say, shire property. And, 
therefore, ignoring the possibility of picking the 
flowers by mistake, taking them without permission is 
no different from stealing them. The condemnation of 
stealing itseLf stands in no need of justification, 
only exceptions to it.
Of course, to say that 5 stealing is wrong’ needs
no just ification is not to suggest tha t reasons cannot be
given for it. I am suggesting merely that they will not
be justificatory reasons, ¥e may well ground such a rule
under some wider moral rule such as 5 one ought to respect
the property of others', and this under some further
rule, and so on. The end to this is not necessarily an
appeal to utilitarian considerations, as Berm suggests
(apart from anything else, any workable utilitarianism
always presupposes certain non-utilitarian moral rules),
but may well be an appeal to some transcendental moral
rule) that is, a moral rule which must be correct if
moral discourse, as an autonomous and objective form of
2practical discourse, is to be possible at all.
1
Philippa Foot notes the importance of moral notions to 
moral, argument in 5¥hen is a Principle a Moral Principle?’, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 
Vol. XJCVIII,” 193^7 p . 108 .
2
See A.Po Griffiths, art. ’Ultimate Moral Principles:
Their Justification’, in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. P. Edwards, New York: Macmillan & The Free Press,
1967, Vol. 8, pp.180-1.
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It is difficult to see how Berm would go about 
refuting this position. He might try to argue that we 
can agree that public property is of the same order as 
private property only if the shire can be regarded in 
the same way as a private individual. And this is to be 
decided by a comparison of the expected advantages of 
having the rule forbidding the picking of flowers with 
the moral rule forbidding stealing. But I think this 
manoeuvre fails since the crucial factor with respect 
to the shire council’s actions is not whether or not they 
decide that unprohibited picking of flowers from the 
shire gardens will have the same disadvantages as 
unhindered 'stealing’, but whether or not they permit 
it. It is their permission or prohibition of picking 
the flowers which is the important factor with regard 
to how one views the act.
It is worthy of note that in later writings Benn 
does not adhere strictly to this point of view. In 
Social Principles and the Democratic State and in his 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on punishment, Benn 
recognizes the need to supplement his utilitarian 
justification of the institution of punishment with 
’considerations of impartiality and respect for persons’"^ 
(or, as he refers to them in the later article, ’principles
2 vof justice’ j. Nevertheless, he considers such 
supplementary principles to be only necessary and not 
sufficient to justify the infliction of punishment.
1
Benn and Peters, op, cit., p.183*
Benn, ’Punishment’, p.31*
2
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I must make it clear that I do not want to deny that 
utilitarian considerations can be relevant to moral 
justifications. All 1 have been trying to show so far is 
that it is too strong to say as Benn does that ’we can 
provide ultimate justification for rules and institutions, 
only by showing that they yield a d v a n t a g e s ' I  shall 
want to argue later that as far as the justification of 
institutions and practices are concerned, utilitarian 
considerations are very important. In the next section,
1 shall present and support a possible non-utilitarian 
candidate for moral justification.
2. Justifying the Infliction of Unpleasant Treatment.
I have endeavoured to show that neither Rawls nor
Benn give convincing reasons why all rules need to be
justified by utilitarian considerations. We saw that a
rule such as ’picking flowers from public gardens is
wrong' could be justified by assimilating it to the more
general rule 'stealing is wrong' without appealing to
the utility of the respective rules. Nor does the
rule 'stealing is wrong' stand in need of justification,
since it is a standard against which other rules or
2actions are to be justified. This, of course, does not 
preclude us from asking why stealing is wrong, but such a 
question is not a justificatory one. Here as well we
1
Benn, 'An Approach to the Problems of Punishment', p.3^6.
2
Of course it is possible to question the standards which 
are invoked to support a justificatory question. In this 
case, however, no ground of dissatisfaction with the 
standard has been shown.
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saw that there is no necessity for an answer to be given 
in utilitarian terms.
This is not to say that Beim 's and Rawls’ views 
are without their persuasiveness. But their 
persuasiveness lies in the fact that their articles 
are concerned with rules which are partially justified 
in terms of utility, namely, those rules which constitute 
social institutions or practices. And it is just this 
structure which I have denied is essential to the rules 
governing the infliction of punishment. It is because 
punishment is usually institutionalized that their 
arguments are so persuasive.
Vith this as a background, I want now to turn to 
the question: ’Can the infliction of unpleasant treatment
on people ever be justified?' Evidently we think that 
it can, yet if this is to be taken seriously (as I think 
it should ) as a justificatory question, there must be 
something about the infliction of unpleasant treatment 
on people that permits and prompts such a question to be 
asked. The standard which is invoked to give the 
justificatory question its rationale is the basic moral 
right which people have to freedom from interference 
from others. This right is usually referred to as natural, 
ineradicable or inalienable, since it is one which human 
beings are thought to possess qua human beings.^"
A close consideration of such rights is beyond the 
purposes of this dissertation. Interesting discussions 
can be found in H.L.A. Hart, ’Are there any Natural 
Rights?’, S.M. Brown, '.Inalienable Rights' and 
V. K. Frankena, 'Natural and Inalienable Rights’, all 
of which appear in Philosophical Review, Vol. LXIV, 
1955) pp.175-232j G. Vlastos, 'Justice and Equality',
(footnote continued on p.l46)
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Nevertheless, sometimes we recognize situations in 
which this right may properly be overridden, namely, 
when the exercise of such freedom constitutes an 
unjustified interference with the freedom of others.
What needs filling out is the notion of justified or 
unjustified interference. In the present section I 
want to consider some of the grounds which we adduce 
to justify the interference with people’s freedom 
which is involved in the infliction of unpleasant 
treatment on them,
To do this I propose to take the cases of quarantine 
and punishment, for I believe that we will find 
exemplified two different types of grounds on which 
the interference with people’s freedom involved in the 
infliction of unpleasant treatment can be justified. I 
shall then consider why the interference should be based 
on different grounds in each of these cases.
(a) If people have or carry dangerous and infectious 
diseases, we consider it morally justifiable to restrict 
their freedom of movement. We do this because of the 
danger which they might otherwise be to others. This 
morally justified activity, which we refer to as 
1 quarantining' , has become (although is not necessarily) 
institutionalized, and in its institutional form it is 
administered by certain authorities. The 
institutionalization of quarantining is distinct from 
the simple activity of isolating disease-carrying persons,
(footnote 1 continued from p.l45)
in Social Justice, ed. R.B. Brandt, Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice -Hall., 1962, pp.37"40; A.P. Griffiths,
op. cit., pp.180-1.
1*4 7
and therefore further argument may be needed to justify 
it. To do this, it would be necessary to show that the 
benefits of quarantining (a safeguard against epidemics, 
the introduction of new diseases, etc.) would help to 
fulfil the legitimate purposes of the institution 
concerned. Further justificatory questions relating to 
its implementation could also be raised. The possession 
of infectious and dangerous disease may morally justify 
the restriction of people’s freedom of movement. But 
it would hardly justify the ’old’ customs of killing 
disease carriers or of regarding them as ’unclean' (in 
a pejorative sense). Somewhat analogously to quarantining 
we consider it morally justifiable to inflict unpleasant 
treatment on people if doing so will save their lives. 
Lancing snakebites in the outback without anaesthetics
is unpleasant, but, like qxiarantining, is justified by
• + 1 its c ons e quence s.
(b) it is my contention that people can justifiably 
suffer the infliction of unpleasant treatment if they 
are guilty of some offence which exposes them to moral 
blame. The basis for this justifiable unpleasant 
treatment is their desert, and we call it ’punishment’.
The unpleasant treatment may serve such useful purposes 
as reforming offenders, lessening crimes, etc., but it 
is not these things which initially justify its infliction 
As in the case of quarantining, punishment is now 
generally administered by certain institutional
1
Certain complications arise if the person on whom the 
beneficial unpleasant treatment is to be inflicted does 
not want it (e.g. Jehovah's Witnesses and blood 
transfusions) .
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authorities, and because of this its administration as 
a social institution needs to be justified by reasons 
over and above those which originally justified the 
infliction of unpleasant treatment. To do this it is 
necessary to show that the benefits produced by punishment 
(reforming of offenders, lessening of crimes, minimizing 
of vendettas, etc.) are such as help to fulfil the 
legitimate purposes of the larger institution of which 
it forms a part (e.g. social order and well-being)."*" 
Naturally, justificatory questions can still be asked 
about the mode of punishment - it is exceedingly doubtful 
whether we could justify the inclusion of torture in 
punishment; many would claim that capital punishment 
is unjustifiable; and some would question the institution 
of imprisonment as an acceptable mode of punishment.
The question which we must now ask ourselves iss 
Why should quarantine be morally justified largely on 
utilitarian grounds, and punishment be justified by 
other sorts of considerations? Is the distinction which 
J am making quite arbitrary? It might be thought that 
the difference lies in the responsibility of those on 
whom the unpleasant treatment is inflicted for that 
which provides the occasion or fundamental ground of 
its infliction. We do not normally regard smallpox 
bearers as responsible for their disease. Therefore we 
logically could not justify isolating them on the grounds 
of their desert. So, if isolating them is to be
1
It is important that the purposes of the larger 
institution are seen to be legitimate. Social order which 
is achieved at the expense of justice is not good enough 
to justify the institutionalization of punishment.
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justified at all, it must be justified on other (most 
probably utilitarian) grounds. But this is not good 
enough. Sometimes people can be held responsible for 
the infectious and dangerous diseaseswhich they contract. 
They might be contracted as a result of moral failure 
(as sometimes in the case of VD) or carelessness (malaria, 
in some circumstances).* Nevertheless, the resulting 
isolation is still justified by its beneficial results.
The difference, if there is one, must lie elsewhere.
My own suggestion lies in the fact that whereas the 
unpleasant treatment involved in quarantining is a 
regrettable accompaniment to some future good, that 
involved in punishing is a matter of deliberate principle, 
it is of the essence of punishment that it is unpleasant 
treatment, but it is not of the essence of quarantine 
that it is unpleasant. It may one day be possible to 
quarantine people without inconveniencing them in any 
way, but without a radical change in the notion, it 
would be impossible to punish them without inflicting 
unpleasant treatment on them.
I think this is what Bradley is driving at in the 
well-known, misunderstood, and somewhat confused passage 
in his Ethical Studies;
1
According to the Australian Army Law Manual the 
contraction of VD is punishable if not reported. Also, 
in New Guinea, soldiers are liable to punishment if 
they contiact malaria, as there is then a presumption 
that they have not taken the prescribed precautions 
against its contraction. But the punishment they would 
receive for the offences is over and above their 
quaran tining.
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If there is any opinion to which the 
man of uncultivated morals is attached, it is 
the belief in the necessary connexion of 
punishment and guilt. Punishment is 
punishment only where it is deserved. We 
pay the penalty because we owe it, and for 
no other reason; and if punishment is 
inflicted for any other reason whatever 
than because it is merited by wrong, it is 
a gross immorality, a crying injustice, an 
abominable crime, and not what it pretends 
to be. -L
Here Bradley is certainly not simply saying what Quinton 
attributes to him, namely, that 'the infliction of 
suffering is only properly described as punishment if 
that person is guilty».2 Of course Bradley recognizes 
that there is a conceptual relationship between 
punishment and guilt. Nevertheless he does not conceive 
this relationship as strictly as Quinton does. From his 
discussion it would seem that he would find no great 
difficulty in speaking of someone as being 'mistakenly 
punished*. What is called »punishment» is 'not what 
it pretends to be* (i.e. punishment) only when it is 
knowingly inflicted on the innocent. And then it is 
'a gross immorality, a crying injustice, an abominable 
crime'. In the second sentence Bradley recognizes that 
punishment is a moral concept, denoting a morally 
justified activity. This is confirmed later when he
1
F.Ho Bradley, Ethical Studies, Second edn., Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1927* pp.26-7*
2
A.M. Quinton, *0n. Punishment', in Philosophy, Politics 
and Society, First Series, ed. P. Laslett, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1956, p.86.
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speaks of punishment as ’an end in itself’. It is 
for this reason that he rather confusingly speaks of 
guilt (or desert) both as part of the meaning of 
’punishment’ and as its justification. His point would 
have been a little less obscure if he had expressed 
himself in the following way:
What is inflicted as punishment is 
punishment only where it is deserved. We pay 
the penalty because we owe it, and for no 
other reason; and if what is inflicted as 
punishment is inflicted for any other reason 
whatever than because it is merited by wrong, 
it is a gross immorality, a crying injustice, 
an abominable crime, and not what it pretends 
to be.2
This does not completely extricate Bradley from confusion 
if taken to be a general comment on ’undeserved 
punishment’. But it will do for the sort of case which 
Bradley appears to have in mind, namely, the deliberate 
infliction of unpleasant treatment as punishment on 
a person who is known to be innocent.
The view which X am putting forward, namely, that 
unpleasant treatment which is inflicted as a matter of 
deliberate principle can be justified only on the ground
1
Bradley, op. cit., p.30.
2
A.S. Kaufman also credits Bradley with more than Quinton. 
As well he sees the need to modify Bradley’s wording 
somewhat. This he does by replacing ’punishment’ in the 
first sentence with ’infliction of injuries’, the first 
’punishment’ in the second sentence with ’infliction of 
injury’, and ’punishment’ in the third sentence with 
’injury’ (’Anthony Quinton on Punishment’, Analysis, Vol.
20, 1959-60, p.ll). My own suggested additions are
less substantial than Kaufman’s, and, I think, preferable.
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of desert, must be clearly distinguished from its common
caricatures as the infliction of pain for pain's sake,^
or punishment for punishment's sake^, or even punishment3for justice's sake . Punishment is not inflicted for 
anything's sake, but this does not mean that there is no 
reason for punishing people. If people ought to suffer 
punishment, it is, in the first instance, because they 
deserve it, and not for the sake of pain, punishment or 
even justice. Punishment is not a means to justice but 
is rather an expression of one form of justice. The 
means-end characterization of retributive punishment is 
only a caricature which results from a predominantly 
utilitarian way of thinking.
Where utilitarian considerations are adduced to 
justify activities in which the infliction of unpleasant 
treatment is a matter of deliberate principle, then an
kinjustice is done. In the case of punishment, if we 
try to justify the infliction of unpleasant treatment on
1
Cf. A.C. Ewing, 'Punishment as a Moral Agency: An
Attempt to Reconcile the Retributive and the Utilitarian 
View', Mind, Vol. XXXVI, 1927, p.292; idem. The
Morality of Punishment, London: Kegan Paul, Trench,
Trubner & Co., 1929, pp.26, 39*
2
Cf. C.W.K. Mundle, 'Punishment and Desert’, Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol. 4, 195^> p.223.
3 Cf. W.D. Ross, 'The Ethics of Punishment', Journal of 
Philosophical Studies, Vol. IV, 1929> p.209*
"4
Unless a person volunteers to undergo unpleasant 
treatment, say, as part of an experiment to test the 
effects of such on the human person. Nevertheless, the 
useful results which might be obtained from such an 
experiment would not justify its infliction upon 
unwilling subjects.
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wrongdoers by the amount of good which it will do to 
themselves and others, then we violate the principle of 
respect for persons. ’Good utilitarian punishment’, as 
Bradley argues, ’is the treating a man like a dog.’^
Desert, I have suggested, is necessary and sufficient 
to provide a moral, justification for having to suffer 
some kind of deliberately unpleasant treatment. But, as 
I tried to indicate earlier, it does not automatically 
justify its infliction by just anybody or just anyhow.
In practice, the ground, the executor and the mode of 
punishment are very closely related, and so it is 
important to ascertain exactly for what and why 
justification is being sought. The punishment which X 
suffers may be morally justified (’I guess I had it 
coming to me’), though perhaps Y ought not to have 
inflicted it (’but you had no right to do anything 
about it’). Or perhaps X ’s suffering punishment would 
have been morally justifiable, but not if it involved 
killing his family in front of him. I have considered 
particular instances of punishment here, but this does 
not affect the point in any way.
There is one final problem which confronts us in 
this section. We can state it thus: Even if punishment
is defined as unpleasant treatment meted out on offenders 
in virtue of their wrongdoing (desert), no
justification has been given for saying that they deserve 
the unpleasant treatment involved in suffering punishment. 
Why should not wrongdoers deserve blame instead? Then
1
Bradley, op. cit., p.32« I shall give further
consideration to the notion of respect for persons in 
Chapter Six.
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punishment will require a justification over and above 
that which justifies the blame.
This objection, I shall endeavour to show, is based 
on a confusion about the nature of blaming. Except to 
note that we often blame inanimate objects for some 
untoward event, I want to limit my discussion to 
situations in which we blame people.'*'
First we must distinguish between 'X is to blame 
for C' and ’X deserves to be blamed for C ’ . These are 
not always distinguished, but when they are, the first 
signifies simply that X is causally responsible for some 
untoward event C! (in which no evaluation of X is implied), 
and the second expresses X's moral responsibility for C^. 
This being the case, the objection we have outlined 
becomes well nigh unintelligible. For to say ’wrongdoing 
deserves blame’ would then be tantamount to saying 
’wrongdoers deserve to be held morally responsible for 
their wrongdoing’. This is odd on two related counts:
(i) typically, in calling people wrongdoers we are 
ipso facto holding them morally responsible for some 
wrong. Thus holding them morally responsible for some 
wrong (i.e. blaming them) is not something extra which 
they can be said to deserve; (ii) in normal speech, to
T
Discussions of blaming can be found in S. Moser, 
’Utilitarian Theories of Punishment and Moral Judgments', 
Philosophical Studies, Vol. VIII, 1957, pp.15-19; R.B. 
Brandt, 'Blameworthiness and Obligation', in Essays in 
Moral Philosophy, ed. A.I. Melden, Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 1958» PP*3-39, L. Kenner, 'On 
Blaming’, Mind, Vol. LXXVI, 1967, pp.238-49; J.E.R. 
Squires, ’Blame’, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 18,
1968, pp.54-60.
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say ’wrongdoers deserve blame’ is odd in a way in which 
’wrongdoers deserve punishment' is not. Normally we 
would say ’Ward deserves the blame’ (because he is a 
wrongdoer) or 'Ward is blameworthy’, the 'blame' here 
being something extra not entailed by the subject.
However, there is a rarer sense of ’blame’ in 
which blaming a person for some wrong is not so much to 
impute to him the responsibility for it, but is rather 
to censure, reprove or reproach him for it; e.g. 'He 
wrote to me, blaming me for my part in the affair’. But 
in this case blame is itself the infliction of 
unpleasant treatment, and we could almost say with 
Stevenson that it is 'a kind of verbally mediated 
punishment’ As a general, characterization of blame, 
Stevenson's view is undoubtedly wrong. Nevertheless, his 
statement does appear to fit one limited sense of ’blame’.
1
C.L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 19^5, P .307 > cf. R.B. Brandt, 
'Determinism and the Justifiability of Moral Blame', in 
Determinism and Freedom in The Age of Modern Science, 
ed. S. Hook, New York University Press, 1958, p.139*
Others who regard 'blame' as essentially synonymous with 
'censure', 'reproach', etc. (though not 'punishment') 
are J. Hospers, Human Conduct, New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, 1961, pp.470-8; J. Plamenatz, 
'Responsibility, Blame and Punishment', in Philosophy, 
Politics and Society, Third Series, ed. P. Laslett and 
W.G. Runciman, Oxford: Blackwell, 1967» pp.173-93;
R.L. Franklin, Freewill and Determinism, London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968, Chapter IX.
2
Some philosophers have argued that in no sense of 
blame could it be regarded as punishment since punishment 
requires an authority for its infliction whereas blame 
does not (e.g. Squires, op. cit. , p.^4; R.L. Franklin,
op. cit., pp.170-4). I have already rejected the view 
that punishment implies authority in Chapter Two.
(footnote continued on p.156)
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3♦ Justifying Particular Instances of Punishment.
In Chapter Two I presented an imaginary discussion 
concerning the conviction of a person (Black) for 
homosexual practices. Two of the contributions went as 
follows:
Williams: ’Do you think they were justified in
punishing him? I wouldn’t have 
trusted the key witness. I’m sure he 
had a grudge against Black.’
White: ’True enough, but the other witnesses
corroborated his testimony, so it’s 
quite likely that he wasn’t lying. But 
even if he wasn’t lying, what does that 
matter? Homosexuality isn’t immoral; 
it’s a psychological defect. The poor 
guy couldn’t have helped it. He needs 
treatment, not punishment.’
In this discussion both Williams and White are questioning 
the justifiability of this particular punishment. The 
significant thing about these, and other questions asked 
with reference to the moral sphere of discourse, is 
that they can be settled by showing that the features 
typically or characteristically involved in punishment 
are present in the particular case. In the present
(footnote 2 continued from p.155)
Interestingly enough, Mabbott argues that ’blaming people 
... that is, expressing adverse verdicts upon them - 
requires a status’ (’Freewill and Punishment’, in 
Contemporary British Philosophy, Third Series, ed.
H.D. Lewis, London: Allen & Unwin, 1956, p,300). In
this he follows Nowell-Smith, who states: ’If a man
deserves blame, someone would be justified in blaming 
him. Not necessarily you; for you may be in no position 
to cast the first stone or to cast any stone at all’
(Ethic s, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 195^> p.27l). Nowell-
Smith and perhaps Mabbott are using ’blame’ in the last 
sense I pointed out.
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instance William's and White's questions are met by 
showing that Black had committed an offence, and that 
this offence had exposed him to moral blame.
Although this procedure would normally be sufficient 
to settle any justificatory questions directly related 
to a particular instance of punishment, this is not 
necessarily the case. For although 'Black deserves to 
suffer punishment' entails that Black ought to suffer 
punishment, the moral consequences of Y's punishing 
Black by means D may be such as to make it wrong for 
anyone (or at least Y) to punish him. 'Wrong', not 
because he ought not to suffer punishment, but because 
the mode of punishment (e.g. imprisonment) or the 
exercise of a particular punishing authority (the state) 
would lead to morally unacceptable consequences (his 
death, or revolution). This type of reasoning, however, 
does not enter into the justification of punishments 
suffered in particular cases. What it justifies is 
the withholding of a particular type of punishment 
by a particular authority. As I said earlier, these 
questions are not easily separable, though they are 
distinguishable. But they are consistent with a person 
deserving to suffer punishment even though no one had 
the right to punish him; and were someone to take it 
upon himself to punish him he would be acting in a 
morally offensive way, even though the wrongdoer would 
have no grounds for complaint with respect to the 
punishment.
Of course, not only moral justificatory questions 
can arise with respect to particular instances of 
punishment. When punishment is meted out within a legal
158
context, questions can arise concerning the legality 
of the punishment. Did Black’s actions fall within the 
legal definition of homosexual practices? Was the trial 
properly constituted? What was the legal status of the 
evidence? and so on. These questions, however, concern 
not so much whether Black ought to have suffered or 
deserved punishment, but whether the punishment which 
he may or may not have deserved was rightly administered 
by a particular authority.
4. Appendix: ’Undeserving* and ’Ill-deserving*.
Some writers have suggested that ’desert’ or ’merit* 
could never be sufficient to justify morally the 
distribution of pleasant or unpleasant treatment because 
it rides roughshod over the inequalities of capacity 
which human beings display: ’Is it just that one man
should earn more than another because he possesses 
natural abilities which fit him to achieve much more 
than the other?' This objection is usually raised 
only when desert is suggested as a criterion for the 
distribution of goods, but if true it would cast doubt 
on the sufficiency of desert as a justification for the 
punishment which a man suffers. It is my belief that 
the objection rests on a confusion between ’undeserving’ 
and ’ill-deserving’.
In a sub-section entitled ’The Revolt Against Desert’ 
Brian Barry states that
in examining the concept of desert we 
are examining a concept which is already in 
decline and may eventually disappear. ’Desert’ 
flourishes in a liberal society where people 
are regarded as rational independent atoms
159
held together in a society by a ’social 
contract’ from which all must benefit.
Each person’s worth can be precisely 
ascertained - it is his net marginal 
product and under certain postulated 
conditions ... market prices give each 
factor of production its net marginal 
product. Life is an obstacle race with 
no special provision for the lame but 
if one competitor trips up another, 
the state takes cognizance of this fact; 
thus compensation is given only when 
there is negligence on one side but not 
on the other.1
Workmen’s compensation, provision for the ’undeserving
poor’, and the attention paid to the rehabilitation of
criminals rather than to seeing that they get their
’just deserts’ are seen by Barry as welcome changes in
this direction. Furthermore, with Bernard Shaw, he
finds ’something ridiculous in trying to compare the
"worth" of different jobs; and ... something degrading
about a court having to decide whether some victim of
a ghastly accident was "negligent" or not and whether
2or not he therefore "deserves" compensation.’
There are a number of difficulties in Barry’s 
contentions, but I mention the one which is relevant to 
my purposes. In failing to distinguish between the 
undeserving and the ill-deserving Barry invalidly infers 
from ’X does not deserve to get A' to ’X ought not to
1
B. Barry, Political Argument, London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1965» pp.112-3 ; cf. John Wilson, Reason and 
Morals, Cambridge University Press, 1961, pp.102-3 ;
J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Everyman edn., London: J.M.
Dent, 1910, pp.53-4.
2
Barry, op. cit., p.ll4.
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get A'. To be valid, his premise would need to have 
been ' X deserves not to get A*. IT a workman does not 
deserve to get $1,000 a year which is the minimum 
subsistence level, it does not follow that he ought 
not to have this $1,000 provided for him. In fact it 
can be argued that a government has a duty to supply 
the basic needs of its citizens and that this is a 
right which they have as human beings. This is a right 
which they have quite independently of their deserts 
and which could be foregone only if they deserve not 
to have such basic needs met. It is difficult to see 
how this could come about unless they showed themselves 
completely unworthy of human society (by murder?).
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CHAPTER FIVE
DESERT, PUNISHMENT AND JUSTICE
I have argued that if punishment is inflicted on 
someone who does not deserve it, then it must be 
qualified as ’undeserved’ or ’unjust’. And if 
deliberately unpleasant treatment or punishment is 
unjust, then its infliction is morally unjustified - 
or so I have implied. I have thus committed myself to 
the view that moral ill-desert is a necessary condition 
for the justifiable infliction of deliberately 
unpleasant treatment on people. I have suggested more 
than this, however. In the last Chapter I took the view 
that a person’s moral ill-desert is sufficient to justify 
his suffering punishment.
These views are not without their difficulties, and 
in the remaining four Chapters I propose to examine my 
conclusions in the light of some of them. To be 
deserving a person must in some sense be held responsible 
for his actions, and in Chapter Six I shall ask, first, 
in what sense must a person be held responsible to 
deserve punishment, and second, whether people can in 
fact be held responsible in the requisite sense. I have 
already noted in a number of places that the fact that 
a person deserves punishment is not usually regarded as 
a warrant for its infliction by just anybody. By whom, 
then, should punishment be inflicted? is the question I 
set myself in Chapter Seven. Desert justifications of the 
infliction of unpleasant treatment have traditionally
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foundered when extended to the determination of how 
much punishment is deserved. I look at this problem 
again in Chapter Eight.
In the present Chapter, however, I want to examine 
some of the difficulties which are engendered by arguing 
that desert is a necessary and sufficient condition of 
morally justified punishment. We shall see that in fact 
the situation is a little more complex than I have so 
far made it out to be.
There is nothing very new in the argument that if 
punishment is undeserved it is unjust and hence 
unjustified. In fact, the key objection to utilitarian 
’justifications of punishment’ has traditionally been 
that they cannot exclude the possibility of justifying 
unjust punishments.^ Generally, utilitarians have 
regarded this as a serious objection to their views, 
and much of their discussion has been devoted to arguing 
that, rightly understood, utilitarian ’justifications’ 
can avoid this consequence.^ Nevertheless, in a number
1
See, for example, H.J. McCloskey, ’An Examination of 
Restricted Utilitarianism’, Philosophical Review, Vol. 
LXVI, 1957, pp.466-85; idem. ’A Note on Utilitarian 
Punishment', Mind, Vol. LXXII, 1963» p*599; G. Vlastos, 
’Justice’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Vol. 11, 
1957» P*340; B. Blanshard, ’Justice and the Good’, in 
A Modern Introduction to Ethics, ed. M.K. Munitz, Glencoe, 
Illinois: The Free Press, 1958, pp.437-41; S.I. Benn
and R.S. Peters, Social Principles and the Democratic 
State, London: Allen and Unwin, 1959» p.183*
2
See J. Rawls, ’Two Concepts of Rules’, Philosophical 
Review, Vol. LXIV, 1953» pp.10-13; S.I. Benn, 'An 
Approach to the Problems of Punishment', Philosophy,
Vol. XXXIII, 1958, pp. 331-2.
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of recent discussions a less defensive position has 
been taken, and the validity of the argument 'undeserved 
therefore unjust therefore unjustified*, as it relates 
to punishment (or unpleasant treatment), has been 
seriously challenged.
It will not be my task to discuss every possible 
challenge which may be presented. For example, I shall 
not examine the classical utilitarian view which maintains 
that each of the terms in the argument can be given a 
utilitarian analysis.^- To some extent I have argued 
against this possibility in Chapters Three and Four, but 
apart from that, there is a considerable literature which 
shows fairly clearly that any attempted utilitarian 
analyse s of the se terms ('desert', 'just', 'justified’ ) 
need at the very least to be supplemented by non­
utilitarian principles, and a further discussion does 
not seem to me necessary at present.^
In the first section of this Chapter I shall be 
concerned to give a brief analysis of 'justice' as it is
1
I refer especially to the views of Hume, Bentham and 
J.S. Mill. Sidgwick also follows in the tradition of 
the classical writers, but he recognizes the non­
utilitarian undergirding of his position.
2
Discussions can be found in J. Hospers, Human Conduct,
New York: Hareourt, Brace and World, 1961, Chapters 9>
10; H.A. Bedau, 'Justice and Classical Utilitarianism', 
in Nomos VI: Justice, ed. C.J. Friedrich and J.W. Chapman,
New York: Atherton Press, 1963» pp.284-305; B. Blanshard,
op. cit., passim.; H.J. McCloskey, 'Utilitarian and 
Retributive Punishment', Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXIV, 
1967, Pp.91-110; N. Rescher, Distributive Justice, 
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966.
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used in relation to punishment. This will be hollowed 
by a consideration of the objection that not all unjust 
punishments are unjustified. Some classical 
utilitarians, who gave 'justice' a utilitarian analysis, 
and modern utilitarians, who give 'justice' a non­
utilitarian analysis, argue that the fact that a punishment 
is just is only one (albeit an important) element to be 
taken into consideration when determining its 
justifiability. The disutility of injustice must be 
weighed against the utility of punishing. Here I will 
consider in some detail the force of saying that 
something is just. The second section of the Chapter 
will be devoted to the following problem: if desert is
necessary and sufficient for the punishment which a 
person suffers to be morally justifiable, is there any 
room left for mercy? Will it not be unjust and hence 
unjustifiable to treat the wrongdoer mercifully? And 
is not this morally repugnant?
1. Justice and Justified Punishment.
The Greeks traditionally viewed justice essentially 
as rendering to every man his due^, and they were 
perceptive enough to recognize that what a man's due 
was, depended to a large extent on what aspect he was 
viewed under. The great advantage of this general 
account of justice was and is the fact that it is able
I
So Simonides, as reported by Plato in The Republic,
331e* The earlier part of this section has benefited 
from Ch. IV of D. Seligman, Justice and the Role of 
Retribution in Punishment, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
New York: Columbia University, 1966.
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to accommodate naturally the several different species 
of justice which we recognize - divine, poetic, 
commutative, social and retributive justice. But the 
formula, 'Justice consists in rendering to every man 
his due*, does not itself define justice. It simply 
provides a broad conceptual framework for the different 
species of justice. Perelman and others speak of it 
as 'formal or abstract justice' and regard it as the 
common element in the various conceptions of justice.^
Some regard the central notion of justice not as 
rendering-to-every-man-his-due but rather as equality. 
Frankena, for instance, while primarily concerned with 
social justice, nevertheless extends his analysis to 
justice in general, which he sees essentially as 
involving the allotment of substantially equal treatment 
to people, except as unequal treatment is justified by 
just-making considerations in the circumstances.^ This
1
Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of 
Argument, trans. J. Petrie, London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1963> pp.12-16. Perelman defines formal justice 
as 'a principle of action in accordance with which beings 
of one and the same essential category must be treated in 
the same way', but this does not seem to be substantially 
different from the ancient formula. Cf. M. Ginsberg,
'The Concept of Justice', Philosophy, Vol. XXXVIII, 1963» 
p.104; G. del Vecchio, Justice, trans. Lady Guthrie 
and ed. A.H. Campbell, Edinburgh University Press, 19^ +2, 
pp.113-15; G. Vlastos, 'Justice and Equality', in 
Social Justice, ed. R.B. Brandt, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1962, pp.53-6; A. Gewirth, 'Political 
Justice', in Social Justice, pp.123-5*
2
V.K. Frankena, 'The Concept of Social Justice', in 
Social Justice, pp.10, 13* This is a modification of
Brandt, who speaks of 'moral' rather than 'just-making' 
considerations as justifying inequalities of treatment
(footnote continued on p.166)
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right or claim to equal treatment he takes to be
ultimately derivable from ’the intrinsic dignity or
value of the human individual’.^  Thus, in considering
the particular case of social justice, he argues that
its grounding in individual human worth makes for a
conception of the just society as one which considers
and protects ’the good life of each man equally with that
of any other no matter how different these men may be,
and so it must allow them equal consideration, equal
2opportunity and equality before the law.’
Now, as an account of social justice, Frankena1s 
egalitarian position has much to be said for it. It is 
only when an attempt is made to apply it to penal or 
retributive justice that its artificiality and 
stipulative nature become clear. Thus, in his only 
attempt to relate equality to retributive justice, he 
write s:
’Retributive justice - for example, punishment 
- must also be considered. Aristotle and 
others have brought it under the principle of 
equality by contending that the retribution 
restores the equality between the offender and 
the injured which had been disturbed. It 
might also be contended that, having violated 
the principle of equality, the criminal may 
justly be regarded as having forfeited his 
claim to a good life on equal terms with
(footnote 2 continued from p.165)
(Ethical Theory, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1959 > p .410). Frankena’ s reasons for this modification 
are not at all clear.
1
Page 23*
2
Page 20.
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others, and even his claim not to be pained. 
Critics of the retributive theory of 
punishment might prefer to argue that 
punishment is made just, and perhaps also 
obligatory, by the fact that it tends to 
promote the most equality in the long run
from infringing on the
Frankena himself inclines to the latter view. It is 
difficult however to spell this out in practice. Take 
the case of a down-and-out who steals money from a 
philanthropist. It would appear from Frankena1 2s 
account that this act of stealing would result in a 
greater equality of distribution of goods than there 
would otherwise have been, and it is not implausible 
to add: 'in the long run*. Would the punishment of
such a man therefore be unjust? I hardly think so.
Even a rule-utilitarian account would not completely 
overcome this difficulty.^ Or, alternatively, 
suppose an otherwise law-abiding citizen takes revenge 
on an underworld leader for some act committed by that 
person. The removal of the underworld leader could 
quite conceivably result in more equal benefits for 
all; nevertheless, it would hardly be unjust to punish 
his assassin (even granting that there might be 
mitigating circumstances). In fact, one might argue 
that a rule prescribing the punishment of such people
Pages 16-17*
2
Rule utilitarianism, as has often been pointed out, 
only minimizes but does not dispel the difficulties of 
act-utilitarianism. On this, see especially H.J. 
McCloskey, 'An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism', 
passim.
1
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would be to deter others from the same sort of action, 
and so to curtail further equalization of the 
distribution of goods.
Frankena's mistake has been to use what is to 
some extent true of social justice^ as a model, for a 
general account of justice. The ancient formula, 
however does more justice to the facts, as it easily 
accommodates the several species of justice. As 
Frankena points out, social justice rests on a 
recognition of certain fundamental rights which people 
have qua people - rights to such things as life, liberty, 
and well-being. These are rights which men can claim 
as their due simply because they are men, and any 
society which ignores such claims is an unjust one.
These rights, however, like other human rights, 
are not absolute, but are susceptible to justifiable 
exceptions. In the realm of retributive justice, what 
is due to a man is determined by his deserts. These 
deserts may constitute a sufficient ground for 
overriding the claims to life, liberty and well-being 
which a man has qua man. But retributive justice, in 
overriding such claims, nevertheless presupposes the 
value of the human individual (respect for persons).
1
Even in the sphere of social justice Frankena’s view 
strikes difficulties not only because of the recalcitrance 
of ’merit’, but also because of the way in which he 
conceives of social equality. On the latter, see S.I. 
Beim, ’Egalitarianism and the Equal Consideration of 
Interests’, in Nomos IX: Equality, ed. J.R. Pennock
and J.W. Chapman, New York: Atherton Press, 1967*
pp.61-78.
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This has an important bearing on the way an individual 
is to be treated even when he deserves the loss of 
life, liberty or well-being. He is not to be degraded 
to the level of an animal or tool. To use Seligman's 
schematic representation, life is like a game in which 
starters are given a number of value-points which they 
keep all their lives, but which may be completely 
overshadowed by the points of value or disvalue 
accumulated by subsequent acts.“*-
As I have so far explicated the notion of justice,
I have considered it as an evaluative and primarily as 
a moral notion. This account seems to me to be 
essentially correct, although it needs to be recognized 
that there are other uses of ’just’ which do not fit 
neatly into this pattern.^ To speak of a * just appraisal* 
for instance is to evaluate the appraisal, but not 
necessarily morally. As much on the periphery are
1
Seligman, op. cit., pp.168-9* W.B. Gallie seems to 
argue that desert and human rights (need) belong to two 
radically opposed moralities - liberal and socialist 
(’Liberal Morality and Socialist Morality’, in Philosophy, 
Politics and Society, First Series, ed. P. Laslett,
Oxford: Blackwell, 1956, pp.116-33)- While it is clear
that in the history of moral and political thought 
each of these two elements - basic human rights (or 
needs) and desert - has on occasion been emphasized 
to the exclusion of the other, I do not see any necessary 
opposition between them. Plato takes an exclusivist 
line in The Republic, where he argues that if a person’s 
illness permanently prevents him from carrying out his 
tasks, then he has lost the right to live (406e-407a).
2
Examples can be found in Gewirth, op. cit.,
Brandt, Ethical Theory, p.4l0.
p.112;
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certain conceptions of legal justice, which, while 
they accord with the general formula 'To every man his 
due', are peripheral precisely because what is due is 
not decided on moral criteria. Thus we find a use of 
'just' which simply indicates that something has been 
done according to law, and this use operates fairly 
independently of the notions of human worth and desert. 
This is the sense in which Mabbott speaks of just 
punishment:
X is the citizen of a state. About his 
citizenship, whether willing or unwilling,
I have asked no questions. About the 
government, whether good or bad, I do not 
enquire. X has broken a law. Concerning 
the law, whether it is well-devised or not,
I have not asked.... It is the essence of 
my position that none of these questions is 
relevant to whether a particular punishment 
is just.l
Thus, every time the law is properly administered, justice 
is done. There is something strange in saying this. The 
fact that the law has been properly administered does not 
entail that the person has been justly punished. Are 
opponents of apartheid in South Africa justly punished 
by the State? There is more to just punishment than the 
impartial administration of the law. This fact has often 
led people to distinguish two senses of 'just', one in 
which we can speak of a law being justly administered 
or of a just judge, and the other in which we speak of
1
J.D. Mabbott, 'Punishment', Mind, Vol. XLVIII, 1939» 
p.l60; cf. Kant, Philosophy of Law, trans. ¥. Hastie, 
Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1887» P*32; F.L. Patton,
'Retribution in Relation to the Justice, Goodness and 
Purpose of God’, Princeton Review, N.S., Vol. I, I878, p.2.
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the law itself being just. Now, I think that the first 
sense of 'just* is parasitic on the second sense, and 
though it can be used in both these senses, it is 
sometimes misleading to do so.* This can be seen by 
contrasting the naturalness of speaking of a just law 
being unjustly administered with the oddity and 
pointlessness of speaking of an unjust law being justly 
administered. ’Just* has the wrong connotations for the 
secondary use to be taken too seriously. In such cases, 
we tend to replace ’justly* by * impartially’ or some 
other more neutral term.^
In sum, we can see that generally to call a punishment 
unjust is to qualify the moral endorsement of the act, 
which would otherwise be conveyed, and to indicate instead 
that the person has not been treated as he de serve s.
But what exactly is the force of saying that a punishment 
is unjust? Does it mean that such punishment is also 
unjustified? As I pointed out earlier, it has often been
1
Pace R.A. Samek, ’Punishment: A Postscript to Two
Prolegomena’, Philosophy, Vol. XLI, 1966, p.217 f/n.l.
2
Cf. S.I. Berm: ’A judge may enforce a racial segregation
law with strict impartiality and yet commit injustice if 
the distinctions embodied in the law are not themselves 
relevant’ (art. ’Justice, in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. P. Edwards, New York: Macmillan and The Free Press,
1967> Vol. 4, p.299; also R.B. Brandt, Ethical Theory, 
pp.409-10; ¥.K. Frankena, op. cit., p ♦5)• ¥e tend to
speak of ’strict justice’ being administered where 
morally extenuating circumstances are not allowed by a 
basically just law which lacks the subtlety appropriate 
to true justice.
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assumed, especially by retributivists, that this is 
so. Nevertheless, quite early in the recent debate it 
was made clear that this inference (presuming that it 
is an inference) could not be taken for granted. it was 
thought that there might be occasions on which an unjust 
punishment would be morally justified. In 1954 Flew 
warned against the ’easy but mistaken assumption’ that 
’to show that something is just (or unjust) is ... always 
and necessarily to show that it is justified (or 
unjustified)’.^  As Flew is arguing here against Mabbott, 
there is some point to his warning, since, as we have 
seen, Mabbott conceives justice in purely legal, terms, 
and it is therefore clearly possible that not all just 
(unjust) punishments will be justified (unjustified).
Perhaps Flew would still have argued in the same 
manner had Mabbott used ’just’ in its primary sense. 
Whether or not he would have, quite a number of 
philosophers have argued in this way.^ In a symposium 
on punishment, H.J. McCloskey criticised utilitarian 
justifications of punishment for their inability to 
accommodate the notion of justice. Justice, he argued,
1
A.G.N. Flew, ’"The Justification of Punishment"’, 
Philosophy, Vol. XXIX, 1954, p-301.
2
H.L.A. Hart, ’Prolegomenon to the Principles of 
Punishment’, in Philosophy, Politics and Society, Second 
Series, ed. P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962, pp.l67“8* idem. ’Murder and the 
Principles of Punishment: England and the United
States’, Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. LII, 
1957» p.453; J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of 
Utilitarian Ethics, Melbourne University Press, 1961, 
pp.4l, 46; E.L. Pincoffs, The Justification of Legal
(footnote continued on p.173)
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cannot be reduced to utility, and, indeed, is often 
opposed to it. Nevertheless, he conceded that
sometimes it is morally permissible and 
obligatory to override the dictates of 
justice. The retributive theory is a 
theory about justice in punishment and 
tells only part of the whole story about 
the morality of punishment.1
T.L.S. Sprigge, the other symposiast, rightly in reply obj ected
that ’to determine that a punishment ought to be
inflicted is to determine that it is morally obligatory,
2and not simply that it is permissible*. In a later
3article McCloskey conceded this point, and argued for 
the following two propositions:
(footnote 2 continued from p.172)
Punishment, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell 
University, 1937» pp.133-6; M. Goldinger, The Moral 
Justification of Punishment, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Ohio State University, 1963» pp.92, 108; H.J. McCloskey,
*A Non-utilitarian Approach to Punishment’, Inquiry,
Vol. VIII, 1963» p p .249-63; idem. ’Utilitarian and 
Retributive Punishment’, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXIV, 
1967> pp.91-110; T.L.S. Sprigge, ’A Utilitarian Reply 
to Dr. McCloskey’, Inquiry, Vol. VIII, 1965» pp.264-91;
D.F. Thompson, ’Retribution and the Distribution of 
Punishment’, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 16, 1966,
PP-39-63; R.M. Hare, ’Punishment’, an unpublished paper 
read to the Australasian Association of Philosophy 
(Canberra Branch), July, 1966; C.L. Ten, ’Mr Thompson 
on the Distribution of Punishment’, Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol. 17, 1967, PP•233-4; J.R. Lucas, The
Principles of Politics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966,
§33» P P .233-43 5 D^ Seligman, op. cit. , pp.199-202; etc.
1
McCloskey, ’A Non-utilitarian Approach to Punishment’,
P.231.
2
Sprigge, op. cit., p.267- 
3
McCloskey, ’Utilitarian and Retributive Punishment’,
pp.102-3.
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[_ i] To be just, punishment must be of an 
offender for an offence and not in excess 
of what is commensurate with the offence, 
where ’offence’ and ’offender’ are to be 
interpreted in the morally relevant senses 
of those expressions.
[ii] To be morally justified, unjust 
punishment must not simply be useful; 
rather, the good it achieves must be so 
great that it outweighs the evil of the 
injustice involved.1
His disagreement with utilitarianism is that it ’does not
take account of the relevance of the claims of justice
when determining whether a punishment is morally right.
For the utilitarian, the utility of the punishment is
2the only morally relevant consideration.’
In a recent book, J.R. Lucas also allows that
3justice, ’as one among many other political goods' , may 
be compromised with 'Equity, Equality, Legality, Humanity,4Rationality, Public Interest, or the Common Good'. Both 
he and McCloskey illustrate their contentions with a 
number of examples.
McCloskey presents a sophisticated version of the 
now familiar case in which a sheriff frames an innocent 
yet 'worthless' Negro in order to prevent race riots 
developing in a race-torn community in which a white 
woman has been raped by a Negro. Sprigge had said of
1
Pages 91-2
2
Page 93.
3
Lucas, op.
4
Page 242.
cit. , p.238.
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this example that if it had been qualified so that 
greater good would result from the sheriff’s action than 
if he had done otherwise, then it would not be rejected 
by ’the plain man'^ after all, but accepted, though with 
regret. On this McCloskey comments:
Whether it was so accepted would depend on 
how much good is promoted and evil prevented 
by the injustice, and also on the character 
and nature of the victim. However, the 
important point is that, whether or not it 
is accepted by the plain man, its injustice 
would be a factor of which the plain man 
would and ought to take account. If he 
accepted it, it would be in spite of its 
injustice. The regret he would experience 
if he did accept such punishment would be 
at having to override the claims of justice; 
on the other hand, it is also true that if 
the plain man rejected the punishment because 
of its injustice, he would experience regret 
at being unfree to prevent suffering. It 
is hard to see how, on the utilitarian theory, 
there is any room for the former regret, for 
it is regret at having to do something that 
is evil of its nature and not by virtue of 
its consequences.^
McCloskey suggests that there may also be situations in 
which the punishment of parents for the offences of their 
children, collective punishment, punishment of the 
insane, and excessive punishment, are rightly administered, 
for ’the claims of justice are simply one sort among
1
An elusive creature, appeal to whom is philosophically 
suspect. Is Sprigge’s contention based on a survey of 
what ’plain men’ have said? Do all ’plain men’ think 
the same? And if they do, does this make them right?
2
McCloskey, 'Utilitarian and Retributive Punishment’, 
p. 96 .
l?6
prima facie claims and ... may on occasion be 
overridden’.^  However, he does not specify the sorts 
of occasions on which this may be so.
Lucas draws a number of examples from the law:
A law, like a particular decision, may be 
open to criticism on the score of injustice, 
yet be defensible on other grounds. ¥e may, 
quite properly, compromise our ideal of 
justice in order the better to secure ease 
of administration, the maintenance of law 
and order, or for the sake of Freedom,
Equality, or Public Interest.^
In the last war, people with German names in Britain
were more likely to be security risks than other people,
and legislation was carried out accordingly. Laws
were formulated in terms of features that were ’partly
or contingently relevant but easy to define or
determine’, in preference to features that were
’totally and necessarily relevant, but difficult to
3describe or in actual cases to apply’. The same applies 
to laws in which liability is strict. As well, Lucas 
suggests that when law and order are in serious danger 
of breaking down (as after an earthquake or riot), it 
might be justifiable to inflict severe and exemplary 
punishment s.^
1
Page 102.
2
Lucas, op. 
3
Page 240.
k
Page 24l.
cit., p.237.
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This is a formidable array of objections to the 
view that if punishment is unjust it is unjustified, and 
I am not sure that they can be met by analysis alone.
And this can be expected, for, as I argued in Chapter 
Two, genuine moral problems cannot be solved by mere 
definitions. Analysis can take us so far, but not all 
the way. There comes a point at which a moral decision 
must be made. Nevertheless, there is some value in 
enquiring into the force of saying that something is 
just.
Mill writes thus:
As we do not call anything justice which is 
not a virtue, we usually say, not that 
justice must give way to some other moral 
principle, but that what is just in 
ordinary cases is, by reason of that 
other principle, not just in the 
particular case. By this useful 
accommodation of language, the character 
of indefeasibility attributed to justice 
is kept up, and we are saved from the 
necessity of maintaining that there can 
be laudable injustice.^
For Mill, an act, policy, law or punishment is just only 
if it is morally right and unjust only if it is morally 
wrong. As I shall argue, there is a good deal to be 
said for this view, for just and unjust are evaluative 
notions which find their primary use in the moral sphere 
of discourse.
Moral notions are of varying degrees of generality, 
from very broad notions such as right and wrong, good 
and bad, to more precise notions such as murder, lying etc.
1
J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Everyman edn., London: 
J.M. Dent, 1910, p-59-
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As well, moral notions may be of varying degrees of
completeness.^ A complete moral notion is one whose
application automatically and consistently carries with
it commendation or (vel) condemnation (on moral grounds),
whereas an incomplete moral notion lacks this consistency.
To take two examples: there may be special circumstances
in which we would regard lying as justifiable - as in
cases where telling a lie would save an innocent person's
2life. Lying is thus not a complete moral notion. ¥e
could make it more complete by distinguishing those
cases in which lying would be justifiable and calling
them by some other name. To some extent this is
discernible in our references to 'white lies’. Murder,
on the other hand, comes closer to what we would regard
as a complete moral notion. Actions to which the name
'murder' would apply except for one or two morally
relevant features which render them justifiable, we
3refer to as justifiable homicides instead.
How do 'just' and 'unjust' fit into this schema?
To call an act or activity 'unjust' is not quite the 
same sort of thing as calling it 'fraudulent', even 
though each is a moral notion. 'Fraud' is somewhat more 
specific than 'injustice'. Only a relatively narrow
1
Mill speaks instead of defeasibility. For a discussion 
of 'complete' and 'incomplete' moral notions, see 
J. Kovesi, Moral Notions, London: Routl.edge and Kegan 
Paul, 1967, pp.^6-32, 104-9, 124, 142.
2
Kant, of course, thought otherwise.
3
Or, in different circumstances, capital punishment, 
acts of war, etc.
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range of acts or activities can be characterized by the 
former, whereas the latter can cover a great range of 
acts or activities, as is evidenced by the different 
species of justice. Some of the Greeks went so far as 
to identify justice with virtue, especially when 
considering 'the just man1  2But this is somewhat 
broader than our general use. Nevertheless 'just' and 
'unjust' do give a moral characterization of a large 
range of intentional behaviour, or, more specifically, 
of that intentional behaviour concerned with the 
distribution of those things which intentional agents 
can claim as their due.
The more significant question, however, is whether
or not 'just' and 'unjust' are complete moral notions.
Perhaps this is a question which we cannot decide in
advance, since we cannot envisage all the possible
situations in which the question of the justifiability
2of compromising justice might arise. But even if this 
is so, we can still consider the various candidates 
which have been put up, and thus get some impression 
of its completeness.
I take first McCloskey's example of a sheriff 
tempted to frame a certain undesirable negro for the 
rape of a white woman. McCloskey argues that whatever 
happened in such a situation, 'the plain man' would
1
Plato, The Republic ; Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 
Book V, Ch. 1.
2
One of the inadequacies of Kovesi's discussion is 
that he gives no criteria for deciding whether or not 
a particular moral notion is complete.
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feel regret, for either way there would be a sacrifice.
I do not need to dispute the fact that there would be 
regrets, whatever happened. But I cannot as easily 
concede that in sacrificing justice the sheriff would 
be doing the right thing. For one thing, though this 
is not decisive, certainty is often impossible to obtain 
in these kinds of situations (Munich, 1938,is evidence 
for that), and where this is so, justice would be 
preferable even from a utilitarian viewpoint. But it is 
no doubt possible to construct a situation in which it 
would be the height of scepticism to doubt the 
consequences of refusing to ’punish' the innocent negro: 
when, for example an unruly and near-hysterical mob 
confronts the sheriff demanding the offender or threatening 
to go out and get a scapegoat instead. Even here the 
broadly utilitarian case does not seem to me to be 
convincing. On my view, the morally right thing for 
the sheriff to do would be to refuse to dirty his hands, 
and then to do everything in his power to prevent the 
mob from carrying out its threat. Should he fail to 
stop them (as is almost certain), and another negro is 
lynched, the blame rests on their shoulders, not his.
He has done the right thing and cannot be held responsible 
for the immoral demands and behaviour of others. The 
responsibility would have been his only if he had 
framed the innocent negro.
Undoubtedly my view will not convince everyone.
For example, it is not likely to convince a person who 
gives more weight to the principle of utility than to 
justice. But even those who agree with the standpoint 
I have expressed here may not be convinced that all unjust
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acts must be unjustifiable. And there is some truth 
in this. It might be said that this example prejudices 
the issue because the injustice which would be involved 
would be of far greater moral significance than the 
disutility of the alternative. But if the disutility 
of justice were multiplied, would the same argument 
still hold? What if the mob threatened ’to get every 
negro in town* unless the actual offender was immediately 
produced? Or to take an even more extreme case, what 
if one country threatened to destroy another, unless 
a certain one of its (innocent) citizens was fined $5? 
Surely in such cases it would be right to sacrifice 
justice to utility?
But such examples, while they make their point, 
tend, if taken seriously, to be self-defeating. A 
country which really meant to destroy another unless a 
certain minor (in comparison) injustice was committed, 
could hardly be trusted to be dissuaded if such a 
demand was acceded to. For the demand is not such as 
one could expect from rational men, in which case 
prediction of consequences becomes well nigh impossible. 
Nor could there be much guarantee that a near-hysterical 
mob, seriously threatening to lynch every negro in town 
unless the ’offender’ was immediately produced, would 
be satisfied should the sheriff (unknown to them) frame 
an innocent negro. It is precisely as the magnitude 
of the injustice diminishes in relation to the 
threatened disutility of justice that the genuineness 
of the alternatives becomes less certain. The more 
irrational the demands, the less appropriate becomes 
the rational calculation of consequences which lies 
at the heart of the utilitarian’s position.
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¥hat does this show? I do not think that it shows 
that no act of injustice could ever be justified. It 
does however indicate the difficulty of showing that any 
act of injustice woulc} ever be justified. If 'just' is 
not a logically complete moral notion, it is nevertheless 
about as close as we are going to get to a complete moral 
notion. It may not follow absolutely necessarily that 
if an act is unjust it is therefore unjustified, but 
it will need a lot to show that in fact a particular 
unjust act is not also unjustified."^
1
See the discussion by G.E.M. Anscombe, who asserts 
that ’if someone really thinks, in advance, that it is 
open to question whether such an action as procuring the 
judicial execution of the innocent should be quite 
excluded from consideration - I do not want to argue 
with him; he shows a corrupt mind*. In a footnote to 
this passage she considers the case in which ’a government 
is required to have an innocent man tried, sentenced 
and executed under threat of a "hydrogen bomb war". It 
would seem strange to me to have much hope of so averting 
a war threatened by such men as made this demand. But 
the most important thing about the way in which cases 
like this are invented in discussions, is the assumption 
that only two courses are open: here, compliance and
open defiance. No one can say in advance of such a 
situation what the possibilities are going to be - e.g. 
that there is none of stalling by a feigned willingness 
to comply, accompanied by a skilfully arranged "escape" 
of the victim’ (’Modern Moral Philosophy’, Philosophy,
Vol. XXXIII, 1958, p .17). Anscombe’s views are 
challenged, to my mind convincingly, by Jonathan Bennett, 
who argues that she confuses two positions: (i) 'In no
situation could it be right to procure the judicial 
execution of the innocent: political probability aside,
the judicial execution of the innocent is absolutely 
impermissible in any possible circumstances' ; and (ii)
'It is never right to procure the judicial execution 
of the innocent: a situation in which this would be
right has never arisen, isn’t going to arise, and
(footnote continued on p.183)
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But perhaps I have prejudiced the case with the
sort of example which I have chosen to discuss. Would
similar considerations work for the sort of examples
adduced by Lucas, namely, strict liability laws (or what
amount to such)? I think so, though here the position
is a little more subtle. It is an important feature of
a good law that it is easily administered, and there is
a tension between this requirement and the requirement
that only the deserving be punished. Consequently, it
sometimes happens that the undeserving are convicted
of some offence. Nevertheless, it would not be quite
accurate to say that such laws were unjust - it might
be better to say that on occasions they 'work a "certain
injustice"'.  ^ Putting it this way, we can explain our
feeling that it is better to have some law rather than
no law here, as well as our feeling that as it stands
the law is not quite satisfactory. We can see this in
practice where, over the years, strict liability laws
have become susceptible to certain defences. In Australia,
for example, it is now possible to make a defence of
2reasonable mistake or ignorance of fact.
(footnote 1 continued from p.182)
cannot even be described without entering into the realm 
of political fantasy.' He goes on to argue that only 
the latter position is viable; the former must be based 
either on obedience to authority or on muddled thinking 
(’"Whatever the Consequences"', Analysis, Vol. 26,
1963-6, pp.83-102).
1
R.B. Brandt, Ethical Theory, p.409*
2
See Colin Howard, Strict Responsibility, London: Sweet
and Maxwell, 1963» Chapters 3 and 6. For the successful 
employment of 'reasonable ignorance of fact’ as a defence 
in English law, see Reynolds v. G.H. Austin & Sons Ltd.
([1951] 2 K.B. 135).
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Certain other manoeuvres are also possible, such as 
the subsequent suing of the party who was really at fault 
(say, of a manufacturer or a supplier by a convicted 
retailer).
For these reasons I find it difficult to view 
justice as just one among several prima facie claims 
relevant to a morally satisfactory law or legal system. 
Justice is, to all intents and purposes, a necessary 
condition of a morally acceptable law or legal system, 
and although laws have legitimate social functions as 
well, which sometimes bring them into tension with the 
requirements of justice, we cannot rest morally content 
with them until they discriminate adequately between 
deserving and undeserving.
However, there still remains a case in which 
injustice may appear to be justified. And to this we 
now turn.
2. Justice and Mercy.
The following objection might be raised against the 
thesis I have advanced: if moral ill-desert is (to all
intents and purposes) a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the justified suffering of deliberately 
unpleasant treatment, am I not committed to the view 
that mercy and clemency^ are wrong? Does not mercy 
become a form of injustice? This conclusion would 
seem to follow from K.G. Armstrong's statement that 
'to be merciful is to let someone off all or part of
T
Clemency, unlike mercy, is restricted to offenders.
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a penalty which he is recognized as having deserved’;
and D.C. Hodges’ similar claim that ’mercy is the pardon
2or mitigation of retributive justice’. J.R. Lucas
sees two possibilities: ’Joseph, being a just man,
was minded to be merciful towards what he took to be
Mary’s fault: often, however, Justice does not include3Mercy, but is opposed to it’. It would thus appear 
that my refusal to countenance any actual departures 
from justice goes counter to our ordinary moral 
convictions. ¥ho, except the Shylocks of this world, 
could fail to accord with Portia’s claim that
... earthly power doth then show likest God’s 
When mercy seasons justice^?
Indeed does not mercy ’triumph over’ justice, which is, 
as someone has put it, a rather ’shabby virtue’?
It would take me too far out of my way to attempt 
a comprehensive analysis of mercy, for it is a 
complicated notion with somewhat different criteria of 
application in different contexts. The core idea, 
however, seems to be that of treating with compassion 
those who are in need, distress, debt or under threat 
of some sort, and who have no claim to such compassionate
1
K.G. Armstrong, ’The Retributivist Hits Back’, Mind, 
Vol. LXX, 1961, p.487.
2
D.C. Hodges, 'Punishment’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, Vol. XVIII, 1957-8» p.217
T7^r.
3
J.R. Lucas, op. cit., pp.233-4.
4
Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, Act 4, Scene 1, 
lines 193-4.
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treatment. I have purposely left the notion of a claim 
ambiguous as between desert and entitlement, since the 
possession or lack of either may provide an appropriate 
context for mercy.
Mercy is not something which can be shown 
indiscriminately. There are proper grounds for mercy. 
If a jury recommends that mercy be shown to a condemned 
man, its recommendation is not simply the expression of 
fellow-feeling for him, but it is a call to take into 
account various factors of the situation which would 
make a strict adherence to the letter of the law result 
in harshness or cruelty to the man.
The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (19^9- 
53) brings together a great variety of grounds which 
have been used to support recommendations for mercy in 
cases where the judge has no alternative but to pass 
the death sentence. It is pointed out that such 
recommendations are almost invariably successful where 
mercy killings, survivors of suicide pacts and 
infanticide are involved. Some of the other cases in 
which the plea for mercy can sometimes be successfully 
entered are
unpremeditated murders committed in some 
sudden excess of frenzy, where the murderer 
has previously had no evil animus towards 
his victim, especially if he is weak- 
minded or emotionally unstable to an 
abnormal degree: murders committed under
provocation which, though insufficient 
to reduce the crime to manslaughter, may 
be a strongly mitigating circumstance; 
murders committed without intent to kill, 
especially where they take place in the 
course of a quarrel; murders committed
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in a state of drunkenness falling short 
of a legal defence, especially if the 
murderer is a man of hitherto good 
character; and murders committed by 
two or more people with differing 
degrees of responsibility.^
Here it can be seen that mercy is not opposed to
justice as such, but to what I have called ’strict justice’,
justice which has been solidified in a system of legal
rules.^ Since it is one of the functions of law to give
a practical and efficient means of judgment, it must
be expressed in terms of relatively clear-cut rules which,
while they usually deal adequately with standard
situations, are often unable to cover fairly the
multiplicity of human behaviour. Pleas for mercy,
then, are intended to have taken into account such
extenuating circumstances as mitigate the offences as
they are defined and sanctioned by the law. It is for
this reason that we usually speak of mercy ’tempering’
or ’seasoning' justice rather than opposing it. And
the prophet of old could claim without inconsistency
that God required of the people they ’do justly, love
3mercy and walk humbly’ with their God.
When we consider the distribution of welfare, true 
justice and mercy come together even more clearly. To 
show mercy to the widow, fatherless and destitute is to
1 '
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953 
Report, Cmd. 8932, London: HMSO, 1953» §39*
2
See above, p.171, f/n 2.
3
Micah 6:8,
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see that they are not deprived of that welfare which 
is their due as human beings but which they cannot claim 
on the basis of their deserts. The paradigm case is 
that of a creditor waiving his right to a debt which the 
debtor is unable to pay.
The Stoics showed considerable interest in the 
relation of justice and mercy, since for them they 
comprised the two fundamental duties of man in relation 
to his fellow-men:
On the one hand, they required from their 
wise men that strict justice-*- which knows 
no pity and can make no allowances; and 
hence their ethical system had about it 
an air of austerity, and an appearance of 
severity and cruelty. On the other hand, 
their principle of the natural connection 
of all mankind imposed on them the 
practice of the most extended and 
unreserved charity, of beneficence, 
gentleness, meekness, of an unlimited 
benevolence, and a readiness to forgive 
in all cases in which forgiveness is 
possible.2
Though the relation between the two exercised them 
considerably, they did not see an ultimate conflict, 
and Zeller reports Seneca as concluding that
not severity, but only cruelty, is 
opposed to mercy; for no one virtue 
is opposed to another: a wise man ...
will not remit punishments in cases
1
Here ’strict justice’ is more like ’absolute 
impartiality’ than ’strict justice’ as I have defined 
it.
2 .
E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, trans. O.J. 
Reichel, New fork: Russell and Russell, 1962, p.315*
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in which he knows them to be deserved, 
but, from a sense of justice, he will 
take human weakness into consideration 
in allotting punishments, and make every 
possible allowance for circumstances.^
This conclusion is very similar to my own, for 
it sees mercy in conflict not with justice, but with 
’strict justice’. The opposite of justice is not 
mercy but injustice, the opposite of mercy is not 
justice but harshness, cruelty and lack of compassion. 
’Mercy without justice is the mother of dissolution,’ 
wrote Aquinas; ’justice without mercy is cruelty.'^
In this Chapter I have examined two possible 
objections to the thesis that for the deliberately 
unpleasant treatment suffered by a person to be morally 
justified it is necessary and sufficient that it be 
deserved. To the view that the possibility of an unjust 
yet justified punishment could not be ruled out I 
conceded that as a logical possibility it could not, 
but that to all intents and purposes it remained simply 
a logical possibility. And to the view that my 
position excluded the exercise of mercy, I replied 
that this objection involved a misunderstanding of the 
notion of mercy, and a confusion of justice with so-
1
Page 316 .
2
Quoted in Lord Longford, The Idea of Punishment, 
London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1961, p»9*
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called 'strict-justice'. But there are even more
fundamental difficulties with the position I have 
taken, and, for that matter, with most theses 
concerning punishment. These we shall now consider.
1
A related objection, which does not strike me as 
serious enough to warrant separate treatment, is Rashdall's 
claim that 'it is one of the great embarrassments of the 
retributive theory that it is unable to give any 
consistent account of the duty of forgiveness and its 
relations to the duty of punishment' (The Theory of Good 
and Evil, Second edn., O.U.P., 1924, Vol. p .306).
Apart from anything else Rashdall wrongly identifies 
mercy and forgiveness (ibid.). Relevant and worthwhile 
discussions can be found in A.C. Ewing, The Morality 
of Punishment, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner &
Co., 1929> pp.30-2, 115-16; idem. Ethic s, Teach 
Yourself Books, English Universities Press, 1953» pp.170-1; 
J.D. Mabbott, op. cit#, pp.157-8; A.G.N. Flew, op. cit., 
p.293; J.M. Smith, Punishment: Its Nature and
Justification, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brown 
University, i960, pp.112-13; R.J. O'Shaughnessy, 
’Forgiveness', Philosophy, Vol. XLII, 1967) PP*336-52;
R.S. Downie, 'Forgiveness', Philosophical Quarterly,
Vol. 15, 1965, pp.128-134.
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CHAPTER SIX
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
Punishment, I have maintained, is inllicted for 
moral offences. However, if a man goes berserk and kills 
several people, we do not punish him. Nor do we punish 
the kleptomaniac who persistently steals nylon stockings. 
What is more important, punishment is not considered 
appropriate in such cases. If asked to give a reason 
for this, we would most naturally say that no matter 
how bad a deed done by a person was, unless he was 
responsible for his action, he could not be blamed for 
it, and hence did not deserve to be punished. Therefore, 
he ought not to suffer punishment.
Of course, there is a secondary sense in which the 
madman and the kleptomaniac are ’responsible for’ their 
deeds, namely, that in which ’X is responsible for B’ is 
equivalent to ’X did B' or ’X caused B to happen’ . Used 
in this sense, ’responsible for' imputes no blame to the 
madman or kleptomaniac, but siinpiy indicates a causal 
relationship between them and their respective deeds.
It is a secondary use because ’responsible for' generally
1 _
There are some contexts in which 'X did B ’ and 'X 
caused B to happen' contextually imply 'X was 
responsible for B' in the stronger sense I shall 
soon discuss, but they can be ignored for the 
present purposes (See G. Pitcher, 'Hart on Action 
and Responsibility', Philosophical Review, Vol. LX1X,
i960, pp.230-1).
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does not depict a scientific or quasi-scientific relation 
holding between two objects, events, etc., but 
characterizes their relationship in a manner appropriate 
to the evaluative (and centrally the moral) sphere of 
discourse.'* This is true even when ’responsible for’ 
is used in relation to the inanimate world; e.g. ’The 
winter frosts were responsible for the poor crops’.
Here there is not only a clear-cut causal relation 
between the winter frosts and the poor crops, but also 
an imputation of blame (of a non-moral variety) to the 
frosts.^
In what sense must a person be or be held
responsible for something in order to be deserving of
3punishment? I shall tackle this question in four
1
.1 am not wanting to suggest that the ascription of 
responsibility necessarily presupposes a causal relation 
between two objects, events, etc. It does so only if 
’cause’ is stretched beyond recognition. On this, see 
J.R. Pennock, ’The Problem of Responsibility’, in Nomos 
III: Responsibility, ed. C.J. Friedrich, New York:
Liberal Arts Press, i960, pp.7-8; K. Baier, ’Responsibility
and Freedom’, in Ethics and Society, ed. R.T. De George,
New York: Doubleday & Co.(Anchor Books), 1966, pp.63-6.
2
See supra, Chapter Four, p.l34f/n.l, to which can be 
added N.A. Dahl, ’"Ought” and Blameworthiness’,
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXIV, 1967» pp.418-28.
3
Questions of responsibility usually rise only when 
something untoward has happened or some wrong has been 
done. Indeed, disregarding the case in which 
’responsibility’ means ’duty’, some have analysed the 
concept as though this were the only context in which 
’responsible for’ could be used (e.g. M. Schlick,
Problems of Ethics, trans. D. Rynin, New York: Prentice-
Hall, 1939» p.131; G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind,
(footnote continued on p.193)
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stages; first, by examining what I take to be an 
unsatisfactory account of this responsibility; second, 
by presenting what I believe is a more satisfactory 
account; third, by considering the objections of 
psychological revisionists; and finally, by comparing 
legal and quasi-legal responsibility with moral 
responsibility.
1. Responsibility as Alterability.
On more than one occasion P.H. Nowell-Smith has 
tackled the question of responsibility, and especially 
'the relation of "fittingness" that is held to obtain 
between voluntary actions and moral judgement'.^ In an
(footnote 1 continued from p.192)
London: Hutchinson, 1949» PP*69~7^j O.C. Jensen,
'Responsibility, Freedom and Punishment’, Mind, Vol.
LXXV, 1966, p.225; Baier, op. cit,, pp.58-9> 67)* But 
there is no necessity that this should be so. There is 
nothing odd about finding out who is responsible for 
some act of kindness - to thank him (cf. A.S. Kaufman, 
art. 'Responsibility, Moral and Legal', in The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards, New York: 
Macmillan and the Free Press, 1967» Vol.7» p.183;
J. Feinberg, 'Action and Responsibility', in The 
Philosophy of Action, ed. A.R. White, Oxford University 
P r e s s , 1968, pp.104-5)♦ My own discussion, however, 
will be limited primarily to responsibility for wrongdoing. 
1
P.H. Nowell-Smith, 'Freewill and Moral Responsibility', 
Mind, Vol.LVIl, 19^8, p.%2. He seems to be guilty of a 
confusion here, for the relation of fittingness he 
discusses is not between voluntary actions and moral 
judgments, but between moral judgments and blame (in 
Nowell-Smith's sense, i.e. 'censure') or punishment.
But this confusion, we shall see, is typical of the 
confusions which beset his position. A later discussion 
of the same issues is found in his Ethics, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 195^> Chapters 19» 20, and modifications
to his earlier view on freewill are contained in 
' De termini sts and Libertarians', Mind, Vol.LXIII, 195^ +»
pp.317-37*
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early article he presents an analysis of moral 
responsibility, voluntary action, and merit or, as he 
usually speaks of it, fittingness.* He begins with the 
familiar idea that if moral responsibility for an action 
is properly to be imputed to me, my action must be 
voluntary, and that it can be considered voluntary only 
if 1 could, had I so wished, have acted otherwise. The 
apodosis is, of course, the stumbling block, but he 
summarizes his own view with a quotation from Ayer:
To say that I could have acted otherwise is 
to say, first, that 1 should have acted 
otherwise, if 1 had so chosen; secondly, 
that my action was voluntary in the sense 
in. which the actions say of the kleptomaniac 
are not; and, thirdly, that nobody compelled 
me to choose as 1 did: and these three
conditions may very well be fulfilled. When 
they are fulfilled, I may be said to have 
acted freely. But this is not to say that 
it was a matter of chance that I acted as I 
did, or, in other words, that my action could 
not be explained. And that my actions should 
be capable of being explained is all that is 
required by the postulate of determinism.^
But while Nowell-Smith considers this sufficient to show 
what the determinist means when he speaks of voluntary
1
It seems clear from his discussion in Ethic s that for 
Nowell-Smith ’fittingness' is a much more general term 
than either ’desert’ or ’merit’ (pp.186-8). The latter 
have the status of particular applications of fittingness 
(p.302; cf. ’Freewill and Moral Responsibility’, 
pp.56, 60-1).
2
A.J. Ayer, ’Freedom and Necessity’, Polemic, No.
1946, p.43; quoted in Nowell-Smith, 'Freewill and Moral 
Responsibility’, p.^2.
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actions, it does not by itself answer the more important
question concerning the sense in which it is ’rational
or just or moral to praise or blame voluntary actions
but not involuntary ones .... We need to explain the
relation of "fittingness" that is held to obtain between
voluntary actions and moral judgement.’  ^ In an endeavour
to clarify this, Nowell-Smith distinguishes between
value judgments and moral judgments. The former concern
events (and their consequences, but not their causes)
which we are concerned to promote or to prevent, and
the latter, while presupposing the former, make an
additional empirical claim to the effect that the agent’s
actions are caused by his voluntary decision. The
explicandum thus stands: ’"Good" and "bad" events that
are also moral actions are fit subjects for praise and
2blame, while other good and bad events are not.’ After 
discussing and dismissing positivist and intuitionist 
accounts of the matter, Nowell-Smith notes that the 
class of voluntary actions coincides ’roughly’ with 
the class of actions caused by characteristics which
1
’Freewill and Moral Responsibility’, p.%2.
2
Page 55* As I have noted above (p.193 f/n.l), Nowell-Smith 
does not use ’blame' in its usual sense of ’ascribing 
responsibility for something untoward or wrong’. As 
he uses it, blaming is like censuring. We must not 
underestimate the importance of this ambiguity to his 
position, for it enables him to conflate two quite 
different questions: (i) What justifies our judging
people’s actions with respect to their morality? and 
(2) What justifies our overt expression of those moral 
judgments? Nowell-Smith uses ’blame’ in the sense 
relevant to (2) to answer (l). Cf. S. Moser, ’Utilitarian 
Theories of Punishment and Moral Judgments', Philosophical 
Studies, Vol. VIII, 1957» pp.15-19*
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can be strengthened or inhibited by praise or blame, 
and then concludes that ’moral characteristics, as 
opposed to intellectual j sic] and physical ones are 
just those that we believe to be alterable in this way’. ^
It is not quite clear how Nowell-Smith intends to
relate ’moral’ and ’alterable by praise or blame’.
Sometimes (as in the last quotation) he appears to
suggest that 'alterable by praise or blame’ is what we
2mean by ’moral'. But if this is the case, he is 
committed to including in morality a much wider range 
of actions than we would normally regard as appropriate. 
Etiquette, for example, would be included in morality, 
since we can alter people's manners by punishing them, 
or reinforce their manners by rewarding them. To some 
extent, so would such things as adherence to the rules of 
games and carefulness in grammar. The inclusion of these 
within the domain of morality is not convincingly ruled 
out by Nowell-Smith's later requirement that morality 3implies 'a rough community of pro- and con- attitudes’.
1
Page 56. Cf.: 'Rewards and punishments are means of 
varying the causal antecedents of actions so that those 
we desire will occur and those we wish to prevent will 
not occur' (p*59)»
2
Cf.: '¥hen we remember that the purpose of moral verdicts 
and of punishment is to strengthen or weaken certain traits 
of character it is not difficult to see that this feature, 
so far from being synthetically connected with the notion 
of a "moral" characteristic, a virtue or a vice, is just 
what constitutes it’ (Ethic s, pp.303-^)> 'Pleasure and
pain, reward and punishment are the rudders by which human 
conduct is steered, the means by which moral character is 
moulded; and "moral." character is just that set of 
dispositions that can be moulded by these means' (p.30^)*
3
Page 301*
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We could, however, strengthen Nowell-Smith's 
position by insisting that ’alterability by praise or 
blame' is only a necessary and not a sufficient 
condition of calling a characteristic 'moral'. It 
would then be possible for him to avoid the objection 
that his definition includes too much. But even this 
would need further refinement, for if 'alterability' 
is to figure as part of the definition of 'moral', a 
distinction must be made between the person, or perhaps 
class of persons, whose behaviour will not be altered 
by praise, blame or punishment (the habitual or 
persistent offender, and the recidivist) and the person 
(or class of persons) whose behaviour cannot be altered 
by praise, blame or punishment. Nowell-Smith does not 
tell us how these two persons (or classes of persons) 
are to be distinguished, and therefore, to this extent, 
at least, alterability is inadequate even as a necessary 
condition of moral behaviour. But apart from this there 
is something very odd about including 'alterability by 
praise or blame' as part of the meaning of 'moral', for 
it seems to make nonsense of the idea of a society in 
which everyone always acted morally (or immorally) but 
in which no one was ever overtly praised or overtly 
blamed, Unrealistic perhaps, but hardly nonsensical.
But there is another strand in Nowell-Smith's 
position which could fare better. And this is that 
'alterability by praise or blame' is simply a criterion 
of moral behaviour. In other words, because moral 
behaviour is necessarily voluntary behaviour, and 'the 
class of actions generally agreed to be voluntary 
coincides roughly with the class of actions that are
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caused by characteristics that can be strengthened or 
inhibited by praise and blame,’ then alterability is a 
reliable guide as to whether or not behaviour is moral.^  
If this were simply a negative principle, I would have 
no real objections to this, though I doubt whether 
it would then truly represent Nowell-Smith’s position. 
Admittedly, the distinction between those whose 
behaviour would not and those whose behaviour could not 
be altered by praise or blame would still need to be 
drawn clearly, but apart from that the behaviour 
excluded by the principle could confidently be called 
'non-moral’. But whether the principle could serve as 
a positive criterion is much more doubtful. For it 
would then be susceptible to the objection I raised 
earlier, namely, that breaches of etiquette, and of 
the rules of grammar and of games could be included 
in the class of 'moral behaviour’. But whether as a 
negative or as a positive criterion, 'alterability by 
praise or blame' seems to be impractical, for we want 
to know whether or not a person's behaviour is moral 
as a preliminary to the decision whether or not to praise 
or blame him. We do not first praise or blame him and 
then decide whether or not his behaviour was moral. This 
objection, however, is relevant only to the act- 
utilitarianism of the earlier article and does not 
count as easily against the rule-utilitarian position 
which Nowell-Smith espouses in Ethics.^
T
'Freewill and Moral Responsibility', p.56.
Ethic s, PP.305--6.
2
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We have not yet commented directly on Nowell-Smith1 s 
'analysis’ of fittingness or merit. ’Fittingness', he 
writes, 'is a causal relation, discoverable neither by 
a special "moral sense" nor by intuition nor by a priori 
reasoning, but by reflection on experience’.-*" There 
are difficulties in this position, not the least of 
which is to understand how fittingness is a ’causal 
relation'. Obviously to say that X is fittingly 
punished is not to say that X or X ’s immoral behaviour 
causes punishment (to be inflicted on him?). All it 
could intelligibly mean, and this chimes in with 
Nowell-Smith’ s original statement of intention, is 
that the causal relation which putatively exists 
between punishment and altered behaviour explains why 
we think it fitting that immoral behaviour be punished. 
But does it? Punishment may well be effective without 
being merited, and merited without being effective. 
Nowell-Smith seems to be aware of this difficulty. This 
is reflected in the somewhat stronger rule-utilitarian 
position he adopts in the later Ethics, and also in an 
unresolved ambivalence he displays in both 'Freewill 
and Moral Responsibility’ and in Ethics. For sometimes 
he takes the extreme view that X acts voluntarily and 
is morally responsible only if his act can be prevented 
from recurring by punishment (in which case recidivists
1
Freewill and Moral Responsibility', p*55* This 
statement is obviously meant to be taken seriously, 
but is hardly consistent with everything Nowell-Smith 
says about fittingness - e.g. his intention 'to explain 
the relation of "fittingness" that is held to obtain 
between voluntary actions and moral judgment' (p»52; 
cf. p.193 f/n.l supra).
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and hardened criminals present problems),^ and on other 
occasions he takes the more moderate view that X acts 
voluntarily and is morally responsible only if 
punishment tends to prevent the recurrence of such acts. 
But even the moderate view, as Mabbott points out, does 
not succeed in acquitting the kleptomaniac,
for kleptomaniacs do not steal when they 
see a policeman or shop assistant watching 
them and do take ingenious steps to avoid 
detection. Their behaviour therefore is 
’affected’ by fear of punishment. The 
reason for regarding them as irresponsible
1
E.g.: ’If it is true that praise and blame are means
employed to bring about good events and prevent bad 
ones, they are appropriate not to all good and bad 
events, but only to those they can in fact bring about 
or prevent. Since a moral action is one that can be 
fittingly praised or blamed, it follows that a moral 
action is one that can be brought about or prevented 
by these means' ('Freewill and Moral Responsibility', 
p .55); 'Pleasure and pain, reward and punishment are 
the rudders by which human conduct is steered, the 
means by which moral, character is moulded; and ’moral’ 
character is just that set of dispositions that can 
be moulded by these means. Moral approval and 
disapproval play the same role. It is not just an 
accident that they please and hurt and that they 
are used only in cases in which something is to be 
gained by pleasing or hurting' (Ethics, p.304).
2
E.g.: 'the fear of punishment will affect the future
behaviour of the thief. . . . If he expects to be 
punished, then in addition to the motive that tends to 
make him steal there will be a powerful motive tending 
to make him refrain' (Freewill and Moral Responsibility’, 
p.6o); ’the point of blame is to strengthen some 
motives and weaken others' (Ethics, p.296). This of 
course makes it much more difficult to speak of a 
'causal relation' between the punishment and the 
altered behaviour.
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is not that this fear has no effect but 
that they show independent signs of motiveless 
irrationality. They steal vast numbers of 
silk stockings or suspenders, which they then 
proceed to hoard and not to resell.^
In itself, it is no criticism of Nowell-Smith's 
analysis of 'fittingness' or 'merit' that it is totally 
at variance with the analysis I gave in Chapter Three.
He seems to be aware of the fact that he is recommending 
a use for the term rather than reporting how it is in 
fact used. Nor does the unorthodoxy of his analysis of 
'moral responsibility' by itself constitute a criticism 
of it. However, it is a criticism if his recommendations 
serve to confuse distinctions which ought to be made.
And this, I have argued, is the case. For satisfactory 
criteria of moral responsibility we must look elsewhere.
2. Criteria of Moral Responsibility.
Even if Nowell-Smith's alterability criterion is not 
successful., we are still left with his view that our 
actions are voluntary if we could, had we so wished, have 
acted otherwise, and that only if our actions are 
voluntary can we properly be held morally responsible. 
'Being able to do other than one actually did' is, of 
course, highly problematic and ambiguous, and for this 
reason a perennial chestnut in the philosophical fire. 
Only certain uses of the phrase serve to impute moral
.1
J.D. Mabbott, 'Freewill and Punishment', in 
Contemporary British Philosophy, Third Series, ed. 
H.D. Lewis, London: Allen and Unwin, 1956, pp.296-7*
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responsibility, ' and a proper discussion of it would 
require a dissertation in itself. Rather than 
involving myself too deeply in these issues, I shall 
simply sketch an outline of our concept of moral 
responsibility which 1 believe to be adequate for the 
ascription of desert (especially in relation to 
punishment). 1 shall therefore prescind from much 
of the contemporary debate.
To hold X morally responsible for some action or
event B is to presuppose that X could, in some sense
of ’could', have done other than B. Despite its
categorical grammatical form, the expression 'could
have done otherwise’ is negatively specified, and
2signifies the absence of certain impediments. These 
impediments can arise on different levels, and the 
presence of any one of them is sufficient either to 
absolve a person from blame or at least to mitigate 
it. I shall endeavour to isolate these impediments as 
best as I can.
1
On this, see J.V. Canfield, ’Freewill and Determinism’, 
Philosophical Review, Vol.LXXI, 1962, pp.352-68; B.
Aune, art. 'Can', in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. P. Edwards, New York: Macmillan and The Free Press,
1967, Vol.2, pp.18-20.
2
Cf. J. Plamenatz: 'What...do we mean when we say that
a man is responsible for what he does when he could have 
chosen not to do it? We mean that, at the time that 
he acted, he was not beyond the reach of certain kinds 
of influence’ (’Responsibility, Blame and Punishment’, 
in Philosophy, Politics and Society, Third Series, ed.
P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman, Oxford: Blackwell, 1967»
p.179; also Benn and Peters, Social Principles and the 
Democratic State, London: Allen and Unwin, 1959»
Chapter 9) •
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(a) A person is absolved from moral responsibility 
if through no fault of his own he is incapable of 
considering rationally various possible courses of 
action and of making rational decisions concerning them. 
This is clearly an impediment which absolves a person 
from moral responsibility and hence desert, since the 
ability to consider rationally differing courses of 
action and to make rational decisions concerning 
them is what qualifies a person as a moral being. It 
is for this reason that moral responsibility is not 
imputable to infants or to the insane. Infants cannot 
do other than they do in the sense that they do not 
have the capacity to make moral judgments (and hence 
are incapable of making morally significant choices). 
This incapacity is due to their not being in a position 
of sufficient maturity to have any reasons for doing 
what they do ( that is, reasons which are relevant to 
the making of moral judgments). In the case of the 
insane man (i use 'insane’ in a rather broad sense to 
cover the kleptomaniac, hypnotic, etc.), these reasons 
are defective in that (even if they correspond) they do 
not depend on the facts of the case. The kleptomaniac 
can give no rational explanation of why he steals and 
hoards (usually kleptomaniacs are financially secure); 
the obsessive's reasons for washing his hands (their 
dirtiness) is not dependent on the truth of his claim 
and cannot be defeated by showing its inapplicability; 
the hypnotic can give a coherent account of his actions 
but it does not correspond with facts which he could 
reasonably be expected to know.
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I have qualified this exculpating condition with 
'through no fault of his own', for there are circumstances 
in which a person’s inability to make rational decisions 
only partially absolves him from moral responsibility or 
maybe does not absolve him at all. For example, if two 
battleships on exercise collide through the inability of 
one of the captains to discern the consequences of his 
orders, then, if his inability to make rational decisions 
based on the facts of the case results from his being 
drunk at the time, he can be held responsible for the 
disaster which follows. Because we believe that people 
in such positions can and should make rational decisions, 
we do not allow such inabilities to exculpate.
(b) Even though a person may qualify under (a), 
yet he may be absolved from moral responsibility if he 
is unable to form or to carry out an intention to do 
other than he did due to some physical impediment. Onee 
again inabilities arising under this head do not always 
exonerate a person from blame or exculpate him; 
sometimes they serve only to extenuate his offence.
His responsibility is said to be diminished. Generally 
speaking, if his inability to form or to carry out an 
intention to do other than he did results from some 
dereliction of duty on his part, then his inability can 
serve only to extenuate his offence and not to 
exonerate him.
The following illustration will indicate the range 
of exculpating and mitigating factors which are included 
in the condition 'inability ... due to some physical 
impediment’. Suppose that Jones drowns. Assuming that 
the right thing to do for anyone who was standing nearby
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would have been to take steps to save him we ask Peters, 
who was nearby, why he did not save him. A sampling of 
Peters' possible reasons, some inculpating, some 
exculpating, and some extenuating, could have been:
(i) 'Jones was no friend of mine, so why 
risk my life.’
(ii) '1 cannot swim, and though I looked, I
could find no others in the vicinity who 
could have helped.'
(iii) 'I had a broken leg at the time, and was 
unable to attract the attention of others 
who could have helped.'
(iv) '1 tried to save him, but could not reach 
him in time.’
(v) '1 was helping to save Smith, who was
also in difficulties.’
(vi) 'I was asleep at the time, and did not 
realise anyone was in distress. ’
(vii) 'I was very drunk, and so unable to do 
anything about it.'
Applying the criterion I have outlined, we can see that 
reason (i) would serve only to inculpate Peters, and 
reasons (ii) - (vi) would usually exculpate him; (vii) 
is more difficult and we shall need to discuss it in 
some detail.
Reason (i) is inculpatory because in no way does 
Peters' indifference to Jones render him unable to form 
or to carry out an intention to do the right thing, 
namely, to take steps to save Jones. Reasons (ii) - (vi) 
are exculpatory for a variety of reasons. Reason (ii) 
is exculpatory because, despite a good intention 
(indicated by the fact that Peters made some effort to 
find others who could have helped), he lacked the skill
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necessary to enable him to implement his intention. 
Provided that his failure to acquire the skill was not 
itself a dereliction of duty (as in some cases it would 
be), then he cannot properly be held in any way morally 
responsible for Jones’ death. Reasons (iii) - (v) 
are exculpatory because, irrespective of any good 
intentions which Peters had or would have had, he was 
or would have been physically prevented from carrying 
them out. Reason (vi) indicates an inability to form 
an intention to save Jones, because of a physically 
based lack of knowledge. Provided that his lack of 
knowledge was not morally reprehensible (as it would 
almost certainly have been, had Peters been a lifesaver 
on duty), then his inability would serve to exculpate 
him.
Before we can decide (vii) we need to know the 
answer to some other questions. First: Is drunkenness
morally reprehensible? If so, then would Peters’ 
inability to help Jones because of his drunkenness be 
sufficient to render him even partially responsible 
for Jones’ death? Or does his morally reprehensible 
action need to be of a certain sort, namely a 
dereliction of duty, before he can be inculpated?
For the sake of argument we shall assume that drunkenness 
is in fact morally reprehensible. It does not seem 
to me that by itself an inability arising from a moral 
reprehensible act can render a person at all responsible 
for some untoward occurrence which would not have 
otherwise occurred, unless one can be said to owe it 
to one’s neighbour not to get into a position where 
help could not be given should the need arise. I think
207
we do recognize such a duty, though there are 
circumstances such as the present in which it becomes 
rather attenuated. The situation would have been 
very different, for example, if in his state of 
drunkenness, Peters had pushed Jones into the water. 
Nevertheless, his action would probably still not have 
inculpated him to the same extent as (i).
However, incapacitating reasons are not always as 
simple as these. It is not too difficult to see how 
various sorts of physical inabilities to carry out an 
intention can exculpate or lessen blame. But not all 
claims of inability to do otherwise refer to physical 
impediments. What if Peters had given as his reason 
for not going to Jones' aid:
(viii) 'Green said that he would kill my
wife, if I went in and saved Jones.'?
Normally we would regard this as sufficient to absolve 
a person from moral, responsibility. To cater for it 
we need to add a further criterion:
(c) Even though a person may qualify under (a) and 
(b), yet he may be absolved from a moral responsibility 
if he is unable to carry out an intention to do other 
than he did because the cost of doing so would have been
greater than could and should reasonably be_expected of
him. In (viii) it is physically possible for Peters 
both to form the intention to save Jones, and also to 
carry it out - though at great cost to himself and 
another. What can and ought to be reasonably expected 
of a person? In answering this, it is difficult to see
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how one can avoid taking up a moral standpoint. Not 
everyone would have identical criteria of 'reasonable 
expectations’. Suppose Peters gave as his reason:
(ix) ’Green threatened to kill me if I 
saved J ones. '
Someone might argue that Peters was being selfish in
preferrring his own life to that of Jones, and, in not
being willing to risk it, was to some extent morally
responsible for Jones’ death. Others would argue
instead that although it would have been commendable
in such circumstances had Peters tried to save Jones,
nevertheless, he was under no obligation to save him.
Even though it was physically possible for him to carry
out an intention to save Jones, it could not reasonably
be required of him. Had he saved Jones, he would have
gone beyond the call of duty - to be classed with
heroes, saints and martyrs. Such people will argue
that it is not really selfish (in a bad sense) to want
to save one’s own life, even if it will almost certainly
be at another person’s expense, in circumstances such
as those outlined. General obligations such as ’Help
those in distress’ can, on occasions, be overridden by
other considerations, so that on such particular occasions
we no longer ought to do what we are generally obliged to 
2do. Arguing in this way, as contrasted with the first
1
Of course this was also the case in (a) and (b), but 
not as obviously so.
2
It is not that there is in fact no general obligation 
to help others in distress, or that the rule is only of 
a summary nature, or that it is only a prima facie
(footnote continued on p.209)
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approach I mentioned, presupposes a conception of 
morality similar to that outlined by Urmson:
Morality, I take it, is something that 
should serve human needs, not something that 
incidentally sweeps man up with itself, and 
to show that a morality was ideal would be to 
show that it best served man - man as he is 
and as he can be expected to become, not man 
as he would be if he were perfectly rational 
or an incorporeal angel.... In the only sense 
of ’ideal’ that is of importance in action, 
it is part of the ideal that a moral code 
should actually help to contribute to human 
well-being, and a moral code that would work 
only for angels (for whom it would in any 
case be unnecessary) would be a far from 
ideal moral code for human beings. There 
is, indeed, a place for ideals that are 
practically unworkable in human affairs, as 
there is a place for the blueprint of a 
machine that will never go into production; 
but it is not the place of such ideals to 
serve as a basic code of duties. 1
However, to accept this conception of morality is 
already to take up a moral standpoint, and even if we 
consider it preferable to the first position, we must 
recognize that what are ’reasonable expectations’ are
(footnote 2 continued from p.208)
obligation. The obligation remains even if overridden 
in particular instances. See A.I« Melden, Rights and 
Right Conduct, Oxford: Blackwell, 1959? pp.1711;
C. H. Whiteley, ’On Duties', Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, Vol. LIII, 1952-3» PP*95-104;
D. Mallock, ’Moral Dilemmas and Moral Failure’,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 45» 1967»
pp.161-8; J.O. Urmson, 'Saints and Heroes’, in Essays 
in Moral Philosophy, ed. A.I. Melden, Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1958, pp.198-214;
J. Feinberg, 'Supererogation and Rules’, Ethic s,
Vol. LXXI, 1960-1, pp.276-88.
1
Urmson, op. cit., pp.210-1.
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not such apart from a particular moral standpoint.
To get further embroiled in this issue, however, would 
go too far beyond the needs of this dissertation.
One final point which can be noticed in this 
connection is that what we can reasonably expect of a 
person tends to differ from situation to situation.
Were Jones a person of strategic importance in some 
worthwhile cause, then our expectations of Peters would 
be correspondingly raised. However, this point too 
must be viewed in the light of what was said in the 
last paragraph.
We have, then, three varieties of impediments which 
are sufficient to absolve a person from moral 
responsibility or at least to diminish his responsibility. 
In such cases, people do not de serve to suffer punishment, 
or, if they do, they do not deserve to suffer as much 
punishment as they would were there no impediment.
We might observe that the criteria for the impediments 
which we have outlined are not simple empirical ones, 
but are delineated by the moral conception of ’what one 
could reasonably expect of such a person in such 
circumstances’. This is a far cry from the sort of 
criteria adduced by Nowell-Smith.
3. The Elimination of Responsibility.
So far, all I have done is to outline the central 
paradigms of excuses or impediments which absolve a 
person from moral responsibility. I have also hinted 
that these paradigms are themselves subject to debate 
and qualification. Our notion of responsibility, since 
it is part of a living language which is constantly
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modified by new configurations of circumstances and 
new discoveries, must, if it is to remain useful, take 
account of such contingencies.'^ Psychological studies, 
especially, have thrown much light (and darkness) on 
the question of responsibility. No longer do we regard 
the insane as wicked, but at the same time we have 
become less certain of the appropriate criteria for 
insanity. In fact, so unsatisfactory has criterion (a) 
appeared to some, that Barbara Wootton, after a survey 
of the criteria of criminal responsibility, concludes:
Any attempt to distinguish between wickedness 
and mental abnormality | is] doomed to failure; 
and ... the only solution for the future [is] 
to allow the concept of responsibility to 
'wither away' and to concentrate instead on 
the problem of the choice of treatment, 
without attempting to assess the effect of 
mental peculiarities or degrees of 
culpability.^
Despite the difficulties involved in formulating adequate
criteria of responsibility, I doubt whether Lady Wootton* s
3counsel of despair is justified. Nevertheless, there is
1
For an interesting discussion of the sort of challenge 
which the techniques of modern commercial advertising 
and of political propagandists present to our concept 
of 'free action', see S.I. Benn, 'Freedom and 
Persuasion', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol.45>
1967, pp.259-75.2
B. Wootton, Crime and the Criminal Law, Hamlyn Lectures, 
1963, London: Stevens and Sons, 1963, p.66; cf. also
idem. Social Science and Social Pathology, London:
Allen and Unwin, 1959, Chapter 8.
3
Criticisms of her position can be found in H.L.A. Hart, 
Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility, London: 
Athlone Press, 1962; idem. The Morality of the Criminal
(footnotecontinuedon p.212)
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a school of thought, strongly influenced by modern 
psychology, which reacts to these difficulties by 
denying the applicability of 'responsible* to human 
behaviour. Such views tend to go somewhat as follows: 
Modern psychological researches have shown us that 
people's behaviour is determined and can be completely 
explained in terms of hereditary and environmental 
factors. This being the case, people cannot be held 
responsible for their actions, for moral responsibility 
assumes that people could have done other than they did. 
Punishment for offences (or deviations), therefore, is 
inappropriate, as it presupposes responsibility and 
hence free agency. Thus it is appropriate for us only 
to treat (or cure) such offenders (or deviants). This 
argument, then, amounts to the claim that the practice 
of punishment is based on concepts which have no 
application.
The following quotations can serve as examples of 
such a view:
Criminal behaviour is an unconsciously 
conditioned psychic reaction over which 
[criminals] have no conscious control....
We have to treat them as sick people which 
in every respect they are. It is no more 
reasonable to punish these individuals ... 
than it is to punish an individual for
(footnote 3 continued from p.21l)
Law, Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1965; V. Haksar, 'The 
Responsibility of Mental Defectives', Philosophy, Vol. 
XXXVIII, 1963» pp.61-8; idem. 'Aristotle and the
Punishment of Psychopaths', Philosophy, Vol. XXXIX,
1964, pp.323-40; idem. 'The Responsibility of 
Psychopaths', Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 15»
1965, p p .135-^5•
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breathing through his mouth because of 
enlarged adenoids,,when a simple operation 
will do the trick.
it seems not too much to expect society 
gradually to accept the thesis that the 
criminal also is socially ill and needs 
diagnosis and some sort of treatment other 
than punishment.,.. Most real criminals 
are so warped by their inherited defects 
or undesirable life habits that their 
crimes are as natural an expression for 
them as law abiding conduct is for the 
rest of us.^
While no man in his right mind would 
think of blaming a ten year-old car for a 
bad performance, an adult criminal is 
everywhere considered responsible for his 
crimes, with only a partial bow toward the 
inherited, environmental and other passively 
acquired characteristics which, together 
with a possible soul, in fact entirely 
account for his waywardness. Man’s 
variegated character and wide capacities 
have blinded us to the fact that he is in 
fact as passive to his creation and 
development, and hence as unaccountable 
for his actions, as an inanimate machine.
1
Benjamin Karpman, ’Criminality, Insanity and Law’,
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. XXXIX,
1948-9, p-58^ 4.
2
H.E. Barnes and N.K. Teeters, New Horizons in Criminology, 
First edn. , New York: Prent ice-Hall, 1943, PP • 952-3 •
3
R.A. Fearey, ’The Concept of Responsibility’, Journal 
of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Vol.
XLV, 1954-5, p. 24; cf. William Godwin: ’The assassin
cannot help the murder he commits, any more than the 
dagger' (Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, Third 
edn., ed. F.E.L. Priestley, University of Toronto 
Press, 1946, Vol.I, p.324; also G. Zilboorg, The 
Psychology of the Criminal Act and Punishment,
New York: Hare ourt, Brace and World, 1954, pT80.
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The view that the wrongdoer or criminal’s behaviour 
is such that he cannot be held responsible for it can 
form part of either a moderate or an extreme position. 
According to the moderate position, it is the behaviour 
of only the wrongdoer which is susceptible to a 
responsibility-defeating explanation. His wrongful 
behaviour is taken as a sign or as evidence for 
psychological abnormality. There is a modicum of 
intelligibility in such a thesis, and perhaps a 
grain of plausibility, but it is only a grain. Its 
crucial failing is the inability of its supporters to 
produce a criterion of non-responsibility other than 
that of the person’s wrongdoing. It is almost impossible 
to say what a criterion which accounted for all wrongdoing, 
and only wrongdoing, would need to be like. It would 
have to denote a class of actions not merely very varied, 
but also varying with place and time. Among other 
things it would have to permit an explanation of the 
fact that different legal systems differ in their 
catalogues of criminal offences; it would need to 
cover such diverse offences as perjury and rape, and 
such unlikely candidates as failure to stop at a stop 
sign and manslaughter. It would also need to give 
similar types of explanation of the offences for which 
parents punish their children.
However, it is the extreme view which is more 
commonly held, namely, that the actions of every person 
are in some sense conditioned by his hereditary and 
environmental background. The difference between the 
offender and the non-offender is that whereas the 
former has been so conditioned by his total background
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as to act (generally or in a particular situation) in 
a socially unacceptable way, the latter has been 
conditioned by his total background to act (generally 
or in a particular situation) in a socially acceptable 
way .
In meeting the claims of this position, it will be 
worthwhile first of all to see whether the exponents of 
this view are making the relatively simple point that 
investigation has shown that behaviour for which we once 
thought we could be held morally responsible has been 
shown to be susceptible to one of the responsibility- 
defeating explanations I put forward in the last section. 
This does not seem to be the case. To take an example:
It is Friday night, and I have been invited to a film.
It is quite a good film, and had it been showing 
tomorrow, I would have jumped at the opportunity of going 
to see it. However, I have promised that I will stay 
home and help my wife. Should I break my promise? I 
decide to break it. Could I have done other than I did? 
Could I be held morally responsible for my course of 
action? It seems fairly clear that my actions were 
rational in the required sense. Whichever course of 
action I had chosen to take, it could have been rationally 
supported, even if not convincingly so (from a moral 
standpoint). It would also be difficult to deny that 
my actions were free from physical impediments which 
would have prevented me either from forming or from 
carrying out an intention to stay at home. I was 
neither asleep nor unconscious. Nor was I dragged 
to the film. Nor does the applicability of criterion 
(c) appear any easier to maintain. The cost of staying
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home to help my wife was not greater than the cost of 
seeing the film, let alone greater than could reasonably 
be expected of me. It appears, then, that the psychological, 
revisionists’ arguments, whatever they are, do not involve 
an obvious denial of our ordinary criteria of moral 
responsibility.
But perhaps to think that they should is to 
misunderstand the revisionist character of their claims. 
Perhaps they are claiming access to information which will 
amount to a denial of at least one of our ordinary 
criteria of moral, responsibility. I shall consider the 
strength of this claim by considering, first, in what 
sense the psychological revisionist is employing the 
term ’responsible for'; and second, whether the sense 
in which he uses the term is relevant to questions of 
blame, desert, and punishability. Naturally there are 
other questions which might be asked, but these two are 
sufficient for the purposes in hand.
Prima facie, it would appear that the psychological 
revisionist is using the term in the same way as we use 
it when we excuse a person because of his background or 
because of some mental defect. But it is not as simple 
as this. To say, 'Nobody is responsible for his actions’ 
is not to make a straightforward remark like 'Nobody is 
responsible for all. his actions', despite their 
grammatical similarity. We have learnt what it is like 
to give the cash value of the latter. We mean that 
sometimes our actions are inadvertent or accidental 
as contrasted with intended or deliberate, compelled 
or forced as contrasted with willing or chosen, and the 
like. True, we have considerable difficulty in finding
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an ’umbrella' to characterize these diverse factors 
which absolve us from responsibility for our actions 
(we tend to characterize them ambiguously as factors 
which prevent us from doing other than we actually do), 
yet the broad contrasts between these general types 
of behaviour are clear enough to us. We can even make 
quite good sense of the statement, 'Not everybody is 
responsible for his actions'. For we know that there 
are some people, who, by virtue of their infancy or 
mental condition, are not in a position to make morally 
significant choices, and therefore not able to do other 
than they actually do.^ They are unable to appreciate 
the character of moral arguments. We contrast their 
behaviour with the behaviour of the generality of us 
who, by and large, can and do take account of 
arguments and moral considerations with respect to our 
behaviour. But to give some cash value to the first 
statement is a different matter. What would we need 
to understand such a remark? One essential, if a 
statement is to be informative, is that it is possible 
to say what it would exclude. 'There are seven chairs 
in this room' is informative because there is some way 
of distinguishing chairs from non-chairs. But when we 
say 'Nobody is responsible for his actions', we are not 
saying anything like this - we have not yet been told 
what it would be like for somebody to be responsible
1 “
The ambiguity of 'being able to do other than one 
actually does' is especially noticeable here. Of 
course there probably is a sense in which they could 
have done otherwise - but not as a result of a 
morally significant choice.
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for his actions. ’Nobody is over fifty stone in weight’ 
is an informative remark, not because there is anybody 
who is over fifty stone in weight, but because we know 
what it would be like for there to be somebody who 
was over fifty stone in weight. But until we are told 
by the psychological revisionist what it would be like 
for someone to b e ’responsible’ in his sense, then we cannot 
be impressed by his claim. It is not good enough for 
him to say that a person who was ’responsible’ (in his 
sense) would be a person who had not been completely 
determined by his heredity and environment, because we 
would then want to know how we could distinguish between 
a person who had been completely determined by his 
heredity and environment and one who had not. Too often, 
what psychological revisionists seem to have done is to 
have illegitimately used explanations of recognisably 
non-responsible behaviour as a model of explanation for 
all human behaviour.^
There is nothing odd in speaking of all of a person’s
actions being determined by his heredity and environment
(though there would be very few people of whom we would
say this). This is because we know what it is like for
a person’s actions not to be so determined - when he 
2acts rationally (although even rational action shows
T
A further discussion of psychological and psycho­
analytic explanation can be found in my The Concept 
of Conscience in the Writings of Butler and Freud, 
Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Western 
Australia, 1965» pp.90~2, 144-50.
2
Cf. S. Hampshire, Thought and Action, London:
Chatto and Windus, I960, pp.l77f'f'*
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the influence of one's environment). if the psychological 
revisionist claims that it is because of his heredity 
and environment that a man acts rationally (and hence 
that he is not responsible for his actions), then in 
the sense in which he wants to use his terms, his claim 
becomes uninteresting. It is uninteresting because 
whatever sense of 'responsibility' is being employed by 
the revisionist, it is not our ordinary sense of 'moral 
responsibility', and there is therefore no guarantee 
that it is relevant to the question of punishability.’*'
For his claim to be interesting the revisionist would 
need to show that what we took to be rational action 
was not really so, and it is difficult to see how he 
could make his claim good. For once again we would 
first want to know what it would be like for actions
to be really rational as contrasted with only
*apparently rational. Not only so, but the revisionist's 
thesis would be self-defeating for he could not on 
his own logic be taken to have proved his case, for
1
On slightly different lines, A.C. MacIntyre concludes: 
'To try and include my reasonableness in a story about 
causal factors is to try and produce a story about my 
behaviour sufficiently comprehensive to include 
everything. This means that whereas the contention 
that my behaviour is determined by causal factors is 
normally taken to mean "determined by causal factors 
as contrasted with rational appreciation, etc.", here 
"causal factors" have nothing to be contrasted with 
and hence the expression "determined by causal factors" 
has been evacuated of its customary meaning' 
('Determinism' , Mind, Vol. LXVI, 1957» p.4o). Further 
substantial objections to the psychological revisionist 
can be found in A.R. Louch, 'Scientific Discovery and 
Legal Change', Monist, Vol. XLIX, 1965» pp.485-503*
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proof in such matters involves the adduction of relevant 
reasons, and it is difficult to see how this would be 
possible on his view.
it is not uncommon for psychological, revisionists 
to use medical terminology to describe immoral or criminal 
behaviour: wrongdoing and crime are looked at as
'diseases' which need to be 'treated' or 'cured',^ or
1
For this sort of talk, see S. Butler, Erewhon, New 
York: The New American Library, 1961; F. Paulsen,
A System of Ethics, Fourth edn., ed. and trans. 
by F. Thilly, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and
Co., 1899» pp.465^1; H. von Hentig, Punishment, London: 
William Hodge and Co., 1937» pp.l27ff; W. Ullmann,
'The Justification of Punishment', Juridical Review,
Vol. LJII, 1941, p.326; N. Morris and D. Buckle,
'The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment: A Reply to
C.S. Lewis', Res Judicate, Vol. 6, 1952-4, pp.231-3 
(though Morris and Buckle insist that such an approach 
should never 'deny the fundamental humanity of even the 
most depraved criminal'). As well as the articles and 
books referred to on pp.211 f/n.2, 213t/ii.l-3 supra, compare also 
the following statement of Lady Wootton: 'Once the
grossly and persistently anti-social can claim to be 
treated as medical, and not as moral cases, it is surely 
only a question of time before the mildly anti-social 
claim the same privilege. . . . To say that A. must be 
judged guilty and punished because the doctors do not 
yet know what to do with him, while B must not be held 
responsible for his actions because he can be reformed 
by medical attention, is really to dig the grave of the 
whole concept of responsibility: for A, poor soul, is
being punished not for his offence but for the limitations 
of medical knowledge. In a year or two's time, when 
medical science has advanced a little more, people like 
him will also rank as psychopaths and be treated as 
sick, not as wicked' ('Neither Child Nor Lunatic', The 
Listener, Sept. 24, .1959» quoted in D. Bazelon, 'The 
Concept of Responsibility', Georgetown Law Journal,
Vol.53» 1964-5, pp.16-7). An exposure of some of the 
fallacies involved in either identifying crime with disease 
or appealing to crime as a symptom of disease can be 
found in A.G.N. Flew, 'Crime or Disease?', British 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. V, 1954, pp.49-62.
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they are regarded as anti-social actions which need to
be ’deterred’ (where deterrence is looked at as a brand
of conditioning). It is important to recognize that
what is being recommended is not a more humane and
efficient method of punishment, but the abandonment of
punishment altogether. Whereas punishment is inflicted
for what people have done or have failed to do, for
disobeying or failing to obey some rule, therapeutic
treatment is administered because of the physical or
mental stäte of the person concerned. And whereas
therapeutic treatment logically must be administered
in order to procure some desired state of affairs, it
is not necessary that punishment be inflicted with any
2further purpose in mind. Moreover, in planishing people 
for their actions we imply that they could be held 
responsible for them, whereas we do not imply this when 
we treat them. As well, punishment necessarily involves 
the infliction of unpleasant treatment, whereas 
therapeutic treatment does not. Only if we do not 
obscure these conceptual differences can we avoid the 
somewhat persuasive confusions characteristic of much 
contemporary psychological writing.
As well, we will be in a better position to rebut 
those who, perhaps because of a misguided humanitärianism, 
have taken over some of the conclusions of the psychological 
revisionist, to arrive at something like the moderate
1
See, for example, H.J. Eysenck, Crime and Personality, 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,1964,especially
Chapters 6-8.
2
Pace Hobbes.
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thesis I briefly discussed earlier.^ Of these, C.S. 
Lewis had some rather trenchant words to say:
Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised 
for the good of its victims may be the most 
oppressive.... Their very kindness stings 
with intolerable insult. To be cured against 
one's will and cured of states which we may 
not regard as disease is to be put on a level 
with those who have not yet reached the age 
of reason or those who never will; to be 
classed with infants, imbeciles, and domestic 
animals. But to be punished, however 
severely, because we have deserved it, 
because we 'ought to have known better' is 
to be treated as a human person made in 
God's image.^
The objection to this 'humanitarian' view is variously
stated: it treats people as means and not as ends;
it involves a denial of the principle of respect for
persons; it denies people their rights as human beings, 
3etc .
1
Plamenatz suggests that the therapeutic approach is 
also misguided because it makes the mistaken assumption 
that 'the less we punish and the more we seek to 
cure... the better' (op. cit., p.187)*
2
C.S. Lewis, 'The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment', 
Res Judicate, Vol.6, 1952-4, p.225.
3
This objection is levelled by many not only at those 
who would replace punishment with therapeutic treatment, 
but also at those who make deterrence and reform the 
primary 'justifying considerations' in punishment.
See, for example, Kant, Fundamental Principles of the 
Metaphysic of Morals, in An Introduction to the 
Metaphysic of Morals, trans. T.K. Abbott, Sixth edn. , 
London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1927» pp.46-9> etc.;
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1942, pp.70-1 (§100), 246; A.C. Ewing,
(footnote continued on p.223)
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Generally, following Kant, this criticism is 
based on a recognition of others as rational beings
(footnote 3 continued from p.222)
The Morality of Punishment, London: Kegan Paul,
Trench, Trubner and Co., 1929, pp.17, 50-1» B Bosanquet,
The Philosophical Theory of the State, Fourth edn., 
London: Macmillan, 1923, p p .206-7» idem. Some
Suggestions in Ethics, First edn., London: Macmillan,
1918, pp.200-2; C. de Boer, ’On the Nature of State 
Action in Punishment’, Monist, Vol. XLII, 1932, pp.6l6,
618-9; C.S. Lewis, op. cit., pp.224-9; A.s. Kaufman,
'The Reform Theory of Punishment’, E thic s, Vol. LXXI, 
1960-1, pp.49-52; K.G. Armstrong, 'The Retributivist 
Hits Back’, Mind, Vol. LXX, 1961, p.484; A. Quinton,
’On Punishment’, in Philosophy, Politics and Society, 
First Series, ed. P. Laslett, Oxford: Blackwell, 1956,
p.85; S.¥. Dyde, 'Hegel’s Conception of Crime and
Punishment’, Philosophical Review, Vol.VII, I898,
PP .63-5; J.D. Mabbott, op. cit., pp.303-55 1* Evans,
’Is Punishment a Crime?’, Dublin Review, Vol. 230,
1955-6, p.6; D.J.B. Hawkins, ’Punishment and Moral 
Responsibility’, in The King’s Good Servant, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1948, pp. 9^ +» 97-8; f"! Adler, ' The Ethics
of Punishment’ , Proceedings of the Academy of Political 
Sc jene e, Vol. I, I9IO-II, p.603; T. Sheard, 'The Theory 
of Punishment’ , University of Toronto Quarterly, Vol.
IV, 1934-5» p .95; ¥. Temple, The Ethics of Penal Action, 
London: Clarke Hall Lectures, 193^ +, p . 25 ; G L del Vecchio, 
'The Problem of Penal Justice’, Revista Juridica de la 
Universidad de Puerto Rico, Vol.27, 1957-8, pp.65-81;
J.D. Percy, 'Revenge and Retribution', London Quarterly 
Review, Vol. 168, 1943, p-70; .&• Petzäll, 'The Social
Function of Punishment’, Theoria, Vol. XIII, 1947, p.17;
J.F. Doyle, 'Justice and Legal Punishment', Philosophy 
Vol.XLII, 1947, p.64; A.R. Louch, op. cit., pp.497-500;
S.I. Benn, art. ’Punishment', in The Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards, New York: Macmillan and
The Free Press, 1947, Vol. 7» PP-31» 3^ +—5; ¥.G. Maclagan,
'Respect for Persons as a Moral Principle', Philosophy, 
Vol. XXXV, i960, pp.300-2; E.E. Harris, ’Respect for 
Persons’, in Ethics and Society, ed. R.T. De George, 
pp.129-30.
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having interests or claims.* To treat a man’s wilful
actions as manifestations of a disease - as something
which (in a sense) he could not help - is to treat him
as a less than a rational moral being. The ’kindness’
which one shows in treating him like this is in actual
fact an insult - for it is only on a par with the
kindness one shows to infants, imbeciles and animals.
However, Maclagan departs from the predominantly Kantian
justification of the principle embedded in this
2criticism for two reasons. First, the importance which 
we attach to rationality is only because rationality 
makes moral goodness possible - its value is therefore 
derivative. Second,
What is mistaken for an axiological estimate, 
having practical import, of persons as rational 
will is really the confusion of an axiological 
estimate of a form of goodness of which only 
such a will can be the locus with . . . cosmic 
wonder at the ontological mystery of there 
being such a will at all.
Maclagan’s first criticism is, I think, well taken; I 
am not sure how one would go about assessing the second. 
His positive suggestions, however, are more interesting. 
He finds the key to the concept of respect for persons 
in agapaeic love:
1
Frankena bases the principle of respect for persons 
not so much on the rationality of human beings as on 
’the fact that all men are similarly capable of enjoying 
a good I happy or satisfactory] life’ (’The Concept 
of Social Justice’, in Social Justice, ed. R.B. Brandt, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962, p.19).
2
Maclagan, op. cit., pp.198-201.
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It is in Agape that we see the significance 
of persons, and we could say with equal 
truth and, so long as we attend carefully 
to our meaning, with equal safety that 
Agape is warranted by the apprehended 
worth of its object or that Agape provides 
its own warrant.1
2Agape is made possible by two conditions: (a) our
general consciousness of obligation; and (b) sympathy
(in the sense of practical concern for others) as a
de facto part of our human endowment. Considered simply
as a moral, or practical, principle the ’fusion' of
(a) and (b) constitutes what we mean by the principle3of respect for persons. Now, treating wrongdoing as 
no more than disease, instead of representing a 
humanitarian attitude towards a person, 'amounts to 
a denial of responsibility altogether. It insults the 
wrongdoer under the guise of safe guarding his interests. 
It treats him as though he were not a person, and falls 
foul accordingly of the very principle of respect to
4which it appeals'. The reason for this is that it 
does not see the 'others' of (b) as having, like 
ourselves,
not only a natural interest in their own 
happiness but a moral interest in values, 
and thus in the dignity of life: and,
further, that this latter interest,
1
Pages 208-9*
2
Pages 209-12.
3
Page 216.
4
Page 301.
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precisely because values are values and 
it is a moral interest, must by them as 
by us be accorded a general priority.
How ... could we more grossly insult our 
fellows than by implying, in our treatment 
of them, that while we indeed have such 
an interest they do not?^
I have suggested then, that despite a certain fluidity 
and even uncertainty in our notion of responsibility, we 
are not therefore ’set upon a slippery slope which offers 
no real resting place short of the total abandonment of 
the whole concept of responsibility.’  ^ The psychological 
revisionist, if he has a case to make out, has not 
succeeded in doing so in any way which absolves all 
wrongdoers from moral responsibility and therefore 
renders them undeserving of punishment.
k. Moral and Legal Responsibility.
As I noted in my discussion of the meaning of 
’punishment’, there is a tendency among many philosophers 
to conceive punishment wholly in legal terms. Punishment 
is meted out for legal offences, and can be avoided if 
various legal excuses can be successfully appealed to.
If not, then, provided that the law is such that its 
enforcement generally promotes social welfare, its 
infliction is morally justified. The question of 
responsibility in such views seems to have become a 
purely legal matter. This seems to me to be an inadequate
T
Page 293*
2
Barbara Wootton, Social Science and Social Pathology,
p . 2 4 9 .
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view of the matter, and in what follows I shall 
endeavour to show in what ways legal and moral 
responsibility can differ, and that punishment is 
morally justified only if a person can be held morally 
responsible for some wrongdoing. Legal responsibility 
legally justifies the infliction of legal punishment, 
it does not necessarily justify it morally.
But before we show this, two things need to be 
said. I do not want to suggest that the criteria for 
legal and moral responsibility are necessarily different, 
except in the rather uninteresting technical sense that 
whereas legal responsibility is defined with reference 
to law, moral responsibility is not. There are, I 
believe, no insurmountable reasons why the criteria 
for legal and moral responsibility should not coincide; 
in fact, we might even argue that insofar as their 
criteria cannot be reconciled, so much the worse for 
moral responsibility.^'
Second, it is perhaps misleading to speak of legal 
responsibility as though it were a simple thing. It is 
not, of course. Criteria for ascribing responsibility 
which are good enough with respect to some offences are 
not good enough with respect to others. This is 
perhaps one of the more striking distinguishing features 
of the law of torts and criminal law as they stand in 
the Anglo-American legal tradition. In this section 
I shall confine myself to the criteria of responsibility
T
This is persuasively argued by J. Feinberg, ’Problematic 
Responsibility in Law and Morals’, Philosophical Review, 
Vol. LXXI, 1962, pp.340-51.
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as they figure in criminal law, though even here there 
is no single conception, but conceptions which differ 
somewhat in different legal traditions, and even within 
the one tradition at different times. Yet they are all 
valid conceptions of legal or criminal responsibility. 
Often enough jurists and legal historians have 
endeavoured to trace one single conception, or even a 
movement towards one single conception, of criminal 
responsibility through the historical development of
the law, but without any real success."*" The doctrine
2of mens rea, which has tended to form the backbone of
legal conceptions of responsibility, is by no means a
necessary or a sufficient condition of crixnina.1
3responsibility, as I shall soon show. Furthermore, it 
is itself subject to differing interpretations. Jerome 
Hall, for example, maintains that though they are 
distinguishable, criminal responsibility is founded 
on moral culpability, because mens rea means, essentially, 
1 the intentional or reckless doing of a morally wrong
4act’. This view is rejected by other jurists, who 
maintain instead that mens rea merely means ’a guilty
1
See A.E.S. Tay, ’Moral Guilt and Legal Liability’, 
Hibbert Journal, Vol. LX, 1961-2, pp.44-32.
2
Actus non est reus nisi mens sit rea. I agree with 
Hart’s contention that negligence is covered by mens 
rea; ’Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility’, 
in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, ed. A.G. Guest,
Oxford University Press, 1961, pp.29-^9•
3
Whether it ought to be is another matter.
4
J. Hall, Principles of the Criminal Law, Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill C o ,, 1947, p .149•
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mind’, and not ’a wicked mind’, and that any coincidence 
that there might be between a guilty mind and a wicked 
mind, while desirable, is only contingent. ^
H.L.A. Hart, arguing for a separation of law and 
morals, has on a number of occasions pointed to three 
respects in which moral and criminal responsibility 
differ - objective liability, criteria of insanity, and 
strict liability - and these will provide the framework 
for my discussion of differences between moral and 
legal responsibility.
(a) One way in which the law can differ from morals
in its conception of responsibility is in its admission
of ’objective liability’ as a rule of evidence. Like
the doctrine of strict liability, that of objective
liability does not require knowledge of the actual
knowledge or intention of the accused as a presupposition
of responsibility. Unlike the doctrine of strict
liability, that of objective liability permits the
imputation to the accused of the knowledge or intention
2which an ’average’ or ’reasonable’ man would have had.
1
A.L. Goodhart, English Law and the Criminal Law,
London: Stevens and Sons, 1953» p.85; H.L.A. Hart,
’Legal Responsibility and Excuses’, in Determinism and 
Freedom in the Age of Modern Science, ed. S. Hook,
New York University Press, 1958, pp.88-92; Lord Longford, 
The Idea of Punishment, London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1961,
pp.16-19•
2
See H.L.A. Hart, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 
Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1965» P*7> idem. Punishment
and the Elimination of Responsibility, London: Athlone
Press, 1962, p.21; idem, ’Negligence, Mens Rea and
Criminal Responsibility’, pp.44-9* Other discussions
(footnote continued on p.230)
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Hart sees objective liability as a compromise between 
competing claims, only one of which being that the 
accused is morally responsible. In allowing objective 
liability, the law abandons ' the attempt to discover 
whether a person charged with a crime actually intended 
to do it’ . ^
In speaking of objective liability as the law’s
abandonment of ’the attempt to discover whether a person
charged with a crime actually intended to do it’, Hart
2appears to overstate the case. It is true that the
(footnote 2 continued from p.229)
of ’objective liability’ can be found in G.W. Paton,
A Textbook of Jurisprudence, Third edn. , ed. D.P. Derham, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964, pp.341-3; P* Brett and
P.L. Waller, Cases and Materials in Criminal Law, 
Melbourne: Butterworth & Co., 1962, pp.682-713*
1
Hart, Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility, 
p.21. Compare Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: 'While the
terminology of morals is still retained, the law... 
by the very necessity of its nature, is continually 
transmuting those moral standards into external 
objective ones, from which the actual guilt of the 
party concerned is wholly eliminated’ (The Common Law, 
Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1881, p.38~)""*
2
Hart's interpretation gains some support from the 
extreme statement of the former Lord Chancellor, Viscount 
Kilmuir, in D.P.P. v. Smith: ’once... the jury are
satisfied f that the accused was unlawfully and voluntarily 
doing something to someone], it matters not what the
accused in fact contemplated as the probable result or
whether he even contemplated at all' ([l96l] A.C. 327)*
This is an extreme statement of the doctrine because
Lord Denning, one of the Lords who assented to the 
Lord Chancellor's speech, afterwards claimed that 
notwithstanding the decision, 'ultimately the question 
is: Did he intend to cause death or grievous bodily
harm?' (Responsibility Before the Law., Jerusalem:
(footnote contined on p.23l)
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doctrine of objective liability, as Holmes originally
propounded it, did involve such an abandonment and
that for him it was 'not an evidential test, but a
substantive standard of behaviour',^ but it is not
easy to find criminal cases in which such a standard
2has actually been applied. D.P.P. v. Smith is the 
closest we have to an embodiment of the principle, but 
even here I think it is too strong to say that the law 
abandoned the attempt to discover the intention of the 
accused. For here there was a conflict between the 
evidence and the accused’s avowal of intention, and 
therefore the court took the view that since the accused 
was a reasonable man (not legally insane - and not 
suffering from diminished responsibility), he should 
be regarded as if the evidential burden (of demonstrating 
that his intention was other than that which should 
be expected in the circumstances) lay on him. This 
seems to be a fairer interpretation than Hart’s, for, 
were his correct, then a person logically could not be
(footnote 2 continued from p.230)
Magnes Press, 1961, p .305 referred to in Hart,
Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility, p .21. 
Furthermore, the criterion used in D.P.P, v. Smith has 
since been rejected by the Australian High Court(see 
Parker (1963) A.L.J.R. 3> 11-12), and abrogated by 
Section 8 of the English Criminal Justice Act, 1967*
Perhaps Hart has overstated the case to emphasize the 
differences between legal and moral responsibility.
But the differences still obtain on my own view. In 
another place, however, he comes closer to my interpretation 
(Punishment and Responsibility, Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1968» p p .241-2).
1
Punishment and Responsibility, p.243*
2
Brett and Waller, op. cit., P.707.
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wrongly convicted if he could be shown to be responsible 
by ’objective* standards - even though his actual intent 
was other than that imputed to him.^“ Nevertheless, the 
doctrine of objective liability does make it difficult 
for a person to show his intention was other than that 
imputed to him, and even when correctly applied may 
lead to the conviction of a person who is morally 
blameless (or not as blamable as he is made out to be).
(b) A second way in which the law can differ from
morals in its conception of responsibility is in its
concentration ’almost exclusively on lack of knowledge
2rather than on defects of volition or will’ as an
admissable excuse. This, of course, has been a standard
criticism of the M ’Naghten Rules, and it is only in
recent years that account has been taken of these
3criticisms in legal practice. However, because of this 
concentration on lack of knowledge rather than on 
defects of will, there have been occasions on which 
the law has been correctly applied and a person
1
It might be argued that it is this very fact which makes 
objective liability so obnoxious, and which has led to 
its abrogation. This may be so, but it still seems to 
presuppose a stronger interpretation of D .P .P , v.Smith 
than is necessary.
2
Hart, Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility, 
p.21. The M ’Naghten Rules maintain that for a person to 
be exempt from criminal responsibility, he must, at the 
time of the act, have suffered from a defect of reason 
arising from a disease of the mind, with the result that 
he did not know the nature of the act or that it was wrong.
For example, in the English Homicide Act of 1937*
3
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convicted of some crime despite the fact that he clearly
1acted from ’irresistible impulse’.
In passing, it is worthwhile commenting on the
intended relation between the legal and moral criteria
for insanity. Hart interprets the M ’Naghten Rules as
excusing from criminal responsibility the person who
2did not know that his act was ’illegal’ , whereas Lord
Chief Justice Tindal had actually said that they served
to excuse the person who did not know that ’he was doing
3what was wrong'. By this the Lord Chief Justice did 
not imply that every morally reprehensible act was 
punishable by law, for, as he said a little later, ’if 
the accused was conscious that the act was one which he
1
For some cases where this has actually happened, see 
True, (1922) 127 L.T. 36I; 27 Cox 287; 16 C.A.R. 164; 
Kopsch, (1923) 19 C.A.R. 30; Plavell (1926) 19 C.A.R. 
l4l; Sodeman, (1936) 2 All E.R. II38; 33 C.L.R. 192; 
Straffen, ("1932 ) 16 M.L.R. 212. In many legal systems 
the defence of irresistible impulse is now being admitted 
See Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part,
London: Stevens & Sons, 1953» §99; Hall, op. cit.,
PP•303-26; also the discussion of cases in P. Brett and 
P.L. Waller, op. cit., pp.6llff. For the Australian 
situation, see Colin Howard, Australian Criminal Law, 
Melbourne: Law Book Co., 1963» pp.282-3» 293-8.
2
Hart, The Morality of the Criminal Law, p.8; idem. 
Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility, pp.21-2
3
M ’Naghten, (1843) 10 Cl. & F. 210. The words of Dixon 
J. in Porter are relevant: ’What is meant by wrong is
wrong having regard to the everyday standards of 
reasonable people' [(1933) 33 C.L.R. 190; compare 
Sodeman, (1936) 35 C.L.R. 213; and the discussion of 
M ' Naghten in Stapleton, (1-932) 86 C.L.R. 367].
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ought not to do, and ... if that act was at the same
1time contrary to the law of the land, he is punishable*. 
Hart’s interpretation of the M ’Naghten Rules is 
clearly correct as an account of what the Rules in fact 
excuse; though in accepting his formulation of the 
Rules there is some danger of removing them from the 
sphere of moral criticism. It would be more satisfactory 
to regard the M'Naghten Rules as an attempt to formulate 
in a legally satisfactory way some of the grounds on 
which a person can be absolved from moral responsibility. 
Moral criticism of the Rules has come, of course, but 
there has been a reluctance to revise or supplement 
them until recently, for fear that such revisions would 
eliminate responsibility altogether.^ Nevertheless, the 
important point for my purposes is that the criteria 
for legal, insanity are at present not perfectly 
consistent with the criteria which absolve from moral 
re sponsibility.
The person who is insane does not qualify for 
consideration under the criminal law. The same applies 
to infants and those with diplomatic status, and here 
again we can see significant differences between the
1
M * Naghten, at 210.
2
Thus Lady Wootton maintains that * once we allow any 
movement away from a rigid intellectual test of 
responsibility on M'Naghten lines, our feet are set upon 
a slippery slope which offers no real resting place 
short of the total abandonment of the whole concept of 
responsibility* (Social Science and Social. Pathology, 
p.249)• She, of course, sees this not as a reason for 
retaining the Rules, but as a reason for eliminating 
questions of responsibility from criminal proceedings 
altogether. See also J. Hall, op. cit., Chapter XIV.
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criteria of legal and moral responsibility. In section 
2(a) I maintained that infants are not held morally 
responsible because, in some significant sense, they 
are unable to consider rationally various possible 
courses of action, and to make rational decisions 
concerning them. As it stands this criterion is not 
easily serviceable, and so the law prescribes a simpler 
expedient: it automatically excludes from criminal
responsibility children below a certain age.'*' Now, 
although the figures prescribed are not arbitrary, they 
are not adequate to distinguish those who can be 
regarded as moral infants from those who cannot. It 
is not difficult to point to cases in which people have 
deserved punishment but have been legally non-accountable.
1
In Australia, children below eight years of age are 
irrebuttably non-accountable. Between the ages of eight 
and thirteen inclusive, a child can be found guilty of 
committing a crime, ’but only upon proof that, as well 
as possessing the appropriate state of mind for the crime,
... he knew that his act was wrong’ (Brett & Waller, 
op. cit., p.406). The ages of irrebuttable and 
rebuttable legal responsibility vary from country to 
c ountry.
2
The following extract from a news report in The Auckland 
Star, 1965» is a good example: ’Mr Albert Clarke has a
toyshop in Fulham, London. And, at frequent intervals, 
a half-brick crashes through the window of the shop.
He knows who does it. So do the police. But they can 
do nothing about it ... just yet. The culprit is a boy - 
only nine years old. And under English Law, no child 
under the age of 10 can be prosecuted. The boy knows it. 
Twice, he has been caught by the police, escaping with 
toys from the shop. But they had to let him go, for he 
reminded them: "You can’t touch me!" With every crash,
Mr Clarke’s insurance premium rises .... "Scotland Yard 
can’t help me", he said. "My solicitor has told me I
(footnote continued on p.236)
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Diplomatic immunity is another clear example of the 
possible divergence of criteria for criminal and moral 
responsibility.^
(c) A. further respect in which legal and moral 
responsibility differ is found in the presence of legal 
offences for which responsibility is strict; that is, 
offences for which neither knowledge nor negligence is 
required for conviction.2 Generally, these are minor 
offences concerned with the endangering of public welfare, 
and are symptomatic of the practical difficulties of 
demonstrating responsibility for certain types of
(footnote 2 continued from p.235)
can do nothing myself - I can’t even hold the boy's 
parents responsible. I could sue the boy in the County 
Court for the damage. But a judge could not order a 
nine-year-old to repay more than a few shillings a week, 
if that".» Actually, Clarke could probably have claimed 
damages from the boy’s parents. But this does not 
vitiate the main point of the example.
1
’The person of a diplomatic agent is inviolable and 
he is immune from any form of arrest or detention and 
from all criminal proceedings’ (j.L. Brierly, The Law 
of the Nations, Sixth edn., ed. Sir Humphrey Waldock, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963» P-256). Of course the
immunity of the diplomat from criminal proceedings is 
not the same as the immunity of the infant and insane 
from such, but it amounts to the same.
2
Hart, Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility, 
p.22. Hart says that offences of strict responsibility 
have been admitted into the law in the last hundred years. 
While it is true that the modern doctrine of strict 
liability is generally taken to have stemmed from Woodrow, 
(1846) M. & W. 404, Tay points out that historically the 
notion goes back much further (op. cit.). Nevertheless, 
in the U.S.A., at least, most (though by no means all) 
offences of strict liability arise in civil law, not 
in criminal law (see Howard, Strict Responsibility,
Chapter l).
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conduct. As I mentioned in the last Chapter, it is 
not easy to give an unambiguous account of what is 
entailed by the notion of strict responsibility. While 
its basic ingredient appears to be that proof of mens 
rea is not necessary, there has been a development over 
the years as to what is necessary. From a notion of 
absolute responsibility, whereby conviction followed 
simply on the proof of actus reus, there has developed 
a notion of strict responsibility (in Australia, at
least) under which certain defences are possible - e.g.
2reasonable mistake or ignorance of fact. However, be
that as it may, the fact still remains that there have
been numerous valid convictions via offences of strict
responsibility where the defendants have not been morally
at fault; and insofar as this is the case, there remains
a hiatus between the notions of criminal and moral
responsibility. To take an example, in State v. Lundgren,
the defendant was convicted for selling intoxicating
liquor to a minor, even though he proved that the sale
was made by his bar-keeper without his knowledge or
3consent and contrary to his orders. The basis of his 
conviction was a Minnesota statute providing that
1
Cf. B.M. Quigg: ’The reason for the elimination of the
operative fact of intent from the ^H^tuLes imposing criminal 
liability ... | is that] to permit such a defense would be
to allow every violator to avoid liability merely by 
pleading lack of knowledge and thus, practically, mullify 
the statute, and defeat the purpose and intent of the 
legislature. The general public interest ... is considered 
a sufficient justification for imposing such absolute 
liability ...’ (’Comment’, Michigan Law Review, Vol.43> 
1943-4, p . 11.06 . )
2 See Chapter Five, p.183 f/n.2.
State v. Lundgren (1913) 124 Minn. 162; 144 N.W. 752.
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Any sale of liquor in or from any public 
drinking place by any clerk, bar-keeper 
or other employee authorized to sell 
liquor in such place shall be deemed the 
act of the employer as well as that of the 
person actually making the sale; and every 
employer shall be liable to all the 
penalties provided by law for such sale, 
equally with the person actually making 
the same.
Cases such as this, in which the doctrine of respondeat
superior has been applied, and other strict liability
offences, have led some, like Sayre, to draw a
distinction between 'true crimes’ and 'offences for
which a person is held criminally liable',1 2 or others,
like Lasswell and Donnelly, between 'condemnation3sanctions' and 'other deprivations’. The justification 
given for these distinctions is that although such cases 
come within the province of the criminal law, yet 
because moral guilt is not necessarily involved, they
1
(1905) Minn. Rev. Laws, 1565* For similar cases, see 
Commonwealth v. Sacks, (1913) 2l4 Mass. 72; 100 N.E.
1019; Gutch (libel), (1824) Moo & M. 433; Walter (libel), 
(1799) 3 Esp. 21. In the latter, Lord Kenyon maintained 
' that the proprietor of a newspaper was answerable 
criminally as well as civilly, for the acts of his 
servants or agents, for misconduct in the conducting of 
a newspaper'. Walter was living away from London, the 
place of publication, and confined by illness when the 
paper was published. Compare also Slatcher v. Smith,
[l95l] 2 K.B. 631.
2
F.B. Sayre, 'Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of 
Another’, Harvard Law Review, Vol. XLIII, 1929-30» PP♦ 
689-723; cf. G.W. Paton, op. cit., p.319* Paton notes
that in the case of '"true crimes" ... the penalty is 
serious and there is a real stigma attached to convictions.’
Lasswell & Donnelly, op. cit.
3
239
cannot be treated as crimes, but only as regulatory 
or public welfare offences.^' There is, of course, much 
to recommend this move, and nowadays there is a 
generally recognized distinction between ’crimes' and 
'regulatory offences'. Nevertheless, linguistic 
distinctions, while they may alleviate, do not solve 
genuine moral problems, and until the law is able 
to exempt from responsibility those who have been 
neither wilful nor negligent, it will not be immune 
from moral criticism.
These, then, are some of the ways in which law and 
morality may differ, and in some cases do differ, in 
their criteria of responsibility. I do not want to 
make the differences to appear too great. More often 
than not, if a person is criminally responsible for an 
offence, he is morally responsible for it as well.
This is because as far as practicable the criteria for 
legal and moral responsibility are the same and thus 
criminal offences tend to incorporate moral wrongdoing.
As a system of social control, the law must formulate 
procedures which are not only morally acceptable, but 
also readily implemented. And in accommodating these 
sometimes competing claims, certain compromises are 
made. As a result of these compromises, the law is 
on certain occasions justifiably open to moral criticism 
sometimes because it permits the punishment of those
1
Sometimes referred to as 'public torts', 'prohibitory 
laws', 'administrative misdemeanours', 'quasi crimes', 
'civil offences', 'violations', etc. See Howard, op. cit., 
p .1 f/n.3•
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who do not deserve it, and sometimes because it 
absolves from responsibility those who deserve to 
be punished, and who, for the benefit of all, ought 
to be punished by law.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
PUNISHMENT AND AUTHORITY
XT a person receives the punishment which he 
deserves, then he has no grounds Tor complaint - at 
least, not about the rightness oT punishment. But 
this does not mean that there is no ground oT 
complaint open to him. He may state his grievance 
thus: ’You have no right to punish me; punishment
is not yours to inTlict'. This is, in Tact, the 
criticism which can characteristically be levelled 
at the lynch mob. It is not necessarily the case 
that by taking punishment into their own hands the 
participants are inTlicting on someone a punishment 
which he does not deserve (in Tact, in a corrupt 
administration, the lynch mob may be the only means 
oT obtaining justice), but that punishment is not 
theirs to inTlict. This complaint, then, is directed 
not so much at the rightness oT punishment, nor at the 
status oT the punishers' act (i.e. whether it is 
’punishment’), but at the status oT the punishers.
They have acted without the requisite authority, so 
it is alleged.
It will be recalled that in Chapter Two I argued 
against the view that punishment ’has to be (at least 
supposed to be) imposed by virtue oT some authority, 
conTerred through or by the institution against the 
laws or rules oT which the oTTence has been
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committed.’ I pointed out that punishment could be 
inflicted by someone who was not authorized to do so 
without its status as punishment being affected.
There is nothing inconceivable or even logically odd 
about punishment by one’s peers, though we may have 
certain general moral objections to such a practice.
Nor is there anything strange in speaking about self- 
inflicted punishments; in fact, even the morality of 
the latter is not normally suspect.
1. The Authority to Punish .
Not only did I indicate in Chapter Two that there 
is no conceptual link between punishment and authority, 
but I also pointed out that we usually consider that 
punishment ought to be administered by some authority.
I enumerated various facts about human beings and human 
nature which together constitute our primary justification 
for restricting the task of administering punishment to 
certain authorities.
The basic reason is that if we did not generally 
confine the power or competence to punish to special 
authorities (be they legal, parental, ecclesiastical, 
or pedagogic, etc.), what should be occasions for 
punishment would quickly degenerate into occasions for 
revenge, or would result in excesses or other injustices. 
The end of civil government, so Locke tells us, is
1
A.G.N. Flew, ’"The Justification of Punishment"’, 
Philosophy, Vol.XXIX, 195^> p.294; See supra, 
Chapter Two, Section 3(e)-
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to avoid and remedy those inconveniences of 
the state of Nature which necessarily follow 
from every man’s being judge in his own 
case, by setting up a known authority to 
which every one of that society may 
appeal upon any injury received, or 
controversy that may arise, to which 
every one of the society ought to obey.
He points out that ’man ... hath by nature a power ...
to judge of and punish the breaches of that law | of
Nature] in others, as he is persuaded the offence 
2deserves’. This power is resigned when man enters 
into political society with others:
But though every man entered into society 
hath quitted his power to punish offences 
against the law of Nature in prosecution 
of his own private judgment, yet with the 
judgment of offences which he has given up 
to the legislative, in all cases where he 
can appeal to the magistrate, he has given 
up a right to the commonwealth to employ his 
force for the execution of the judgments of 
the commonwealth whenever he shall be called 
to it, which, indeed, are his own judgments, „
they being made by himself or his representative.'
Being the sort of men we are, it is only by restricting 
the responsibility for inflicting punishment to an 
impartial person or body of persons that we can hope for 
a tradition of just punishment. It is natural for most 
of us to hit back or to retaliate if hurt or injured by
1
J. Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, Everyman 
edn., London! J .M . Dent, 1924, §90» pp.160-1.
2
§87, pp.158-9.
§88, pp.159-60.
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someone else. Our judgment is easily clouded by 
emotion, and our knowledge is very often inadequate.
To ensure justice we usually need some impersonal agency 
with a detachment and with resources of knowledge beyond 
those which we have ourselves. Even the ancient Hebrew 
system, in which punishment for murder was inflicted by 
the dead man’s next of kin, had to be supplemented by 
cities of refuge to which a man who had accidentally 
killed a person could betake himself. For there was 
no guarantee that the dead man’s relatives would wait 
to assess the assassin’s guilt or would be pacified by 
the knowledge that the death was accidental. Punishment 
by special authority is not as susceptible to these 
sorts of abuses.
Even T.H. Green, whose organic conception of society 
permits him to recognize that there can be societal or 
legal indignation, maintains that this indignation is 
’inseparable from the interest in social well-being’.^
In fact, ’the conception of vengeance is quite 
inappropriate to the act of society or the state on 
the criminal. The state cannot be supposed capable of 
vindictive passion.'  ^ However, these last remarks need 
to be kept in perspective. In claiming that the state 
is incapable of ’vindictive passion’, Green acknowledges
T
T.H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political 
Obligation, London: Longmans, 1941, p .184.
2
Page 183; cf. B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory 
of the State, Fourth edn., London: Macmillan, 1923»
p.211; W.I. Lofthouse, 'Retribution and Reformation’, 
Hibbert Journal, Vol.XLI, 1942-3, p.39.
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his debt to Hegel rather than his dependence on the 
facts. Apart from some fairly obvious examples in 
treason and espionage trials, the state, through its 
judicial agencies, has often forsaken justice for the 
satisfaction of an unrighteous indignation. Nevertheless, 
it is true that a public authority such as the state 
generally possesses a competence and a detachment of 
which private individuals are only rarely capable.
Needless to say, were this not the case it is doubtful 
whether we would (if we had the choice) tolerate such 
an institution.
It is this need for impartiality and competence to 
judge which helps us to understand why we generally 
think that punishment ought to be taken out of the hands 
of private individuals, and placed in the hands of some 
impersonal body or authority. It also helps us partially 
to understand why we do not argue that a person has no 
right to punish himself, and why we generally have no 
objections to fathers punishing their own children.
A person may sometimes judge himself severely, but we 
do not expect him to judge himself unjustly, and we 
acknowledge that people are often better judges of their 
own actions and motives than others who have no 
acquaintance with them.^ Similarly, we expect a father 
to have an understanding of and commitment to his child 
which will counteract feelings of vindictiveness.
1
Of course, it is not difficult to cite numerous 
exceptions to these statements. But, unless we are 
Freudians, we do think of them as exceptions rather 
than as the rule.
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2. Punishing Authorities.
To point out our natural inclinations to retaliate 
and avenge ourselves takes us only part of the way in 
our justification of the institutionalization of 
punishment. For what has been presented so far does 
not give anything like a justification of the actual 
authority structure which we recognize in our society.
A person authorized to punish does not have the right 
to punish any wrongdoing. A father may have authority 
to punish his children, but thi s does not extend to 
punishing people for their crimes. He is not entitled 
to punish the intruder he apprehends. We recognize 
the authority of the state to punish crime, but do 
not recognize this as extending to the excommunication 
of heretics. Of course, it is not difficult to recount 
cases in which fathers have considered themselves as 
possessing the authority to punish criminal actions 
(independently of legal authorization), and in which 
states have excommunicated heretics, but these are 
things which nowadays we would regard as undesirable.
It is the aim of the following discussion to suggest 
why this should be so.
To attempt to justify particular systems of 
authority is far too large a task to take on here; 
and, moreover, it would be of only secondary importance 
to the central issues of this dissertation. Consequently, 
what is presented here is only the barest outline, a 
mere schema, for justifying the diversification of 
punishing authorities. I have therefore ignored 
completely many of the important problems which arise 
in such a venture.
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Naturally, not every culture has the same or as 
clearly differentiated systems of authority as our own 
Western European one, but it is the one with which I 
am most familiar, and can serve as well as any to 
illustrate my points. It is not essential to my 
discussion that our tradition be regarded as the best 
or even a good one, since I wish only to give the 
rationale for the diversification of authority, and not 
to endorse a particular social system.
In our own culture, the basic social unit is still 
the family, even though it does not possess quite the 
same importance and range of functions as in former 
times. Even though we tend to regard the family as an 
institution, it is generally constituted as such, not 
so much in virtue of the prescriptions of legal rules, 
as by consanguinity and deeper emotional and moral 
ties.^ The structure of the family tends to be somewhat 
fluid, perhaps comprising only husband, wife and child(ren), 
but sometimes extending to include a great number of 
relatives. As well, partly because the family is not 
structured by a set of precise legal rules, there is 
no fixed locus of authority. 'Parental’ authority is 
of a somewhat traditional nature, having as its basis 
'the sanctity of the order and the attendant powers of 
control as they have been handed down from the past',
1
Of course, there are situations in which the family 
unit is held together almost solely because of legal 
and economic pressures, but this does not invalidate 
my point.
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to use Weber’s definition. The sanctity of the 
attendant powers of control is also partly based on 
personal credentials, and this helps to account for 
some of the diversity in authority within the family 
structure. Sometimes it resides in the father alone; 
sometimes it is shared jointly with the mother. On 
other occasions it may be found in one of the relatives - 
e.g. the grandparents or mother-in-law (though not so 
commonly in our own society).
The functions which the family unit fulfils also 
tend to be diffuse. There was a time when education was 
regarded as one of the responsibilities of the family, 
later it was thought to belong to the Church, and now 
it seems to have been largely taken over by the state. 
Consequently, the function of the modern family tends 
to be centred in its provision for the more intimate 
expression of human emotions and the moral education and 
rearing of children. It is not my task to assess these 
trends, only to note the way in which they affect our 
understanding of the proper sphere of parental punishment. 
It is because we have a certain conception of the 
legitimate functions of the family that we see its 
legitimate punishing authority only in relation to these 
functions. Thus, in our own society there is a 
tendency to regard as proper the punishment of children 
for moral offences such as lying, swearing, and the 
repudiation of parental authority, but only till such
1
M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organization, trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, 
and ed. Talcott Parsons, New York: The Free Press, 1964,
p.32*!.
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time as the child is thought mature enough to make 
balanced decisions of his own, capable of ’standing on 
his own two feet'. At this point the time of parentally 
enforced moral education is thought to have ended.^ It 
is to be noticed that because the task of moral 
education is thought to belong to the family unit, 
punishment of wrongdoing by those outside the family 
is often regarded as unacceptable: ’You had no right
to punish my son, even if he did break your window. You 
should have come and told me’ is not an uncommon 
complaint. In cases where the young offender comes 
from an undisciplined home, punishment by those other 
than the father (e.g. the aggrieved neighbour) might 
not be looked at askance (except, perhaps, by the father).
A more formally structured institution is the 
school,^ having not only its own special educational 
functions, but nowadays also having functions which to 
some extent overlap with those of the family. The 
schoolmaster is usually empowered to punish not only 
the lazy pupil, but also the refractory or mendacious 
one. But this authority is confined roughly to school 
hours and school activities, and the master who claims 
more than this is usually thought to have exceeded his
1
Once again, I recognize that there are considerable 
differences of opinion about this, but these do not affect 
the point of my argument, which is to show the 
interrelatedness of the justifiable scope of parental 
authority with what are taken to be the legitimate 
functions of the family.
2
For a more detailed discussion, see R.S. Peters, Ethic s 
& Education, London: Allen & Unwin, 1966, Chapter X.
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authority. In the school situation, the authority
structure is more highly formalized than in the family,
prescribed as it is by quasi-legal rules (probably
promulgated by a central educational authority).
Nevertheless there is no single authority structure
which holds for all schools. It used to be the case
that any teacher could inflict corporal punishment on
a pupil, but in many schools this is no longer so, and
the authority to inflict such punishment resides in
the headmaster alone (and sometimes not even in him).
Onereason for this discrimination in authority can
be found in the abuses to which this type of punishment
is subject, the very abuses which had led to the
restriction of punishment to authorities in the first 
2plac e.
Churches, too, generally have certain provisions 
for the punishment of those formally connected with 
them, the range of offences being closely related to 
what are conceived to be their proper functions. 
Churches in mediaeval times punished a far greater 
range of offences than they do today, largely because 
the functions of the Church were seen to be more 
extensive than they are now. Some of the functions 
of the Church are significantly different from those 
of the family and the school, and consequently some 
of the offences which it is seen as legitimately
1
Unless, perhaps, the misdemeanour is committed while 
in school uniform.
2
Perhaps another reason can be found in a prevalent 
hostility to corporal punishment.
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punishing are different. Excommunication for heresy 
belongs uniquely to the Church, for the teaching and 
promulgation of sound doctrine is considered to be 
a specific task of the Church. The Church may also 
censure or excommunicate people for certain moral 
offences which are thought to frustrate or hinder 
other proper tasks which it has. As in the case of 
schools, the authority to punish is carefully prescribed 
by rules, although different churches may have different 
rules.
The need for a general and publicly enunciated 
system of rules prescribing and proscribing certain 
kinds of social behaviour, such as is found in the 
laws of a state, has arisen largely because of the 
increasing complexity of social relationships. Human 
beings living together generally are not merely 
individuals ’living their own lives’, but they interact 
with one another in various ways, not only as 
individuals, but also as members of various societal 
groups, the tasks and interests of which may come into 
conflict. There is a need for some institution to 
mediate between these individuals and groups and to 
regulate their behaviour and relations with each other. 
This is achieved primarily through the legal system 
of the state, which not only proscribes behaviour which 
is thought to damage the interests of others, but also 
limits the authority of different societal groups in 
various ways. To take just one example, Section 59 
of the New Zealand Crimes Act (1961) stipulates the 
following:
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(1) Every parent or person in the place 
of a parent, and every schoolmaster, 
is justified in using force by way of 
corrective towards any child or pupil 
under his care, if the force used is 
reasonable in the circumstances;
(2) The reasonableness of the force used 
is a question of fact.
Here the authority of a parent or schoolmaster to punish 
his child or pupil is recognized (not given), but is 
limited by considerations intended to be in the 
interests of all.
The task of mediation is by no means the only 
function of the state, or even the best expression of 
it. Some see the task of the state largely in 
economic terms - the provider of benefits and securities 
which the individual is unable to provide for himself 
(roads, police, etc.). Ross, on the other hand, 
writes that
we have come to look upon the state as the 
organization of the community for a particular 
purpose, that of the protection of the most 
important rights of individuals, those 
without which a reasonably secure and 
comfortable life is impossible; and to 
leave the promotion of other good ends to 
the efforts of individuals and of other 
organizations, such as churches, trade 
unions, learned and artistic societies, 
clubs.1
Yet others see the task of the state in terms of the 
maximization of liberty, while others look to the
1
The Right and the Good, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930,
P.59.
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state to provide conditions for and to promote the 
realization of
goods such as privacy, self-determination, 
self-perfection (including moral excellence), 
rationally held belief, true knowledge, 
enjoyment of rights, justice, equality (in 
so far as it is dictated by justice), 
happiness, and, in so far as they differ 
from the foregoing, well-being and 
perfection of self.^
Each of these statements of the proper task of the
state is different, and what behaviour is regarded
as properly punished by the state will depend on which
conception is presupposed. For example, under the last
conception I mentioned, a place might be found for
the proscription of and punishment for such things as
organized gambling, fornication, the enjoyment of
2pornography, etc., whereas this is unlikely if 
Ross’s statement is followed.
Again I want to emphasize that I am not necessarily 
endorsing the descriptions which I have given of the 
functions and authority structure of the family, school, 
Church and state. Nor do I want to suggest that these 
are the only institutions within which the authority 
to punish is recognized. The armed forces, sporting 
bodies, clubs and lodges nearly always recognize some
1
H.J. McCloskey, ’The Problem of Liberalism’,
Review of Metaphysics, Vol.XIX, 1965-6, p.270.
2
McCloskey, op. cit.; and also ’Mill’s Liberalism - A 
Rejoinder to Mr Ryan’, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.16, 
1966, pp.64-8, by the same author.
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internal punishing authority. And sometimes we grant
the propriety of punishment inflicted in even more
informal relationships. For example, workmates might
punish a fellow worker who had continually lied to or
about them by refusing to mix with him or by subjecting
1him to public shame. In the more formalized 
relationships we can see that there is a very close 
relation between the functions which the institutions 
have and the sorts of offences which they are seen as 
legitimately punishing.
3• What Constitutes the Authority to Punish?
So far we have noted some of the considerations 
which lead us to restrict the task of punishment to 
authorities. As well we have shown some of the factors 
which go towards justifying the diversification and 
limitation of punishing authorities. However, we have 
not yet considered the exact nature of the authority 
to whom the right to punish has been given. This is 
important, for it brings to light a tension in my view 
which we have not considered as yet. This tension is 
forcibly brought out by Mabbott:
My fundamental difficulty with j the 
traditional retributive] theory is the 
question of status. It takes two to make 
a punishment, and for a moral or social 
wrong I can find no punisher. We may 
be tempted to say when we hear of some 
brutal action *that ought to be punished* ; 
but I cannot see how there can be duties
1
Compare the practice of sending a blackleg or scab 
to Coventry.
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which are nobody’s duties. If I see a 
man ill-treating a horse in a country 
where cruelty to animals is not a legal 
offence, and I say to him ’I shall punish 
you’, he will reply, rightly, ’What has it 
to do with you? Who made you a judge and 
a ruler over me?’ I may have a duty to 
try to stop him and one way of stopping 
him may be to hit him, but another way 
may be to buy the horse. Neither the 
blow nor the price is a punishment.
For a moral offence, God alone has the 
status necessary to punish the offender; 
and the theologians are becoming more and 
more doubtful whether even God has a duty 
to punish wrongdoing.
Mabbott’s viewpoint stands in opposition to the thesis 
I have advanced so far, namely, that punishment is 
properly meted out for moral wrongdoing. Not that 
Mabbott denies that wrongdoing deserves punishment. 
Whether or not it does is a question which does not 
arise for him, for the question which concerns him 
is: ’What justification can be given for the
punishmentswhich we actually mete out?’ And this 
question he believes he can and must answer without 
reference to moral wrongdoing.
But for all its persuasiveness, there are some 
fairly deep-seated difficulties in Mabbott’s position. 
For one thing, it does not always take two to make 
a punishment, as he claims, self-inflicted punishment 
being a case in point. Self-inflicted punishments do 
not require a legal or quasi-legal authorization to be
1
J.D. Mabbott, ’Punishment', Mind, Vol.XLVIII, 1939» 
p.154.
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morally acceptable, and as we shall come to see, the 
reasons for this contribute to our understanding of 
what we expect of a punishing authority.
In making punishment so dependent on the presence 
of an appropriate authority, Mabbott is also led to 
beg the important question. He concludes from the 
fact that he can find no one with the status necessary 
to punish moral wrongdoing, that punishment is therefore 
not justifiably inflicted for moral wrongdoing.^ To 
this conclusion he is not entitled, for it could very 
well be the case that none of the punishments which 
we actually mete out are justifiable, God alone having 
the requisite authority.
What Mabbott should have made, but does not make, 
clear in this passage is why God has the authority to 
punish wrongdoing and others do not. From the general 
drift of Mabbott’s argument one would imagine that if 
cruelty to animals, lying, gossiping and prurient 
thoughts had been legislated against, then appropriate 
human authorities could be cited. For he ’cannot see 
how there can be duties which are nobody’s duties’, 
and they are nobody’s duties only because they are not 
legislated against. To the person who threatens 
punishment for wrongs which are not legal offences 
Mabbott answers: ’What has it to do with you? Who
made you a judge and a ruler over me?' Although he
1
For Mabbott, moral wrongdoing is not even a necessary 
condition for justified punishment. All that is 
necessary is that there is a law or rule and that it has 
been broken by the accused.
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does not say so, Mabbott presumably thinks that God 
qualifies as having the requisite status because God 
stands in relation to morality as legislators and 
judges stand in relation to the law.
Even supposing this to be true, it is nevertheless 
still too superficial to account adequately for the not 
infrequent claim that only God has the authority to 
punish moral wrongdoing.^ Such authority is not 
likely to be or to remain de facto unless certain 
other conditions are fulfilled. In other words, we 
are not likely to be convinced that God should have 
the authority to punish moral wrongdoing unless other 
requirements than that of being ’authorized* to do so 
are also fulfilled. The authority to punish moral 
wrongdoing is thought to be properly God’s partly 
because only he is seen to be in a position to look 
into the human heart and to take adequate account of 
all the factors relevant to a correct moral assessment:
As modern psychological research continues we 
must find it harder and harder to satisfy 
ourselves as to the extent of the moral 
failing in any particular case. We must 
find it harder and harder to believe that 
there is even the roughest approximation 
between the penalties we mete out to the 
wrong-doer and those which God would award 
him. In other words between human and Divine
1
See, for example, A.C. Ewing, Ethics, Teach Yourself 
Books: English Universities Press, 1953» p.172; Benn
and Peters, Social Principles and the Democratic State, 
London: Allen and Unwin, 1959» p.l77> Lord Longford,
The Idea of Punishment, London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1961.
p. 49.
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justice. It is at this point that the 
very sharp issue of practical justice 
arises, as to whether in practice the 
idea of retribution can properly be 
retained at all in an enlightened penal 
system. When I talk of retaining the 
idea of retribution, I mean retain some 
connection between the supposed heinousness 
of the offence, the degree of moral failing 
on the part of the culprit on the one side, 
and the severity of the punishment on the 
other.1
It is thought, therefore, that it is beyond the 
competence of humans to assess moral wrongdoing. 
Consequently punishment, if it is to be justly 
administered, must be for different sorts of offences, 
namely legal or quasi-legal, in which we have workable 
measures of guilt. Of course, since it is in the 
interests of justice that we confine the task of 
punishment to authorities, we expect judges to be 
competent and discerning in those things pertaining 
to their office. To some extent these expectations 
are built into the qualifying conditions for election 
or appointment to the judiciary. Perhaps coupled with 
these expectations is our demand that judges be men of 
exemplary character. We would be loathe to recognize 
the authority of a judge who had a criminal record or 
was notorious for his loose-living. With such a man 
we would feel that there was no guarantee that justice 
would be done.
It seems to me that to some extent the hiatus 
drawn between human assessments of moral guilt and
1
Longford, loc. cit♦
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the assessments of which God is supposedly capable 
is unjustified. Not only do we continually attempt 
such assessments, but often there is no reason to 
think that such assessments are far wide of the mark. 
And in Chapter Eight I shall discuss some of the 
criteria which are appropriate to the determination of 
moral guilt.
On the other hand I do not want to deny that we
often do have objections to punishing moral wrongdoing
simply qua moral wrongdoing. It is not simply in the
interests of justice that we expect of a judge or
punisher that he be a man of exemplary character, but
we feel that there is a presumptuousness or self-
righteousness about punishing others for offences of
which one is most probably guilty oneself: ’Let him
who is without sin cast the first stone’.^  This is
what really gives the strength to Mabbott’s retort:
'What has it to do with you? Who made you a judge and
2a ruler over me?' It is for this reason as much as
1
From John 8:7; cf. Nowell-Smith: 'If a man deserves
blame, someone would be justified in blaming him. Not 
necessarily you; for you may be in no position to cast 
the first stone or to cast any stone at all' (Ethic s, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 195^> p.27l).
2
This can be seen from the context in which the retort 
was originally made: 'One day, when Moses had grown up,
he went out to his people and looked on their burdens; 
and he saw an Egyptian beating a Hebrew, one of his 
people. He looked this way and that, and seeing no one 
he killed the Egyptian and hid him in the sand. When 
he went out the next day, behold two Hebrews were 
struggling together; and he said to the man that did 
the wrong, "Why did you strike your fellow?" He answered, 
"Who made you a prince and a judge over us? Do you mean 
to kill me as you killed the Egyptian?"' (Exodus 2: 11-14).
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any other that there is a tendency to ascribe to God 
alone the authority to punish moral wrongs which do 
not harm the legitimate functions of the various social 
institutions and associations.
Mabbott mistakenly thinks that because only God 
has the necessary status to punish moral wrongdoing, 
therefore no justified punishments which we inflict 
could be for moral wrongdoing. He overlooks the 
distinction which Ross and others have made between 
wrongdoing as such and wrongdoing as profitably 
legislated against. Ross writes:
We do not claim that laws should be made 
against all moral offences, or even 
against all offences by men against 
their neighbours. Legislation should 
be guided to a great extent by such 
matters as the possibility of enforcing 
a given law if it were made, the question 
whether a certain type of offence is 
important enough to make it worthwhile 
to put the elaborate machinery of the law 
at work against it, or is better left to 
be punished by the innocent person or by 
public opinion; and by other similar 
c on siderations.^
Normally we look upon particular punishments as justified 
only if the wrongs for which they are inflicted are such 
as also frustrate the legitimate purposes of the 
institutions which enclose the wrongdoer, and as well 
if they are inflicted by the appropriate authorities
1
W.D. Ross, 'The Ethics of Punishment’, Journal of 
Philosophical Studies, Vol.IV, 1929» p.207. This also 
constitutes a reply to Benn and Peters' criticism, 
op. cit., p .177•
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within those institutional structures. Thus 
homosexuality is usually regarded as properly punished 
by legal authorities only if it tends to cause harm 
to others, the prevention of such being one of the 
legitimate functions of the state. If punishment is 
not primarily inflicted for wrongdoing, but for 
something like law-breaking instead, then there is no 
longer any guarantee that our legal system will be just, 
except perhaps in the secondary sense of ’impartially 
administered’. The interests of justice can be 
secured only if punishment is meted out for, and is 
commensurate with, moral wrongdoing.
CHAPTER EIGHT
GETTING AS MUCH AS ONE DESERVES
In Chapter Seven I returned to a distinction which 
I had made earlier between what a person deserves and 
what a particular authority is justified in giving him. 
In justifying social institutions we need to be able to 
point to their legitimate advantages and possible 
alternatives."*" Within such institutions authorities 
are properly empowered to act only in such a manner 
that these general justifying aims are not violated.
The situation may therefore arise in which a particular 
authority is not justified in giving to a wrongdoer 
the punishment which he deserves. This distinction 
needs to be kept in mind as we proceed with our 
discussion in this Chapter.
It will also be recalled that in Chapter Three I 
distinguished between raw, institutionalized, and 
specific desert claims. There I took the view that 
specific desert claims are usually of the same general 
form as institutionalized desert claims, viz. ’X 
deserves A of Y in virtue of B’. The difference lies 
in the fact that, whereas institutionalized desert 
claims are basically concerned with what treatment is
1
Cf. J. Feinberg, ’On Justifying Legal Punishment', in 
Nomos III: Responsibility, New York: Liberal Arts
Press, I 960, pp.1 5 8 - 9 .
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deserved, specific desert claims refer to the quantity 
or degree or amount of treatment which is deserved.
As examples I gave the following:
(i) ’Nolan deserved every bit of the $300 
he got for the First Prize.’
(ii) ’McKenzie deserves about five years 
gaol for his offence.’
(iii) ’Menzies deserved at least a K.C.M.G.’
As can be clearly seen, each of these statements
presupposes an institutional framework. Prize-giving,
knighthoods, and imprisonment are social institutions,
and as such we can expect and require them to be at
least partially justified in terms of the benefits*
which would accrue from their adoption and perpetuation.
But only partially. My discussion in Chapter Four was
devoted to showing that their primary justification
must be that they are deserved, since each of them
necessarily involves the awarding of deliberately
2pleasant or unpleasant treatment.
1
Including so-called moral goods (not a particularly 
felicitous locution).
2
Cf. Kant: 'Now the notion of punishment, as such,
cannot be united with that of becoming a partaker of 
happiness, for although he who inflicts the punishment 
may at the same time have the benevolent purpose of 
directing this punishment to this end, yet it must be 
justified in itself as punishment, i.e., as mere harm, 
so that if it stopped there, and the person punished 
could get no glimpse of kindness hidden behind this 
harshness, he must yet admit that justice was done him, 
and that his reward was perfectly suitable to his 
conduct. In every punishment, as such, there must first 
be justice, and this constitutes the essence of the
(footnote continued on p.264)
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However, it is one thing to justify the giving of 
prizes, the conferment of honours, and the imposition 
of gaol sentences; it is another to justify their amount.
It is with the latter problem that we shall be concerned 
in this Chapter. Two main justificatory questions 
immediately come to mind: (A.) By what criteria can we
determine the amount of pleasant or unpleasant treatment 
which a person deserves? and (b) By what criteria can 
we decide the prizes, honours, penalties, etc. which a 
particular authority is justified in giving? Justificatory 
question (ß) naturally divides into at least two 
justificatory questions: (B^) By what criteria can a
particular authority determine the prizes, honours, or 
penalties it is justified in awarding for different 
sorts of deserving actions? and (B^) By what criteria 
can a particular authority determine the prize, honour, 
or penalty which ought to be awarded for a particular 
deserving action? Other justificatory questions are 
possible (depending on whether or not we are limiting 
ourselves to moral justification), but we shall ignore 
these. Our main concern in this Chapter will be with 
(a ), though I shall make a few observations relevant 
to (B1) and (B^) at the end of the Chapter. It is 
question (B^) which has usually absorbed the attention 
of philosophers, though this is partly because it has 
been confused with (a ). One further restriction on this 
Chapter is that I shall confine myself largely to a
(footnote 2 continued from p.263)
notion. Benevolence may, indeed, be united with it, but 
the man who has deserved punishment has not the least 
reason to reckon upon this’ (Critique of Practical Reason, 
I.l.viii; quoted in E.L. Pine offs, The Rationale of 
Legal Punishment, New York: Humanities Press, I.966, pp*6-~7)*
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discussion of these questions as they relate 
specifically to punishment.
Problem (a ) has usually been considered to pose 
insuperable difficulties for many so-called retributivist 
justifications of punishment. It is said to be impossible 
to determine how much of a particular kind of treatment 
a person deserves. Only on utilitarian criteria can 
determinations be made of the amount of unpleasant 
treatment a person can justifiably undergo, so it is 
argued. But to argue in this way is to put the cart 
before the horse, for the suggestion that utilitarian 
criteria are more appropriate to the determination of 
what amount of unpleasant treatment is justified 
because they are easier or possible to apply is of no 
value unless it has previously been decided that such 
criteria are morally acceptable. Only then does the 
question of practicability arise. If it turns out that 
specific desert determinations are impossible for us to 
make, this will not necessarily indicate that utilitarian 
considerations are appropriate, it may indicate only 
that no one would be justified in inflicting punishment.
The plan of this Chapter will be as follows: In
the first section I consider the importance of specific 
desert determinations in the infliction of justified 
punishment. This is followed by a short section on the 
relation between specific deserts and different modes 
of punishment. Section Three is devoted to a refutation 
of one common objection to the possibility of specific 
desert determinations. Finally, in Section Four, which 
forms the main part of the Chapter, I discuss the 
scaling and determination of specific deserts. The
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argument of this last section, by virtue of the 
magnitude of the problems on which it touches, is of 
necessity highly schematic.
1. Is the Determination of Specific Deserts Necessary?
From my previous discussion it would appear to 
follow naturally that desert considerations ought to be 
primary in deciding how much punishment could justifiably 
be inflicted on a wrongdoer. While it is true that 
punishment which is administered within an institutional 
framework must take account of utilitarian considerations, 
we would be mistaken if we thought these were the sole 
or even primary considerations. What is of fundamental 
concern to us is what amount of unpleasant treatment a 
person ought to suffer for his misdeeds, and the 
suffering of deliberately unpleasant treatment can be 
justified only by desert. What punishment a particular 
authority is justified in inflicting is a distinguishable 
secondary issue. This is supported by the fact that 
it is not necessary for specific desert claims to 
presuppose an institutional framework (though they 
usually do). The statement, ’Peters deserves to get 
good weather (but not a trip around the world) for his 
holidays’ can be construed as a specific desert claim, 
yet no institution which can supply such treatment is 
presupposed.
Nevertheless, there have been those who have 
argued that although desert considerations are relevant 
to whether or not a person ought to suffer punishment, 
how much punishment a person ought to receive is 
determined by reference to utilitarian considerations.
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It will be worth our while to look at the consequences 
of such a position.
Bradley is sometimes thought to have taken this
view.^ He writes: ’Having once the right, we may
modify the punishment according to the useful and the
pleasant, but these are external to the matter; they
2cannot give us the right to punish’. But Bradley 
never says that we determine the punishment to be 
awarded by appeal to utilitarian and other non-retributive 
considerations: he says merely that they ’may modify
it', and this is a different matter. Bosanquet, however, 
puts forward a view very much like the one we are 
considering. While maintaining that punishment is
3the wrongdoer’s ’right, of which he must not be defrauded’,
1
For example, by A.C. Ewing, The Morality of Punishment, 
London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1929»
pp.40-3; M. Goldinger, The Moral Justification of 
Punishment, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State 
University, 1963» pp.18-19; D. Seligman, Justice and 
the Role of Retribution in Punishment, Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, New York: Columbia University, 1966,
P.234. Rashdall also leans towards this interpretation 
of Bradley, but he also shows some difficulties in 
Bradley's view that non-utilitarian considerations may 
simply ’modify’ the severity of punishment (’The Theory 
of Punishment', International Journal of Ethics, Vol.II,
1891-2, pp.22-3).
2
F.H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, Second edn., Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1927» p.27.
3
B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State, 
Fourth edn., London: Macmillan, 1923» p.211; cf.
F. Lieber, quoted in G.S. Hillard, ’Lieber's Essay on 
Punishment', North American Review, Vol.XLVTI, I838, 
p .433; Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942, §101; Solovyof, The
(footnote continued on p.268)
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he also insists that the state ’cannot estimate either 
pain or moral guilt.... The graduation of punishments 
must be almost entirely determined by experience of 
their operation as deterrents. ’ ^ This view, however, 
has a number of unwelcome consequences.
For one thing, it is artificially stipulative and 
restrictive, since it necessitates our discarding a 
number of significant locutions relating to the 
severity of punishment. Except in the secondary legal 
sense, it is open to us to speak of penalties as just 
or unjust only if we can also determine whether or not 
they are deserved. If we succumb to the view that the 
determination of specific deserts is either impossible 
or unnecessary, then we remove from ourselves the 
possibility of criticizing penalties inflicted on 
wrongdoers from the point of view of their justice or,
(footnote 3 continued from p.267)
Justification of the Good, trans. N.A. Duddington,
London: Constable, 1918, p.322; W.S. Lilly, ’The Ethics
of Punishment’, Fortnightly Review, N.S., Vol.XLVI, 
July-Deeember, I889, p.115* The idea of punishment being
a ’right’ is criticized in Benn and Peters, Social 
Principles and the Democratic State, London: Allen and
Unwin, 1959» p.179; A.M. Quinton, ’On Punishment’, in 
Philosophy, Politics and Society, First Series, ed.
P. Laslett, Oxford: Blackwell, 1956, pp.85-6; S.
Gendin, Theories of Punishment and the Idea of Criminal 
Responsibility, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New 
York University, 1966, pp.94-7- A version of it is 
defended in W.A. Miller, ’Mr Quinton on "an Odd Sort 
of Right"’, Philosophy, Vol.LXI, 1966, pp.238-6 0 .
1
Bosanquet, op. cit., p.212. Rashdall is amazed that 
Bosanquet speaks of his view of punishment as 
’retributive’ (The Theory of Good and Evil, Second edn., 
Oxford University Press, 1924, Vol.I , p .300).
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rather, injustice. This is a high price to pay.
Bosanquet’s view would also rule out the possibility 
of our speaking of some people deserving greater 
penalties or heavier punishments than others.
Second, if utilitarian considerations are used 
to determine how much punishment a person ought to 
suffer, then the possibility is left open that a 
person will suffer appreciably more or less punishment 
than he deserves - witness the case of exemplary 
punishments. Such punishments are unjust. To 
obviate this objection, Bosanquet would need to show 
either that utilitarian considerations would never 
lead to a person* s suffering more punishment than he 
deserved, or, alternatively, why utilitarian considerations 
cannot override desert in the determination of whether 
or not a person ought to suffer punishment, whereas 
they can in the determination of how severe a punishment 
a person ought to suffer. However it is clear that 
neither of these possibilities has much to commend it.
Third, Bosanquet*s concession is damaging even 
to the claim that desert must determine who ought to 
suffer punishment. If taken seriously, it reduces the 
original desert claim to the purely negative one that 
a person ought not to suffer punishment unless he 
deserves it. Thus it now says very little, if anything, 
about who ought to suffer punishment, for a person who 
deserves punishment can be exempted from it on utilitarian 
grounds. Bosanquet*s position would have been more
T
Ewing draws similar conclusions from the view that 
retributive considerations impose a duty to punish,
(footnote continued on p.270)
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acceptable had he distinguished between the punishment 
which a person ought to undergo, and the punishment 
which a particular authority is morally justified in 
inflicting on him. For then he would have been able 
to preserve the positive nature of desert claims/ while 
yet allowing the possibility that a particular authority 
would not be justified in inflicting punishment in all 
cases in which it was deserved.
We can conclude from our discussion in this section 
that if we forgo the necessity of making and justifying 
specific desert claims, then we lose the ability to 
criticize penalties attached to crimes or wrongs on 
the ground of their injustice. And this we are not 
prepared to do.
2 . Specific Deserts and the Modes of Punishment.
Before we consider the determination of specific 
desert claims in more detail, we must draw attention to 
two possible sources of confusion. The one which we 
shall discuss in this section arises largely from the 
institutionalization of specific deserts.
(footnote 1 continued from p.269)
though utilitarian considerations determine how much 
punishment: 'It makes very little difference whether
we admit that, if utilitarian considerations ever 
required it, we ought to let off a murderer, or deny 
this, but admit that we might for those reasons lower 
his penalty to any extent, say, to a fine of one 
shilling’(op. cit., p.4l).
1
This is at least implicit in Bosanquet's claim that 
punishment is a right of which the wrongdoer cannot be 
defrauded.
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There is some ambiguity in the examples I have 
given as to what, exactly, is said to be determined by 
desert. We can distinguish somewhat artificially the 
following four elements in example (i) above. First, 
there is the pleasant treatment which is involved in 
awarding Nolan the $500 as First Prize. Pleasant 
treatment, as we have seen, is a proper object of 
desert. Second, since the statement presupposes an 
institutional context, it is quite appropriate to 
speak of the deserved treatment as a prize♦ Third, a 
specific amount of money and a specific grade of prize 
are said to be deserved, and there is no linguistic 
impropriety in this. These three elements correspond 
to the distinctive features of raw, institutionalized, 
and specific desert claims. But there is a fourth 
element which can be discerned, and which might be 
thought to constitute a legitimate desert, namely 
that Nolan deserved to get five hundred dollars as 
First Prize, rather than, say, a cup, an overseas trip, 
or a scholarship. It seems to me that the determination 
of what sort of deserved treatment to give a person is, 
within certain limits, settlable on utilitarian grounds. 
For example, in an Art Competition a money prize might 
act as a greater incentive than possible alternatives.
The same sort of point applies also to the other 
two examples of specific desert claims which I gave.
It might be argued that a knighthood would not be the 
best way of giving Menzies what he deserves - perhaps 
a statue would be more lasting or a sizable pension more 
useful. Again, it could be argued that although 
McKenzie deserved the amount of unpleasant treatment
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which five years in gaol would constitute, yet he 
ought not to be imprisoned but fined, deported, or 
sent to some rehabilitation centre, because these 
modes of punishment would produce greater benefits.
What many prison reformers fail to realize is that 
their proposals for the enlightened treatment of 
criminals do not necessarily come into conflict with 
giving them the punishment they deserve.^ The 
enforced attendance of criminals at rehabilitation centres 
may itself constitute punishment.^
I noted that the utilitarian determination of 
modes of punishment was subject to certain limitations.
One of these limitations is the fairly obvious one 
that certain methods of punishing, such as torture, 
are in themselves immoral and so unacceptable, even 
though they might serve a useful purpose. A further 
limitation is that some modes of punishment do not 
allow of sufficient realistic variation, and so would 
be unsuitable for deserts of a certain magnitude. For 
example, it would be unrealistic to fine a person for 
wilful murder or to deport someone for a minor case 
of shoplifting. It would be pointless to expect people
T
Cf. J.B. Moore, who points out the difficulties in 
making a clear practical distinction between punishment 
and its accompaniments (Retributive Justifications of 
Punishment, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard 
University, 1965» p.62); A.C. Ewing, ’Punishment as
Viewed by the Philosopher’, Canadian Bar Review,
Vol.XXI, 1942, p.120.
2
On this, see R.C. Findlay, ’What Constitutes Punishment?’ , 
Notre Dame Lawyer, Vol.XXXIX, 1964, pp.595-600.
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to be able to pay the fine which wilful murder might 
deserve, and deporting is too high-pitched for offences 
like shoplifting.
3. The Impreciseness of Specific Desert Claims.
The second misconception to which I want to draw 
attention is the inference that if specific desert 
claims are possible, they must be precise. On the 
contrary. Even though desert claims may be specific, 
they are not necessarily precise, and where they are 
precise, it is because of special institutional 
reasons. What I mean is that where a specific amount 
of something is said to be deserved, it is not to 
be taken that precisely that amount is deserved, unless 
this is prescribed by the rules of the institution. The 
$300 which Nolan deserves is a precise amount, and it 
might look as though this precise amount was determined 
by desert considerations. But this is not so. Had 
the First Prize instead been $400 or $600, then it is 
not unlikely that we could have just as truly said: 
’Nolan deserved every bit of the $400/$600 he got for 
the First Prize’. This does not make it impossible 
for us to say that Nolan got more or less than he 
deserved. Had the prize been $10 and the same 
painting entered, we would claim that a painting like 
that deserved a better prize. Also, we would complain 
that Nolan got less than he deserved had the First 
Prize been fixed at $300 and Nolan given only $400.'*
T
Also in this case he would get less than he was 
entitled to.
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Similar considerations would apply in the case 
of McKenzie’s gaol sentence. Were he given four years 
or six years imprisonment we would probably not complain 
unless he was thereby being treated significantly 
differently from others in a similar position, or 
unless there was a fixed penalty of five years for his 
offence (and he had no mitigating circumstances to plead). 
As well, we would complain of injustice if the same 
offence were to be given seven days or life imprisonment, 
for although specific desert claims are not usually 
precise, there are limits to their impreciseness.
It is important to notice this inherent 
impreciseness in specific desert claims, since many 
critics of retributivist justifications of punishment 
have used the fact that it is impossible to relate 
offences and penalties in a mathematically precise way 
as a substantial objection to such justifications. 
Strangely enough, the difficulties of doing the 
Benthamite hedonistic calculus are not allowed to 
count against utilitarian justifications of punishment.^
Ewing is one philosopher who interprets 
retributivism as maintaining that ’punishment should 
be just, and every excess over the just must be in the
1
That is, if looked at as a quasi-mathematical 
procedure. The hedonistic calculus suggested by Bentham 
was completely unsatisfactory, though more recent writers 
have attempted to make it workable. See, e.g.,
H. Rashdall, ’Can there be a Sum of Pleasures?’, Mind, 
Vol.VIII, 1899, PP’357-82; idem. ’The Commensurability 
of All Values’, Mind, Vol.XI, 1902, pp.l45-6l;
R. McNaughton, ’A Metrical Concept of Happiness,
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.XIV,
1953-4, pP .172-82.
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same ethical position as punishment of "the innocent", 
an injustice which seems much worse than non-punishment 
of the guilty. ' ^  But because he conceives retributive 
justice as having mathematical preciseness he goes on 
to claim that
it is certain that either this injustice or 
the opposite one of inflicting too slight a 
penalty will be perpetrated in nine cases out 
of ten, nay in 999 cases out of a thousand, so 
great are the difficulties in the way of 
securing the right proportion between the 
punishment and the guilt of the offender.^
Qualitative notions, even when qualified by apparently 
quantitative adjectives, are not measurable or 
comparable on an ordinary interval scale. To think 
that they are is to commit a category error. The 
notion of ’precise measurement’ is thus inappropriately 
used in relation to desert. It is not simply that with 
a little sharpening up of our criteria for specific 
deserts we might be able to determine how much punishment 
wrongdoers deserve with mathematical preciseness. The 
two scales are logically different.
1
It is at least questionable whether punishing a man 
slightly more than he deserved would be in exactly 
the same ethical position as punishing an innocent man, 
for the former at least deserves punishment whereas 
the latter does not.
2
Ewing, op. cit. , p.18; compare Mittermeier: ’The
penalty which transgresses by even one atom the 
seriousness of the crime is unjust’ (quoted in M.R. Cohen, 
'Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law’, printed in Reason 
and Law, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1950»
p.'-'n/...
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Oddly enough, Hegel appears to recognize the 
intrinsic impreciseness of specific desert claims, yet 
he argues that because of this it is almost impossible 
to avoid injustice. He states:
Reason cannot determine, nor can the concept 
provide any principle whose application could 
decide whether justice required for an 
offence (i) a corporal punishment of forty 
lashes or thirty-nine, or (ii) a fine of 
five dollars or four dollars ninety-three, 
four, &c., cents, or (iii) imprisonment 
of a year or three hundred and sixty-four, 
three, &c. , days, or a year and one, two, 
or three days. And yet injustice is done 
at once if there is one lash too many, or 
one dollar or one cent, one week in prison 
or one day, too many or too few.l
But if there is logically no way of telling whether 
justice requires forty lashes or thirty-nine, then it 
logically cannot be said that injustice is done if one 
lash too many has been given. The only contexts in 
which it can be said that one lash too many has been 
given are where one more than a prescribed number is 
given (without special reason), or where a particular 
wrongdoer is given one lash more than others from 
whom he cannot be morally differentiated.
4. The Scaling and Determination of Specific Deserts.
We are now in a better position to tackle the main 
problem of this Chapter, namely, the determination of 
how much punishment a particular wrongdoer can be said
1
Hegel, op. cit., §214, p.137
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to deserve. It is a problem which, to my knowledge, 
has never been solved, and to the solution of which I 
shall lay no claim. For the issues it centres on 
concern not only retributivism but go right to the 
heart of ethics. Nevertheless, I shall endeavour to 
show schematically that the claims which I make in 
this section are open to substantiation.
To determine specific deserts we need first of all
to map out the 'projections’ of specific desert claims.
I have already noted that it is logically inappropriate
to weigh or measure deserts on an ordinary interval
scale. Qualities are not amenable to such treatment.
Nevertheless it is true that there is some sort of
scale discernible in our use of the term. At first
glance it might appear that this would be a simple
ordinal scale ('X deserves more/less than Z '). However,
this representation does not quite do justice to the
situation. For not only do we order deserts, but also
(partially) the intervals between them. To say that
McKenzie deserves five years imprisonment for armed
robbery rather than seven days, is not merely to say that
he deserves more than seven days, but also to give an
idea of how much more. But this cannot be expressed
as a precise mathematical relation. McKenzie's offence
365is not 5 x — —  times more serious than one deserving 
seven days imprisonment (or even some more sophisticated 
formula which gives a diminishing value to each day as 
the length of the sentence increases). The same point 
holds even when specific desert claims are made in 
conjunction with a simple ordinal scale such as 'First 
Prize, Second Prize, Third Prize, etc.'. In Art 
Competitions it not infrequently happens that no
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First Prize is awarded, because none of the entries is 
thought to merit it. In such cases, the best painting 
is probably given Second or even Third Prize.
This isn’t to say that people always or even often 
get their deserts in such Competitions. Once again it 
is easy to confuse desert and entitlement claims. We 
must not suppose that because a particular painting is 
given Second Prize, it deserves it. Suppose that 
Richardson entered the same Competition as Nolan. Nolan’s 
painting undoubtedly deserved the First Prize and 
Richardson’ s was next best, but is so much poorer than 
Nolan’s and so far below the standard we have come to 
expect in this particular Competition, that there is 
really no comparison. Clearly Richardson’s painting did 
not deserve the Second Prize, but provided that the 
rules of the Competition stated that the two best 
paintings should be given prizes, then his painting 
would have been entitled to it.^ The criteria of 
entitlement are not the criteria of desert.
The type of scaling which is reflected in our
specific desert claims is neither ordinal nor interval,
but something in between. It is what is usually referred
2to as an ’ordered metric scale’. This is a scale in
1
Consider the more frequent case of an athletic event 
in which there is only one entrant. So he gives a token 
performance to fulfil the conditions for winning the 
event and thus being entitled to the prize. But he does 
not therefore deserve it.
2
Cf. A. Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology
for Behavioral Science, San Francisco: Chandler
Publishing Co. , 1964, pp.194-5-
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which not only different objects are ordered but also 
the intervals between them. This scale allows us to 
rank wrongs in order of their seriousness - say, A, B,
C, D, E and F, where A is the least serious and F is 
the most serious. But more than this it caters for 
judgments of the sort: ’The difference between A and B
is greater than the difference between D and E, and 
the difference between A and C is greater than the 
difference between C) and F. ’ This type of scale 
accords with the way in which we commonly talk about 
different wrongs or offences. We compare shoplifting 
and loitering with rape and murder and argue that the 
difference in seriousness between the former two is 
not as great as the difference in seriousness between 
them and the latter two. It is on the basis of 
judgments such as these that we make our specific 
desert claims.
In the last seven or eight years advances in 
psychometrics have enabled the relations between 
qualities to be given a quantitative representation.'*'
All that is necessary for such a representation to be 
worked out is that it be possible to make judgments 
of proximity in relation to pairs of qualities. Thus, 
in order to give a quantitative representation of the 
relations between different wrongs or offences, we need 
only to be able to make a number of judgments like those 
above concerning shoplifting, etc.
T
See R.N. Shepard, ’The Analysis of Proximities: 
Multidimensional Scaling with an Unknown Distance 
Function’, Psychometrika, Vol.XXVII, 1962, pp.125-40, 
219-46; W.S. Torgerson, ’Multidimensional Scaling of 
Similarity’, P syc home trika, Vol.XXX, 1965» PP • 379-93«
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This is much more easily said than done. It is 
made even more difficult by the fact that a combination 
of such scales is required in making specific desert 
claims. Thus we shall need to know at least the 
following things: (a) criteria whereby wrongs can
be ordered in terms of their seriousness; (b) criteria 
adequate to ordering the intervals between different 
wrongs (these may or may not be the same as those 
appropriate to the initial ordering of wrongs);
(c) criteria which will enable us to order penalties 
or punishments in terms of their relative severity;
(d) criteria for ordering the intervals between 
different penalties or punishments; and (e) some 
formula whereby we can relate a wrong of a certain 
seriousness with an appropriate penalty.
These are all difficult (some would say impossible) 
demands, but ones which must be fulfilled if any 
reliance is to be placed on specific desert claims. 
Moreover, unless such demands can be fulfilled, we 
cannot complain of the injustice of certain punishments 
or seek to make them just, except in the sense of not 
punishing the innocent. Our problem, then, while of 
considerable theoretical difficulty, is of great 
practical importance. What follows, however, will 
have to be very sketchy and oversimplified.
Our first concern shall be with (a) - the criteria 
relevant to determining that one wrong is more serious 
and hence deserving of more punishment than another. 
Various criteria have been suggested as appropriate to 
such determinations. The three which I shall touch on 
here are (i) the public indignation or resentment
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produced by an offence, (ii) the amount of damage an 
offence causes, and (iii) the moral turpitude involved 
in committing a wrong. I shall argue that only the 
last of these is appropriate to the determination of 
the seriousness of wrongs and hence to the determination 
of specific deserts.
(i) In his discussion of punishment, Dürkheim 
recognizes the utilitarian considerations by which it 
is now commonly ’justified1 2. Nevertheless, he insists 
that in fact these aims are essentially alien to 
punishment, which ’consists in a passionate reaction 
of graduated intensity’.^  Others too have looked at 
punishment as the legitimate satisfaction of feelings 
of resentment. Thus Stephen writes that
the infliction of punishment by law gives 
definite expression and a solemn ratification 
and justification to the hatred which is 
excited by the commission of the offence, and 
which constitutes the moral or popular as 
distinguished from the conscientious sanction 
of that part of morality which is also 
sanctioned by the criminal law. The criminal 
law thus proceeds upon the principle that 
it is morally right to hate criminals, and 
it confirms and justifies that sentiment 
by inflicting upon criminals punishments 
which express it.^
1
E. Dürkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, trans. 
G. Simpson, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1933»
p. 90.
2
J.F. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law in 
England, London: Macmillan, 1883» Vol.II, p .81 .
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And again:
in cases which outrage the moral feelings of 
the community to a great degree, the feeling 
of indignation and desire for revenge which 
is excited in the minds of decent people is,
I think, deserving of legitimate satisfaction.
However, it is not difficult to see that the intensity 
of indignation which is felt toward an offence or 
offender is hardly an adequate measure of the seriousness 
of the wrong. Hence it is an inadequate measure of 
desert. The intensity of indignation which is felt 
toward an offender is too affected by considerations 
such as mood, temperament, political conditions, and 
the face of the offender, all of which are extraneous 
to the determination of desert.
Ewing recognizes these difficulties, and argues 
instead that the severity of punishment should be 
determined by the degree of moral condemnation which 
is felt towards a particular kind of crime. In this 
way we are absolved from the impossible task of 
determining guilt in each individual case. Ewing, 
however, does not link his view so much to desert as 
to moral education. His argument is 'By linking a
1
Vol.I, p.4 7 8 . Cf. J.S. Mill, An Examination of Sir 
William Hamilton's Philosophy, Second edn., London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1865» P-512; W.H. Lowrie, 'The 
Philosophy of Civil Punishment', Princeton Review,
N.S., Vol.XLIII, 1871, p .80; H. Rashdall, 'The Theory 
of Punishment', pp.22, 26; D.C. Hodges, 'Punishment',
Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, Vol.XVIII, 
1957-8, p .215; J. Feinberg, 'Justice and Personal 
Desert', in Nomos VI: Justice, ed. C.J. Friedrich
and J.W. Chapman, New York: Atherton Press, 1963» P*93*
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particular punishment with a particular kind of crime 
we bring home to people just how serious that crime is' 
rather than ’By linking a particular punishment with a 
particular kind of crime we are giving people what they 
deserve’ - though the latter never quite fades out of 
the scene. For Ewing, the admission of extenuating 
circumstances is justified by this aim of moral, 
education.^
However, Ewing’s view is not without its problems.
If his task of moral education is to be properly aided
by punishment, it will not be sufficient to determine
the severity of punishment by the degree of moral
condemnation which is felt towards a particular kind
of crime, for, as Ewing admits, 'some thefts are no
2doubt worse acts than some murders’. If justice is
to be done in such circumstances, the former ought to
be punished more severely than the latter. But this
is ruled out on Ewing’s account, since ’a murder ...
generally deserves more [disapproval] than a theft’
and therefore ought to be punished more severely. Yet
the just punishment of criminals is important to
Ewing's thesis, since he sees it as ’a presupposition
3of punishment doing its work effectively'. To some 
extent Ewing could escape the force of this objection 
by distinguishing between different kinds of murders 
and thefts - those murders which are more serious than
T
Ewing, op. cit., p.106.
2
Ibid.
3
Page 107.
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some kinds of theft, those which are less serious, 
etc. This, while it might serve to bring the punishments 
inflicted on crimes more in line with the moral, 
condemnation felt towards them, does so at the 
expense of the simplicity which was intended to 
recommend his view. Furthermore, since the disapproval 
which we naturally show to wrongdoing is not always 
appropriately or well-grounded, criteria would need to 
be adduced to distinguish well-grounded from ill- 
grounded indignation.^ And these criteria, surely, 
would need to be such as determine the moral turpitude 
involved in the offence - a task which Ewing considers 
impossible.
(ii) Montesquieu and others have argued that
punishment ought to be proportioned to criminal damage
(either to individuals or to society).1 2 3 One reason
they give for this is that men meaning to commit a
crime may thereby be induced to choose the least
3harmful way of pursuing their end. But another reason
1
For a starter on this, see G.E. Hughes, ’Moral 
Condemnation’, in Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed.
A.I. Melden, Seattle: University of Washington Press,
1958, pp.108-34. Hughes, however, endeavours only to 
supply criteria for distinguishing moral from non-moral 
indigna tion.
2
Baron de Montesquieu, Persian Letters; quoted in 
J. Heath, Eighteenth Century Penal Theory, Oxford 
University Press, 1963» PP*77-8.
3
Ibid. Sir James Stephen, on the other hand, maintained 
that ’it gratifies a natural public feeling to choose 
out for punishment the one who actually caused great 
harm', but not the equally guilty person who has had 
’the good fortune to do no harm’ (op. cit., Vol.III, 
P-311).
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which is sometimes given is that the damage done by
an offence provides an adequate criterion of the
punishment which it deserves - as seems to be the case
with so-called poetic justice. There may be public
advantages in a policy of this sort, but it fails to
provide a necessary or sufficient condition for the
adequate gradation of a person’s deserts. Were this
view to be taken seriously and exclusively, we would
be committed to punishing a person whose intended
criminal act resulted in unforeseeable bad consequences
as severely as one who intended to bring about those
bad consequences. For example, we would be required to
punish a person who, in holding up a shop assistant
with a toy gun, frightened her to death, as severely
as a person who intended to shoot the shop assistant
to protect his identity. Only in exceptional
circumstances (e.g. if the first person knew the shop
assistant had a weak heart) could the two wrongs be
said to be equally deserving.^ On the other hand, on
Montesquieu’s view, we would be committed to letting
off, or punishing only minimally, those who had
attempted but failed to commit criminal acts, while
punishing far more seriously their moral similars who
2had been ’fortunate’ enough to succeed.
T
Further difficulties arise in the case of group crimes, 
in which the proportioning of penalties to the damage 
caused seems quite inappropriate.
2
A further difficulty which this view faces when 
simply stated is that sometimes it is indistinguishable 
from compensation. See Hart, ’Intention and Punishment’, 
printed in Punishment and Responsibility, Oxford:
(footnotecontinued on p.286)
Ferri adopts a somewhat weaker method of 
determining punishments which obviates my last objection. 
He contends that
The State and its system of criminal justice 
can do no more than adopt such measures to 
defend the community against criminals as 
are reasonable in themselves, and 
proportionate to the danger threatened 
to society.
By taking the danger threatened rather than the harm
actually done to society as the criterion for
determining punishment, Ferri’s view has the advantage
of putting the successful and the unsuccessful criminal
on the same footing. However, as Ferri well recognizes,
even this criterion will not be sufficient to
determine specific deserts. It needs to be at least
supplemented by some criterion relating to the
2responsibility of the offender.
(footnote 2 continued from p.285)
Clarendon Press, 1968, pp.130-1. Some, however, would 
argue that punishment ought essentially to be reparation 
(D.C. Hodges, op. cit. , passim. ; S.II. Ranck, ’Punishment 
to Fit the Crime*, American Journal of Sociology, Vol.
VI, 1900-1, pp.695-706; G. del Vecchio, ’The Problem 
of Penal Justice: Imprisonment or Reparation of Damage’,
Revista Juridica de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, Vol.
27, 1957-8, pp • 65-8.1; Brissot, cited in J. Heath, op. cit., 
p.62; cf. H. Spencer, ’The Ethics of Punishment’,
Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and 
Criminology, Vol.I, I9IO-II, p .866).
1
E. Ferri, Criminal Responsibility, quoted in 
G. Gardiner, ’The Purposes of Criminal Punishment’,
Modern Law Review, Vol.21, 1958, p.119 (italics mine).
2
Ferri’s criterion becomes more relevant when we come 
to consider the proper limits of the state’s authority 
to punish.
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(iii) It should be fairly clear from my discussion 
in Chapter Three that criteria relevant to the 
determination of specific deserts will have to centre 
round the wrongdoer's moral turpitude or moral guilt.
It is just this which has often been said to be 
impossible to determine, and which has consequently 
been replaced by (i) and (ii) above. Yet determine 
moral turpitude we must if we are to assess the justice 
of punishments.
Putting it rather schematically and dogmatically, 
assessments of moral turpitude or guilt are hybrids 
of two further sorts of assessments: (l) those of the
responsibility of the wrongdoer for his deed; and (2) 
those of the nature of the deed committed or attempted 
by the wrongdoer. Often the separation of (l) and (2) 
is somewhat artificial, since a proper description of 
the nature of a particular wrong can include a reference 
to the nature of the wrongdoer's responsibility; e.g. 
as in manslaughter and wilful murder. Nevertheless, I 
shall consider each of these two factors separately, as 
I think this can be done with profit.
(l) In Chapter Six I discussed a number of criteria 
which are relevant to the determination of a person’s 
responsibility for his misdeeds. I indicated there 
that people could be held responsible in varying degrees 
for such acts, depending on our expectations of what 
they could and should undergo. Such factors as duress, 
drunkenness and provocation, for example, we generally
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recognize as diminishing a person’s responsibility for 
his ac t s.^
However, the task of assessing the degree of a 
person’s responsibility for his acts is no easy one.
In fact, many philosophers have regarded an accurate 
assessment as well nigh impossible. Ewing, for 
example, writes:
In the first place, in order to find the 
degree of wickedness involved in the 
commission of the offence, the offender’s 
exact state of mind at the time would have 
to be ascertained, and how that could be 
done even very roughtly, without intro­
spective knowledge of the criminal, I 
cannot see. But this introspective 
knowledge can only be possessed by one 
man, the criminal himself, and he would 
not be likely to tell the truth about it.
Even if he would, he could hardly do so 
to much effect. That a man cannot 
properly estimate even his own motives 
is a platitude, and a man about to 
commit a crime is not likely to be 
introspecting carefully at the moment.
In the second place not only his state of 
mind at the time of committing the offence, 
but also a great deal of his previous 
psychological development, would have to be 
ascertained in order to estimate the moral 
guilt even of the particular act by itself, 
for we must know how much or how little 
excuse he had, and this knowledge could only 
be acquired by examining a psychological
1
As well, in assessing a person’s guilt we need to take 
into account the motives with which he acts. A man’s 
motives may lead us to take a more lenient view of an 
otherwise bad act. However, good motives do not 
necessarily exonerate a person from blame for bad 
acts.
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process lasting over years. For instance, 
how far was the abnormal difficulty he had 
in resisting a particular kind of temptation 
congenital, and how far was it due to his 
having formerly yielded to that temptation 
when resistance would have been as easy as 
it is for the average man? How far was his 
mental outlook at the moment when he ^
committed the crime due to bad education?
This is hardly a fair criticism of the attempt to
assess a person’s responsibility for his wrong. Apart
from anything else, it demands from the retributivist
an exactitude which he does not need to claim for 
2himself. Provided that the offender can rationally 
consider the alternatives before him, and can make 
moral decisions with respect to them, there does not 
seem to be any necessity to make anything like the 
psychological investigation which Ewing insists must be 
made. As well, Ewing defeats his own purposes when 
insisting on the impossibility of determining the 
criminal’s state of mind at the time of the crime.
He insists that such knowledge can be obtained only 
by introspection. But then he goes on to argue that 
this is not sufficient, because we are often unable 
to estimate our own motives properly. This may well 
be true, but it can be asserted only if there are criteria 
for ascertaining a person’s motives independently of his
1
Ewing, op. cit., p.37* Cf. E. Ferri, ’The Reform of 
Penal Law in Italy’, Journal of the American Institute 
of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol.XII, 1921-2, p.182.
2
Although Ewing’s criticisms, if valid, would count 
equally against some utilitarian justifications of 
penalties.
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own introspection of them. And if this is the case, 
introspection is not necessary to their determination.
And this would seem to be the case. Often a man's 
motives can be correctly ascertained from the circumstances 
surrounding his acts, and sometimes the onus of proof 
to the contrary must lie with the man himself.
If all Ewing means is that the task of ascertaining 
a person’s moral guilt is too complex and difficult for 
the present machinery of the law to accomplish 
adequately, he is probably right. The law must be 
practicable, and at present its practicability involves 
it in stating in hard and fast terms what is not always 
hard and fast. Nevertheless, the necessity for the 
law to be practicable does not exempt the state from 
seeking practicable ways of determining moral guilt 
more adequately, and where punishment has been inflicted 
upon the innocent, and severe penalties have been imposed 
on the person with morally mitigating circumstances to 
plead, injustice has been done.
Xf we grant that the determination of responsibility 
is not rendered impossible by the sorts of difficulties 
which Ewing brings up, then we shall be in a position 
to make rational decisions concerning the degrees of 
responsibility of wrongdoers for their offences. We 
shall not, for example, expect a young child or an 
insane person to make responsible moral choices. We 
shall hold more responsible for a homicide a drunken 
person who knew that alcohol tended to make him violent 
than one who had previously shown no such tendencies.
We shall be more inclined to treat leniently a person
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who has come from a bad background than one who has 
always had the opportunity and encouragement to behave 
morally. These judgments of responsibility are 
relatively simple to make. In real life they are not 
quite as simple as this, for we often have to take 
account of several different factors in determining 
the responsibility of a single offender. And we need 
to have criteria to decide whether a bad family 
background has greater value as a mitigating factor 
than drunkenness. Furthermore, there is still 
considerable controversy about the criteria for 
responsibility, even in cases where we are fairly 
sure about our conclusions - e.g. psychopaths. I 
do not want to underestimate these and other 
difficulties in the determination of the degrees of 
responsibility of wrongdoers for their offences. For 
my purposes it is sufficient to show that these are 
questions which we can discuss rationally and to which 
we can give rational answers. The answers may be 
controversial, and it may be that we are not yet in a 
position to appreciate all the relevant factors 
involved, but we are nevertheless able to discuss 
these questions intelligibly.
(2) When we come to consider the criteria by 
which we determine, morally, the nature of the deed 
committed or attempted by the wrongdoer, we are again 
faced with considerable controversy. As often as not 
such controversy often reflects differences in basic 
moral standpoint, for the problem is one which forces 
us to take a stand on the fundamental questions of 
ethic s.
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There is, of course, a sense in which there is no 
general answer to questions like 'How serious a wrong 
is murder, theft, etc.?' and ’How much more serious is 
murder than theft?’, because their seriousness depends 
very largely on the context in which they are committed. 
Words such as ’murder’, ’theft’, ’assault’, etc., which 
belong primarily to the moral sphere of discourse, each 
encapsulate for us a great variety of empirically 
different situations which, although they bear certain 
moral similarities to each other, are by no means 
morally identical. To look for general answers to 
these questions, then, would be pointless. Nevertheless, 
we sometimes do make judgments of the sort, ’Murder is 
worse than theft’, and ’Rape is worse than lying’, and 
we mean something by them. It is the criteria for 
making such judgments which interests us here.
Benn suggests that
part of what we mean when we call an offence 
'relatively trivial’ is that we do not care 
so much about people committing that one as 
we do about others, and that in turn implies 
that we should be unwilling to inflict so 
much suffering to prevent it. Similarly, 
relatively serious crimes are those that are 
relatively intolerable; and to describe them 
in this way is to say that we feel justified 
in going to much greater lengths to prevent 
them. If this is so, the proposition ’Trivial 
crimes do not deserve severe penalties' is 
analytic, being necessarily the consequence 
of the way we use 'trivial' in this context.^
1
Benn and Peters, op. cit., p.190.
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Thus, to say that murder is worse than theft is to 
say that we are prepared to go to greater lengths to 
prevent it, and an ordered metric scale of different 
kinds of offences will be a scale showing the lengths 
to which we would be prepared to go to prevent such 
of f enc e s.
This account, however, will not do. For one thing, 
the most which Benn is entitled to conclude from his 
argument is that trivial crimes ought not to be given 
severe penalties. Our inability to justify going to 
great lengths to prevent them does not necessarily 
have anything to do with what they de serve. It is true 
that when we talk about ’trivial crimes’, ’minor 
offences’, and such like, we are often referring to those 
which, because of the little social harm they cause, 
we are not greatly concerned to prevent. But this is 
not equivalent to saying that, from a moral point of 
view, they are less objectionable than those which are 
referred to as ’serious crimes’ or ’major offences'.
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that racial 
snobbery, pride, fornication and meanness of spirit are 
in general morally no less objectionable than the 
failure to pay one’s radio and TV licence, the failure 
to report an accident, limited tax evasion, the use of 
offensive language in public, and vagrancy, yet we are 
prepared to go to some lengths to prevent the latter, 
whereas we generally take no action against the former 
- not in law, anyway. What Benn has done is to confuse 
the question of how much punishment wrongdoers deserve 
with the question of how much punishment a particular 
authority would be justified in inflicting for some wrong
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or offence. Benn's position is persuasive for two 
reasons. First, he confuses * Trivial crimes do not 
deserve severe penalties’ (with which, with the 
qualification to follow, I am inclined to agree) with 
•Trivial crimes ought not to be severely penalized to 
prevent them' (with which also with the qualification 
to follow, I am inclined to agree). Second, he trades 
on an ambiguity in the phrase 1 trivial crimes’ . As 
often as not, when we speak of a crime as trivial, 
we are thinking of its social repercussions rather than 
its moral gravity. It is the former which is relevant 
to the question of prevention and the latter which is 
relevant to desert, but Benn relies on the former to 
draw conclusions about the latter. The criteria we are 
looking for, then, will have to lie elsewhere.
There is one other direction in which we might look, 
and which I want to criticize, before I make some more 
positive suggestions. This is McCloskey’s view that 
judgments about the relative seriousness of various 
wrongs are basically intuitive. He writes: ’the issue
of the seriousness of the crime, like that of the
degree of goodness of an intrinsic good, impresses me
1as a matter of intuitive insight’.
1
H.J. McCloskey, ’Utilitarian and Retributive 
Punishment’, Journal of Philosophy, Vol.LXIY, 1967» 
p.105. Rashdall, however, reports that he finds in his 
mind ’no intuitions on the subject’ (The Theory of 
Good and Evil, Vol.I, p.289)»
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There probably is a sense in which many of these
judgments are matters of intuitive insight, but ft is
the sort of intuitive insight of which Butler speaks
when he writes that 'in all common ordinary cases we
see intuitively at first view what is our duty, what is
the honest part.... In these cases doubt and
deliberation is itself dishonesty.1 2^ What Butler means
is that just as simple multiplications and additions
have become so familiar to us that we do not have to
go through a process of reasoning to do them but
just 'see* the answers, so the perception of our duty
in most ordinary cases is not something which we must
work out afresh. The same may well apply to many of
our common comparative moral judgments. Deliberating
about them or requesting reasons for them may be a
2sign of what Butler calls an 'unfair mind'. Nevertheless 
we can uncover the rationale of our simple 
multiplications and additions, and, it would seem, if 
such are not to be subjective and arbitrary, it must 
be logically possible for such a rationale to be given. 
This becomes critical in the case of our moral 
reasoning, for here we are frequently confronted by 
situations which do not obviously conform to any one 
of our moral paradigms. In such cases it is necessary 
for us to explicate our paradigms before we can 
determine whether the situations under consideration
1
J. Butler, Sermon VII, in Works, ed. W.E. Gladstone, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896, Vol.II, p .132.
2
Page 133.
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can be assimilated to them.' In taking the view that 
grounds are inappropriately required of comparative 
moral judgments, McCloskey is effectively able to end 
any argument, but in so doing he encumbers himself with all 
the problems of ethical intuitionism.^  Apart from the 
fact that intuitionism removes from ethics the 
possibility of testing the adequacy or truth of 
comparative moral judgments, it leaves us helpless in 
a world of diverse and opposing moral values."
1
See the discussion in Chapter Four, pp.l4l-3-
2
See, for example, W.D. Hudson's recent study, Ethical 
Intuitionism, London: Macmillan, 1967*
3 A recent public opinion survey on the seriousness 
with which various offences were regarded produced the 
result that a majority placed rape before murder, and 
murder before theft. Only 259° of the respondents 
placed offences involving death at the head of the 
list (reported in Punishment, published for The Church 
Assembly Board for Social Responsibility, Westminster: 
Church Information Office, 1963» p.10). Rose and Prell
also report an investigation in which university 
students were asked to rank in seriousness thirteen 
different crimes as defined by California statutes - 
including bigamy, forgery, theft, assault with a 
deadly weapon, and attempted burglary. They rated as 
most deserving of punishment serious child-beating by 
a father. Of a group of Californian prisoners serving 
sentence, the actual average punishment meted out for 
this offence was less than for eleven of the other 
crimes, and the longest average sentence was for 
injuring electric or telephone lines, which the 
students rated twelfth in seriousness (’Does the 
Punishment Fit the Crime? A Study in Social Valuation', 
American Journal of Sociology, Vol.LXI, 1953-6, pp.247-59» 
reported in H. Weihofen, 'Retribution is Obsolete', 
in Nomos III: Responsibility, ed. C.J. Friedrich, New
York: Liberal Arts Press, 1963» p.119)• These particular
studies obviously have their limitations, but they are 
enough to indicate that intuitionism is an unhelpful 
solution to problems in this area.
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There does not seem to be any single criterion 
whereby kinds of action are denominated right or wrong 
and can be ranked according to their goodness or 
badness. Or, if there is such a criterion, it 
possesses no general recognition. What we have instead 
is a multiplicity of criteria of varying levels of 
generality to which we appeal as the occasion warrants. 
For example, the criteria to which we might appeal 
in justifying the statement 'Murder is worse than 
theft1 are likely to be different for the most part 
from those to which we appeal in justifying a 
statement like ’Rape is worse than lying’. Or, if the 
criteria coincide, it is likely to be at such a high 
level of generality, that there is no obvious or 
clear relationship between them and the statements 
they are intended to justify.'*' Furthermore, often, 
if not always,these criteria are themselves dependent 
on the prior acceptance of particular and competing 
moral standpoints. Whether there are any criteria 
which are neutral with respect to standpoint is a 
controversial matter, and is not likely to be settled 
until we are more clear as to the precise nature of 
moral discourse.
A.P. Griffiths, in a recent article, puts forward 
a transcendental argument to the effect that if there 
is to be a form of discourse which is ’practical, 
universal, objective, and autonomous’, then the following 
three principles must be accepted:
Cf. my discussion on p.l42 supra.
1
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One ought to treat similar cases 
similarly;
One ought in action to consider the 
interests of all rational beings;
One ought not to interfere, without 
specific justification, in the chosen 
course of any rational being or impose 
on any rational being conditions which 
will prevent him from pursuing his 
chosen courses of action.^
These principles are very general, and there is no 
straight line between them and the denomination of any 
particular kind of action as right or wrong, or the 
ranking of such kinds of action according to their 
goodness or badness. Further principles are needed 
to indicate what makes cases ’similar’, what the 
’interests’ of rational beings are, and what 
’interferences’ are allowable. It is also to be noted 
that these three principles depend on the prior 
acceptance of moral discourse as ’practical, universal, 
objective, and autonomous’. Whether all these 
characteristics are necessary to moral discourse is 
itself a matter of debate.
Nevertheless, Griffiths’ arguments are not 
implausible, and as I wish to use them only for 
heuristic purposes, it is not necessary that we discuss 
them in detail. Let us now consider how we might justify 
a statement like ’Murder is worse than theft’. First
[1]
[2] 
[3]
1
A.P. Griffiths, art. ’Ultimate Moral Principles:
Their Justification’, in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
ed. P. Edwards, New York: Macmillan and The Free
Press, 1967> Vol.8, pp.180-1.
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we would need to show the sorts of considerations which 
lead us to characterize some acts as ’murder’ and others 
as ’theft’. Using the above three principles as a 
background, we could point out that in both cases 
people who were similar in relevant respects would be 
treated differently, their interests would be ignored, 
and their chosen courses of action unjustifiably 
interfered with. Discussion here would centre round 
the identification of relevant similarities, interests, 
and justifiable interferences. Agreement on such 
issues is not easy to reach, but there is no reason 
why it should not be reached by rational discussion.
At the second stage of our justification we would need 
to show that at least some of our criteria for calling 
these kinds of action wrong could be scaled, thereby 
enabling a comparison to be made. This does not seem 
an unreasonable request. Murder involves the more 
radically different treatment of moral similars than 
theft (although, as it is, Griffiths’ first principle 
is only marginally relevant to the statement in question); 
we recognize some human interests as being more important 
and more basic than others, and murder involves the 
violation of a more basic human interest than theft; 
and the unjustified interference with a rational being’s 
course of action is irremediable and total in the 
case of murder, but not in that of theft.
Admittedly this account has been very sketchy, 
and it would take me too far out of my way to explore 
all the issues that are here raised. But if my argument 
appears to rest on too many unquestioned or even 
question-begging assumptions, it is, I think, partly
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because it is difficult to see what could be wrong 
with such assumptions - to know what they need 
justifying against.
We can sum up so far as follows. Assessments of 
moral turpitude are generally hybrids of two further 
sorts of assessments: (l) those of the responsibility
of the wrongdoer for his deed; and (2) those of the 
nature of the deed committed or attempted by the 
wrongdoer.'*' It is possible for us to adduce criteria 
which will enable us to make comparative judgments 
with respect to each of these assessments. Comparative 
assessments of moral turpitude will then involve 
comparing the deeds committed or attempted by the 
wrongdoer and modifying these comparative judgments 
(if necessary) by reference to his responsibility.
The criteria enabling us to make comparative moral 
judgments are not uncontroversial, but there is no 
reason to suggest that discussion of them should be 
anything but rational. Furthermore, these criteria 
make possible an ordered metric scale of moral 
turpitude or guilt, for they allow us to compare pairs 
of wrongs and also pairs of impediments in terms of 
their ’proximity’.
In making specific desert claims we need to be 
able not only to scale moral turpitude in an ordered 
metric fashion, but also, as I mentioned earlier, 
unpleasant treatment or penalties. This too seems a
T
Again I would emphasize the fact that the distinction 
between (l) and (2) is somewhat artificial.
301
possible task. in fact, were all punishments of the one
sort,the formation of an ordered metric scale would be
a relatively simple matter, being based on expressed
preferences for one amount of unpleasant treatment
rather than another. Here it would probably be found
that as the amount of punishment increased, each unit
of unpleasant treatment decreased in value. Judgments
of proximity would show the rate of diminution and
thus allow the formation of an ordered metric scale.
For example, taking one year's imprisonment as the
unit of unpleasant treatment, the following preferential
judgment might be made: ’It would be more unpleasant
to have a sentence increased from one year to two
years than for one to be increased from five years to
six years.’ If enough of these preferential judgments
are made, the techniques are available to scale the
penalties in an ordered metric fashion.'*' If, however,
a variety of penalties is administered (such as
imprisonment, fines, and corporal punishment),
complications set in, for we must first be able to
compare these in terms of their unpleasantness. As well,
especially in the case of fines, the unpleasantness of
the same penalty will vary considerably with different
people, or different types of people. A $20 fine
may mean almost nothing to a rich man, but be an almost
intolerable hardship for a poor man with a large family 
2to support. Nevertheless, these complications do not
T
See the references in f/n.l on p.279 supra.
Perhaps they ought to be graduated like income tax.
2
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render the formation of an ordered metric scale 
impossible, though they do point to the need to give 
discretionary powers to judges who are administering 
just ice .
There is one more problem on which we will comment 
in this section, namely, the provision of some formula 
whereby moral turpitude of a certain magnitude can be 
related to an appropriate penalty. It is not enough 
to say that the punishment which a person deserves is 
determined by his moral turpitude. We must also say 
how it determines it. We say that one deserves the 
other, but what sort of a relation is that?
It is sometimes said that there must be some 
proportion between the guilt of the offender and the 
punishment he receives, and that this is all there 
needs to be. But, as Bentham notes, the idea of 
proportion is 'more oracular than instructive’ .  ^ We 
need to know how this proportion is to be determined. 
Mundle, for example, interprets it simply as meaning 
that the greater a person’s guilt, the more severe 
a penalty he deserves:
In order to supply the principle of proportion, 
all that is necessary is that we should be 
able (a) to compare different offences in 
respect of their relative gravity, and (b) 
to compare different penalties in respect 
of their relative unpleasantness - and 
surely we can make such comparisons in 
many, if not all, cases.^
1
J. Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in Works, ed. J. 
Bowring, Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843» Vol.I, p.399*
2 C.W.K. Mundle, ’Punishment and Desert’, Philosophical 
Quarterly, V o 1.4, 1954, p.222.
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However, as simply stated as this, Mundle's view faces 
serious difficulties. For the following two 
possibilities are consistent with his thesis:^ Let us 
assume that we regard offensive language as the least 
serious of wrongs, and that one day's imprisonment is 
the lightest penalty that we can efficaciously inflict. 
Then, for the next more serious wrong we could give two 
days gaol, the next three days, and so on, concluding 
our catalogue of wrongs with 385 days gaol as punishment 
for a particularly offensive murder. This would be 
consistent with Mundle's view. So also would the 
following: Suppose that we take death as the
maximum penalty which we can humanely inflict, and 
that we keep this for particularly offensive murders.
Then we could award the next less serious wrong life 
imprisonment, the next twenty-five years imprisonment, 
and so on, finishing up with twenty-three years and 
348 days for offensive language. This, too, would 
display the sort of proportioning between moral 
turpitude and severity of punishment which is permitted 
by Mundle's view. Both of them immediately strike us 
as unsatisfactory and unjust. What is more, there is 
no way of choosing between them and between countless 
other possibilities as well.^ Even if a more sophisticated
1
For illustrative purposes I have presented these 
examples in a simplified legal context.
2
Compare Goldinger* s somewhat similar criticism in The 
Moral Justification of Punishment, Unpublished Ph.D* 
dissertation, Ohio State University, 1965» PP-45-7* Also,
H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and the Elimination of 
Responsibility, London: Athlone Press, 1962, p.7>
(footnote continued on p.304)
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scale than the simple ordinal scale implied in 
Mundle’s account is used, the difficulties are not 
overcome. The ordered metric scale which I have 
suggested is appropriate to the determination of 
specific deserts would be useful in arranging the 
intervals between the different penalties, but this 
could be done within the limits set by the two examples, 
and would not touch the major difficulty which I have 
pointed out. Simply having scales of turpitude and 
penalties is not enough; there must be ways of 
relating them as well.
Some writers, therefore, have spoken not merely 
of a proportion between the moral turpitude of an 
offender and the punishment he deserves, but of an 
equivalence between them. And there does seem to 
be some plausibility in this view when we consider the 
intimate logical connections between desert and justice.
But how is this equivalence to be conceived and 
determined? To many of the objectors to retributivism, 
the notion of such an equivalence is unintelligible. 
Maclagan, for example, writes:
The retributive principle is impossible of 
application unless in the act of retribution 
it is possible to secure an equivalence of 
guilt and punishment, and that is not the 
case. I do not mean by this simply that 
we are not in fact in a position to form a
(footnote 2 continued from p.303)
T. Stromberg, 'Some Reflections on the Concept of 
Punishment’, The oria, Vol.XXIII, 1957» P*77> J • Feinberg, 
’The Expressive Function of Punishment’, Monist, Vol.
XLIX, 1965, p.422.
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precise idea of equivalence of which we can 
none the less form an idea; nor even that we 
are not in fact in a position to form a 
precise idea of an equivalence that is none 
the less in principle possible. I mean 
that the very notion of such an equivalence 
is an impossible one. The two things that 
are to be measured against each other are 
in their very nature incommensurable.^
Maclagan does not make it very clear why he thinks that
the idea of an equivalence between moral guilt and
punishment is an impossible one. Practically all he
says in this regard is that ’those who think that the
difficulty is not one of principle but only of the
practical application of a principle are ... using as
the standard of measurement of the guilt the actual 
2thing done’. As well, he finds the idea of degrees 
of moral guilt a very puzzling (’though I certainly 
cannot say an obviously absurd’) one. His problem, then, 
seems to be not so much one of scaling moral guilt and 
punishments, but of scaling them in such a way that they 
can be compared. This is made a little more clear by 
Rashdall, who takes a similar line to Maclagan. 'How 
can moral guilt be expressed in terms of physical 
pain?', he asks. He answers: ’The idea of expressing
moral guilt in terms of cat or birch-rod, gallows or
1
W.G. Maclagan, 'Punishment and Retribution’, Philosophy, 
Vol.XIV, 1939» p.290; cf. A.C. Ewing, 'Punishment as a 
Moral Agency’, Mind, Vol.XXXVI, 1927» pp.301-2 ;
E.H. Sutherland and D.R. Cressey, Principles of 
Criminology, Sixth edn., New York: J.B. Lippincott &
Co., I960, P.599.
2
Ibid.
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pillory, hard-labour or penal servitude seems to be
essentially and intrinsically unmeaning. There is
absolutely no commensurability between the two things’
Rashdall prejudices the issue somewhat by expressing
the problem as one of weighing guilt against physical
pain; nevertheless, the point he appears to be making,
namely, the logical disparateness of the two scales,
is intelligible enough. As Ferri puts it: ’one cannot
determine an absolute criterion of proportion between
punishment and crime, because they are heterogeneous
2entities, not commensurable with one another’.
Not everyone has been convinced by this argument. 
Some have thought instead that the achievement of an 
equivalence between two such apparently incommensurable 
things was possible by an appeal to some version of the 
lex talionis: ’eye for eye, tooth for tooth, etc.’ By
this formula it is sometimes believed that an 
equivalence is made possible.
1
Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol.I, p.289.
2
E. Ferri, La giustizia nel secolo XX, Rome, 1912, 
p.29; quoted in G. del Vecchio, Justice, trans. Lady 
Guthrie and ed. A.H. Campbell, Edinburgh University 
Press, 1942, p.192. On the same page del Vecchio refers 
to a number of others who have made a similar point.
See also Moberly, 'Some Ambiguities in the Retributive 
Theory of Punishment’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Vol.XXV, 1924-5, pp.294ff.; T.C. Hall,
'The Significance of Coercion’, Hibbert Journal, Vol.
XI, 1912-13» p.832; Keedy, quoted in M. Privette, 
'Theories of Punishment’, University of Kansas City 
Law Review, Vol.XXIX, 1962, p.62.
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It is very difficult to find anyone who has
held this doctrine in the form in which it is usually
criticized. For, as can readily be seen, a literal
interpretation lands one in insiiperable difficulties:
what penalty would you inflict on a rapist, a blackmailer,
a multiple murderer, a dope peddler, a sodomite, a.
smuggler, or a toothless fiend who has knocked
somebody else's teeth out? Or, as Laird says even
more pointedly, ’What genuine equivalence is there
between an old eye and a young one, or between a short-
1sighted eye and an emmetropic one?’ The trouble with 
the lex talionis, taken literally, is that it reflects 
the impossible attempt to secure some mathematical or 
quasi-mathematical equivalence between moral guilt (or, 
more often, injury actually caused) and punishment.
Yet, as I said, it is doubtful whether proponents 
of the lex talionis have ever meant it to be taken quite 
literally. Certainly in the Old Testament, where it is 
possibly first enunciated,^ it was not understood in 
a literalistic fashion, but rather as a simple demand 
for equity or as a limiting principle in the 
distribution of punishment; for the principle is
1
J. Laird, ’The Justification of Punishment', Monist, 
Vol.XLI, 1931» PP•359-60. Solovyof writes that the 
arguments supporting the principle of exact retribution 
’are so feeble that no doubt they will be an object 
of astonishment and ridicule to posterity' (op. cit., 
p.307); cf. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, Fifth edn., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1773»
Book IV, Chapter 1, §3*
2
Exodus 21:23-3*
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immediately exemplified in these terms: 'When a
man strikes the eye of his slave, male or female, 
and destroys it, he shall let the slave go free for the 
eye's sake. If he knocks out the tooth of his slave, 
male or female, he shall let the slave go free for 
the tooth's sake'
Of those who have appealed to the lex talionis, 
Kant comes closest to holding it in a literal form. 
According to him, 'RETALIATION (jus talionis)... is 
the only principle which ... can definitely assign
2both the quantity and the quality of a just penalty.'
Thus he sees the lex talionis as determining both
the quantity and the quality of punishment. It is not
surprising then that he insists that the 'sentence
pronounced over all criminals [be] proportionate to
3their internal wickedness’, and that 'the state of 
mind of the Agent or Doer of the deed makes a4difference in imputing its consequences’ . What is
1
Exodus 21:26-7* A somewhat similar, more literally 
understood, principle can be found earlier in the Code 
of Hammurabi (c. 2100 B.C.).
2
Kant, Philosophy of Law, trans. W. Hastie, Edinburgh: 
T. and T. Clark, 1887» p.196. Ewing too willingly takes 
Kant at face value here, and presents this passage as 
expressing Kant's whole doctrine (The Morality of 
Punishment, p .16) . E.L. Pincoffs draws a distinction 
between jus talionis and lex talionis, but it does not 
affect our argument at a l l ( The Justification of Legal 
Punishment, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell 
University, 1957» PP•3^» 13l)*
3
Philosophy of Law, p.198.
4
Page 39.
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surprising is that he still clings to the principle of
’Like for Like'. This is especially so when we
consider the other significant qualifications he
makes to the principle. First, he recognizes that
'the application may not in all cases be possible
according to the letter', though 'as regards the effect
it may always be attained in practice'.^  Second,
although Kant considers death to be the only appropriate
2penalty for murder, he makes a number of exceptions 
to it; for example, when a great number of the
Qpopulation are accomplices to murder (as in a rebellion), 
in the case of maternal infanticide, and for killing4a fellow-soldier in a duel. Third, in special cases,
such as rape, paederasty, and bestiality, in which
there can be no external likeness between the offence
and the punishment, Kant appeals to a variation of
the lex talionis: Per quod quis peccat per idem
punitur et idem. The rapist and the paederast are to
be castrated, and the sodomite to be banished from human
5society. It is clear that Kant has so qualified the 
lex talionis that it completely loses the definiteness 
and simplicity which is its peculiar attraction.
1
2
3
4
3
Page 197* 
Page 198. 
Pages 200-1. 
Pages 202-4. 
Pages 243-4 .
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Hegel, who in many respects agrees with Kant, is
far more convinced of the fruitlessness of appealing to
the lex talionis as it stands. In fact, he refers to
it as an absurdity."*' Punishment, on his view, is the
annulment of crime, which is ’retribution in so far as
(a) retribution in conception is an "injury of the
injury", and (b) since as existent a crime is something
determinate in its scope both qualitatively and
quantitatively, its negation as existent is similarly 
2determinate.’ Punishment, then, involves some sort
of equality. However, ’the two injuries are equal only
in respect of their implicit character, i.e. in respect
3of their "value".’ Equality is to be found only in 
the internal form of the crime and the punishment. In 
respect of their external form,
there is a plain inequality between theft and 
robbery on the one hand, and fines, 
imprisonment, &c., on the other. In respect 
of their ’value’, however, i.e. in respect 
of their universal property of being injuries, 
they are comparable.... It is a matter for 
the Understanding to look for something 
approximately equal to their ’value’ in this 
sense.^
Like Kant, Hegel too has a quasi-mathematical conception 
of equality in the back of his mind, and this leads him
1
2
3
4
Hegel, op. cit.,
§101, p .71
Ibid.
§101, pp.72-3.
§101, p.72.
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to the strange position I noted earlier in which reason 
is unable to determine this equality with exactitude, 
even though the slightest inequality leads to injustice. 
Equality, he thinks, is an ideal to which we can only 
approximate in the sphere of externality:
in the field of the finite absolute 
determinacy remains only a demand, a 
demand which the Understanding has to 
meet by continually increasing 
delimitation - a fact of the greatest 
importance - but which continues ad 
infiniturn and which allows only of  ^
perennially approximate satisfaction.'
We can see, then, that neither Kant nor Hegel 
succeed in breaking away from a quasi-mathematical 
conception of the ’equality’ or ’equivalence’ of moral 
guilt and punishment, despite their recognition of the 
fact that they are dealing with qualities. Their 
inability to break away is partly due to the 
metaphysical nature of their theories of crime and 
punishment, in which crime, in some mysterious sense, 
carries its punishment within itself.
In suggesting an alternative which I believe to 
be more satisfactory, I want to return again to Mundle's 
suggestion that all that is needed is that punishment 
and moral gravity be paired off according to their 
placings in their respective scales. I can agree with 
his view that we can and do scale both moral gravity 
or turpitude and penalties or punishments in order of 
their seriousness or severity. Where Mundle’s view
1
§101, p.72.
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lalls down is in its failure to propose a means of 
fixing one scale to the other. It seems to me that 
the fixing of one scale to the other is basically a 
simple matter. Our human condition places certain 
limits, upper and lower, on both the wrongs we can 
commit and the punishments we can inflict.’*' There is 
a limit to the depths which human depravity can reach, 
as there is also a point beyond which we do not speak 
of behaviour as morally wrong. So too, there is a limit 
to the severity of the punishment which can be humanely 
inflicted upon a wrongdoer, as there is also a point 
beyond which we do not speak of treatment as punishment. 
Very roughly, a mild censure and a pang of bitterness 
would come close to the bottom of the scales of 
punishment and moral gravity respectively, and death 
and murder would come close to the top. In relating 
punishments to offences, we simply reserve the mildest 
punishment we can give for the least serious wrong which 
can be committed, the most severe punishment we can 
humanely give for the most wicked deed which can be 
committed, and scale other wrongs and punishments in 
between in an ordered metric fashion. On this view, 
moral guilt and punishment can and ought to be equivalent 
in the sense that they possess the same relative position 
on their respective scales.
1
Though as we know the atrocities of war-time may 
lead us to revise our ideas about human depravity 
and the severity of punishments which can be acceptably 
inflicted.
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There will, of course, be some disagreements about 
the identity of the most and the least serious wrongs, 
just as there will be disagreements about the lightest 
treatment which can figure as punishment and the most 
extreme unpleasant treatment which can be humanely 
inflicted on a person. But by and large these 
disagreements occur within a relatively small area.
Even where they are substantial they are amenable to 
rational discussion. Some people find the death penalty 
morally unacceptable, and for these, the maximum amount 
of unpleasant treatment which could be justifiably 
inflicted on a person would probably be life imprisonment. 
Even those who enjoin the death penalty recognize that 
it cannot legitimately include the cruel and inhumane 
treatment involved in torture. Thus Kant insists that 
the murderer's 'death ... must be kept free from all 
maltreatment that would make the humanity suffering 
in his Person loathsome or abominable'.^
To conclude this section, I want to make a few 
observations on a utilitarian account of penalty­
fixing. Beim considers the equivalence sought by 
retributivists as impossible of achievement. This is 
partly because he mistakenly conceives this equivalence 
in a quasi-mathematical way. The retributivist view,
1
Kant, Philosophy of Law, p.198; cf. G. Vlastos, 'Justice 
and Equality', in Social Justice, ed. R.B. Brandt, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962, pp.47-8;
S.S. Schmucker, 'Capital Punishment', American Biblical 
Repository, Vol.X, 1837» P*77> S. Gendin, op. cit., 
p.222. But see M. Charlesworth, 'Capital Punishment:
The Moral Issues', in The Penalty is Death, ed. B. Jones, 
Melbourne: Sun Books, 1968, pp.18-19*
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he thinks, involves the attempt to make a quantitative 
comparison of the harm done to the community with that 
done to the criminal.^ His own view, however, simply 
involves the expression of a preference, a preference, say, 
between a certain degree of harm to the community plus 
a certain amount of suffering to a roughly ascertainable 
number of offenders, and a smaller amount of harm to 
the community, but a greater amount of suffering to 
fewer offenders. Presumably Beim thinks that reasons 
could be given for preferring one course of action 
over the other. To do this he would need first to compare 
the harm done to the community with the suffering caused 
to offenders. Do the two sufferings have the same 
value? On what basis can they be compared? Presumably 
they could be compared by relating them to a schedule of 
human interests. But even when such a comparison has 
been made, we do not have enough for a rationally based 
preference of one course of action over another. We 
would still need to determine how much more important 
one interest was than another. I think it would be 
possible to make these comparisons. The point I want 
to bring out, however, is that Benn's additions are no 
easier to make than the retributivist's comparisons. In 
fact, up to a point, precisely the same sorts of 
determinations have to be made.
1
Benn and Peters, op. cit., pp.187-9« Benn’s account 
of retributivism is hardly adequate, Cf, also R.S. 
Peters, Ethics and Education, London: Allen and
Unwin, 1966, p.2 7 7 .
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I have tried to show then, that the task of 
determining a persons deserts, even though fraught 
with difficulties, is not an absurd, much less an 
impossible one. Not only so, but the difficulties it faces 
are shared also by some of the more acceptable 
utilitarian approaches.
It must be remembered, however, that what I have 
been concerned with in this section has not been so much 
with how a particular authority ought to go about 
determining the severity of the punishments which it 
awards, but simply with the determination of how much 
punishment a person might be said to deserve. Whether 
people ought to be given their deserts by a particular 
authority is a further question to be considered.
When an authority considers the principles by which 
it ought to determine the penalties it is justified in 
awarding for different kinds of deserving actions, it 
must take into account not only the deserts of the 
offenders but also the morally permissible advantages 
which will accrue from the prescription of such-and-such 
a penalty for their offences. The state can serve as 
our example. In fixing maximum penalties for different 
kinds of offences, the state will properly take into 
account the importance of law for the preservation of 
social order and well-being, and so it should take into 
account as a prime consideration the scaling of penalties 
according to deserts. For if the law becomes an 
instrument of injustice it is likely to lose the respect 
and obedience which is fundamental to its own 
justification.
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Sometimes, however, the state is not justified in 
punishing offences to the extent to which they deserve. 
Apart from the cases of wrongs in which no public harm^ 
is produced, we have a good example in the punishment 
of attempted crimes. On my view, a person intending to 
and succeeding in murdering someone else is no worse 
morally than a person who is similarly-minded but who 
fails to achieve his goal. Ceteris paribus such people 
deserve to suffer punishment of similar severity. This, 
however, does not reflect what we often regard as an 
acceptable feature of our legal system, viz. that 
attempts are generally punished less severely than 
successful crimes. Admittedly there is nothing 
sacrosanct about the law as we have it, and in fact 
Section 2 of the French Code Penal fixes the same 
kind and measure of punishment both for an attempt 
and for a completed crime.^ In practice, however, this 
is usually ignored, and attempted crimes are punished 
less severely than successful ones.
While it is possible, I think, to envisage social 
situations in which attempted crimes ought to attract as 
much punishment as successful ones, it is also possible 
to provide a rationale for our present practice of 
punishing attempts less severely.
T
The notion of ’public harm’ is of course, very tricky. 
See H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality, Oxford 
University Press, 1963*
2
See A.D. Margolin, ’The Element of Vengeance in 
Punishment’, Journal of the American Institute of Criminal 
Law and Criminology, Vol.XXIV, 1933-^> p .763•
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Broadly conceived, the authority of the state to 
punish is taken to be grounded on the conduciveness of 
punishment to the fulfilment of the state’s task of 
preserving and promoting social harmony, well-being 
and good. This is most successfully accomplished when 
the state punishes people according to their deserts, 
for the law is respected as just, and obedience to it 
tends to be morally based rather than externally imposed. 
However, the law’s concern, basically, is not so much 
with morality as with the social aspect of human 
behaviour. As long as human behaviour is socially 
acceptable the law is not particularly concerned with 
the question of motives. Its interest in the motivation 
of human behaviour is aroused only when that behaviour 
is or threatens to be socially harmful. Where a person 
has attempted but failed to commit a crime the state is 
justified in taking steps to discourage such acts 
because of their potential danger to social well-being.
However, an important feature of most attempted 
crimes (a feature which tends to distinguish them from 
successful crimes) is the fact that punishing them less 
severely than they deserve does not weaken their 
deterrent value, since ’the criminal who embarks on a 
crime contemplates success and will not be less deterred 
if he knows that the punishment in the event of failure 
will be less than if he s u c c e e d s . A n d  since the
1
H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honore, Causation in the Law, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1939? P*333* In a footnote on the same 
page they report Wechsler and Michael’s concession that 
’whenever (as in treason and some homicides) the probability 
of conviction is greater in the event of failure than in the 
event of success the threat of an equally severe penalty 
for attempts may increase the deterrent efficacy of the law.’
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state's authority to punish is related to its ability 
to deter socially harmful behaviour, there are grounds 
for treating attempted crimes more leniently than 
successful ones. Of course, if a person who attempts 
but fails to commit a particular crime is punished 
as severely as a person who succeeds, then he has no 
grounds for complaint - he cannot complain that his 
punishment was undeserved.'*' It is significant to note 
that in cases where an authority is justified in giving 
a person less punishment than he deserves, we do not 
speak of it as unjust, though it is clearly not just 
either. We speak of injustice only when the authority 
can be given no good reason for awarding less punishment 
than the offender deserves. This again serves to 
corroborate our discussion in Chapter Five about the 
indefeasibility or completeness of the notion of justice.
I cannot claim in this Chapter to have dealt 
adequately with a fraction of the issues which have been 
raised, for a discussion of specific desert claims is 
like a stone dropped in the pond of ethics, whose 
ripples reach its farthest periphery. Nevertheless, I 
hope that there has been some achievement, even if it 
has been the limited one of showing that positions generally 
regarded as absurd are in fact intelligible and 
amenable to rational consideration. And, indeed, this is 
what one would expect to find, for the determination of 
specific deserts forms a significant part of our day-to-day 
evaluative behaviour.
For a somewhat different account which, however, is not 
inconsistent with my own, see G. Dwork.in and D. 
Blumenfeld, ’Punishment for Intentions’, Mind, Vol.LXXV, 1966, pp.396-404.
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